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Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors,
sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary
experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Mid-
dle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In
antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions
for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a partisan in this debate, but his
position is poorly understood. This dissertation examines how Aristotle’s perceptual psychol-
ogy responds to ancient challenges to the naïve conception, and so articulates his defense of
perceptual knowledge.
Aristotle’s defense relies on an ontology of “perceptual qualities”—a core class of perceptible
properties—according to which those qualities, despite having a perceiver-independent essence
rooted in the physics of causation and affection, nevertheless can be present in experience as
they essentially are. Chapter 1 defends this realist and objectivist reading against competing
interpretations, which overlook a crucial distinction betweenperceptual qualities andperceptual
objects. Chapter 2 presents Aristotle’s ontology as a physicalism that uncharacteristically allows
for perceptual qualities to appear in experience as they essentially are.
This ontology informs Aristotle’s account of the psychological conditions under which per-
ceivers actually are presented with the essence of perceptual qualities. The locus of this account
ii
is an obscure passage where Aristotle purports to show that the senses “discriminate” perceptual
qualities because the senses are “mean states” (An. 2.11, 424a5–7). Chapter 3 develops a compre-
hensive interpretation of the sensory mean state, which Chapter 4 uses to elucidate Aristotle’s
argument for sensory discrimination. Sensory discrimination turns out to be a process in which
the essence of a perceptual quality comes to be present in the affection it produces in a perceiver.
For Aristotle, this shows that sense perception meets a condition for knowledge that his prede-
cessors, including Plato, thought it could not meet. For in his view, but not in theirs, sense
experience shares in both the truth and the essence of the qualities it perceives.
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Introduction
What would it be for sense perception to be a kind of knowledge? One approach to answering
this question looks to the character of ordinary sense experience. When we perceive an object,
we seem to be presented directly with certain of its properties. In vision we seem to be presented
with its color, shape, size, movements, and perhaps other features; in hearing we seem to be pre-
sented with the sounds it makes, perhaps along with its location and other attributes.1 One way
for sense perception to be a kind of knowledge would be for this naïve conception of our sense
experience to be partially vindicated. It would be for the colors, sounds, and other properties
that seem directly presented to us in experience to be as they standardly appear, for there to be
nothing to what these properties are that is not evident in standard experiences as of them. We
would thereby have knowledge of these properties because, in a well-known metaphor, their
essential natures would be fully revealed in the experience of them.2
Whether sense perception is a kind of knowledge for those who take this view depends on
whether perceptible properties really are how they standardly appear in sense experience. Col-
ors, for instance, look a certain way in visual experience. Consider an opaque body observed
in daylight—a ripe banana, say. The yellow of its surface looks to be qualitative through-and-
1For instance, we may also be presented in hearing with the meaning of linguistic utterances. In general, how-
ever, it is difficult to identify constraints on the types of properties we perceive, and the boundaries are quite possibly
vague. Fortunately, my discussion will focus on what we may call “core cases” of perceptible properties—namely
colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and tangible properties such as temperatures and moistures, which for Aristotle
have a well-defined priority over other perceptible properties in relation to the special senses—so I shall put this
question to one side. For a detailed discussion centered on the case of vision and defense of a rather permissive
conception of the properties represented in perceptual experience, see Siegel 2011.
2Themetaphor is due to Johnston 1992. Other metaphors employed in these discussions have it that such prop-
erties are “laid bare” (Johnston 1992), “displayed” (Hardin 1993, e.g. at 66), “disclosed” (Campbell 2005), or “made
transparent” (Campbell 2005, cf. Campbell 1997) in the experience of them.
x
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through, not the excitation of a disposition to appear a certain way or a configuration of the ba-
nana’s micro-physical properties; moreover, it appears constant across different circumstances
of viewing, not (as the appearance of a hologram superimposed over a driver’s license) as an
ephemeral feature shifting with our perspective; and it appears to be spread out over the banana
itself, not (as an after-image) the occupant of a private visual field. Clearly, the essential nature
of such a color is fully revealed in visual experience only if it really is the constant, qualitative
attribute it appears to be. And what goes for color goes mutatis mutandis for other perceptible
properties of the banana, for instance its size, shape, taste, and texture. The possibility of this
sort of perceptual knowledge for any range of properties is principally a question of the ontol-
ogy of those properties, of whether their essential nature is as it is presented to the subject in
experience. So whereas theorists who the claim that certain properties are knowable in this way
must commit themselves to an ontology on which how those properties essentially are is how
they standardly appear in experience, their opponents are committed to showing that how those
properties essentially are is not exhausted by how they appear in experience.
This dialectical scheme is familiar from recent philosophical discussions of color.3 But it
has its deepest roots in an ancient debate over the epistemic value of perception, a debate that
centered on the question whether perceptual experience is a means by which the soul appre-
hends the being and essence—the οὐσία or τί ἐστι—of the perceptible qualities we experience
things as having. Aristotle was an early partisan to this debate. Against theorists whom he took
to deny that perceiving subjects are presented with the essence of a perceived quality—whether
because the being and essence of the quality is not exhausted by how it is presented in experi-
ence or because it lacks being altogether—Aristotle defended an ontology according to which
colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and tangible qualities like warmth and moisture are in their very
nature identical to what the subject encounters in the experience of them. And against theo-
rists whom he took to deny that perception alone is enough to grasp the being and essence of
3I have alreadymentioned a few of themajor contributions to this literature, namely Campbell 1997, 2005, John-
ston 1992. Others I’ll have occasion to mention in this introduction include Allen 2011, Boghossian and Velleman
1989, Broackes 1992/1997, Gert 2008, McLaughlin 2003.
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the qualities presented in sense experience, he argued that even the most basic modes of sense
perception are states in which the being and essence of these qualities can be fully present to the
perceiver. Aristotle’s theory of basic sensory cognition—the psychophysical process whereby
a perceiver becomes cognitively related to a quality uniquely accessible to a sense—is in many
respects a response to arguments he took to threaten this naïve conception of sense experience
a state in which the perceiver is presented with the essential nature of perceived qualities. Yet
crucial details of his response have not been understood by modern interpreters.
This dissertation articulates the defense of this naïve conception of sense experience em-
bodied in Aristotle’s theory of basic sensory cognition. Aristotle’s defense may helpfully be
interpreted in light of the dialectical scheme sketched above. My goal in this introduction is to
lay out the general contours of Aristotle’s defense in terms of this dialectical scheme. I’ll be-
gin by isolating a certain view of sense experience that is alive in contemporary philosophical
discussions of color, what I’ll call “Weak Revelationism”. I’ll argue that this view expresses a
conception of how experience manifests the essential nature of perceptible properties that is
both credible in itself and moreover captures what Aristotle takes to be at stake in the ancient
debate. In particular, I’ll argue that the teleological aspects of Aristotle’s perceptual psychology
reflect his commit to theWeak Revelationist view of sense experience, and that his commitment
to this view shapes his appraisal of rival theories of perceptual qualities.
Let me emphasize at the outset that the claims I make about the arguments of Aristotle’s
opponents are in the service of interpreting Aristotle’s reception of their views. For all I’ll have
said, it may turn out that what I present as the arguments of these figures is inaccurate as inter-
pretations of their historical views; all the same, there are good reasons to believe that they are
nevertheless Aristotle’s interpretations, and establishing this claim will be my primary concern.
Weak Revelationism
Weak Revelationism is characterized by the claim that subjects are acquainted in sense expe-
rience with the essential nature of a certain range of perceptible properties. For the purposes
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of Weak Revelationism, a subject is acquainted with the essence of a perceptible property if,
but perhaps not only if, it is presented to her directly, and not by means of some limited mode
of presentation. So understood, Weak Revelationism expresses a version of a thesis that since
Johnston (1992) has been discussed as an intuitive desideratum for a theory of color, what we
can call the ‘revelation thesis’. According to Johnston, a maximally satisfactory theory of color
will (as far as possible) support the thought that a standard experience as of a color, canary yel-
low for instance, fully reveals its “intrinsic nature”—or, as I prefer to say, the essence or essential
nature⁴:
Revelation. The intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual ex-
perience as of a canary yellow thing. (Johnston 1992, 223)
The version of the revelation thesis expressed by Weak Revelationism is weak compared to a
version that has been widely discussed in the philosophical literature on color. This view, which
I’ll call Strong Revelationism, is characterized by the claim that sense experience gives us knowl-
edge of facts about the essential nature of a certain range of perceptible properties. The intuitive
appeal ofWeak Revelationism comes into sharp relief against the background of this far stronger
version, so I’ll begin by briefly rehearsing the arguments against it.
The formulation of Strong Revelationism that has beenmost discussed in the literature treats
the revelation thesis as identical to the following biconditional:
p is in the nature of the colors iff, after careful reflection on color experience, it seems to be
in the nature of the colors that p.⁵
⁴Cf. Gert 2008, 142n29. ‘Intrinsic nature’ is inapt in a formulation of the revelation thesis, at least insofar as we
want to include facts like canary yellow is more similar to scarlet than to sky blue among what is revealed in sense
experience, and insofar as the “intrinsic” nature of a color contrasts with its “extrinsic” nature. In opting for talk
of essences and essential natures I do not presuppose any particular notion of essence. As I intend it, the essential
nature of a property iswhat it is to be that property, where what it is to be that property includes, minimally, all that
must be mentioned in the canonical definition of that property.
⁵Byrne and Hilbert 2007, cf. Byrne 2001. On this version of the revelation thesis, the same biconditional ap-
plies mutatis mutandis to other naturally related sets of perceptible properties. As Byrne and Hilbert note, “in the
philosophy of perception, for the most part color just plays the role of an especially colorful example. The consid-
erations that favor a particular view about color would be expected, mutatis mutandis, to apply to other perceptible
properties such as sounds and tastes” (2007, 81). That is, while it may turn out that the ontological facts differ for
different sets of naturally related properties (colors and sounds, say), considerations supporting a view of one set
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Both directions of the biconditional have significant consequences. Look first at its left-to-right
direction. It states that, if it is in the nature of the colors that p, then it seems on the basis
of color experience that it is in the nature of the colors that p. This conditional has the striking
consequence that scientific investigation can tell us nothing about the nature of the colors thatwe
were not already in a position to know through careful reflection on color experience.⁶ Striking
as it may be, however, this consequence is not obviously implausible. Perhaps it is the case that
what we know about the nature of the colors can only be gleaned from our experience of them;
perhaps we mistake for scientific inquiry into color the investigation of the causal conditions for
color experience.⁷
The farmore objectionable consequences of the biconditional follow from its right-to-left di-
rection. In this direction, the bicondional states that color experience is an infallible guide to the
nature of the colors, for if careful reflection on color experience suggests that p is in the nature
of the colors, then it is in the nature of the colors that p. Though it has been suggested that this
direction of the biconditional enjoys wide acceptance,⁸ the contentious history of scientific and
philosophical theorizing about color and color experience seems to me to tell decisively against
it.⁹ Take, for instance, the proposition that green is a “compound” hue, its shades appearing to
various degrees both yellowish and blueish. Plausibly, if green is a phenomenal “compound” of
yellow and blue, then it is in the nature of the colors that it is. Yet whether green is a compound
or elemental hue—and indeed whether there exists a element-compound distinction among the
of perceptible properties should, to the extent that they apply, support the same view of another set of perceptible
properties. As we’ll see in ch. 2, Aristotle has a general ontological framework for articulating the nature of per-
ceptual qualities, so in his view the considerations that support a view of one range of perceptual qualitiesmust be
taken to support the same view of the others.
⁶See e.g. McLaughlin 2003, 98: “Revelation entails that there is nothingmore that we can learn about the nature
of our old acquaintances [sc. the colors] than what visual experience teaches us. While scientific investigation can
uncover the underlying causal conditions for seeing such things as the redness of a ripe tomato, . . . such investiga-
tion will reveal nothing about the nature of these colour qualities themselves”.
⁷Cf. Broackes 1992/1997, 214–215. Compare with McLaughlin’s remarks in the previous footnote the following
remarks from Locke: “These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to
perceive, and know the Idea of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be,
and how ranged in the Superficies, to make any Object appear White or Black” (Essay II. VIII. 2).
⁸See Byrne and Hilbert 2007, 79.
⁹Cf. Allen 2011, who deploys a similar argument against the left-to-right direction of the biconditional.
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hues—has been a subject of controversy.1⁰ Now, it is a consequence of this direction of the bi-
conditional that if it is not in the nature of the colors that (say) green is a phenomenal compound
of blue and yellow, then green does not seem after careful reflection on color experience to be
a compound of blue and yellow. The problem of course is that, to a number of color theorists,
green has seemed to be a compound of blue and yellow, and to be so in its nature. Assuming that
there is a fact of the matter about whether green is a compound or elemental hue, and assuming
that disagreement on this question is not a suitable basis for positing massive discrepancies in
the phenomenal character of human visual experiences as of green, then we seem to be left with
the conclusion that theorists to whom green seems to be a compound hue have simply failed to
reflect carefully on their color experience. We are led to the same conclusion regarding other
controversial theses about the nature of the colors. It is surely in the nature of the colors whether
they are mind-dependent, or whether they are (or are sometimes) causes of experiences as of
them; and we know that both sides of these questions have been vigorously defended over the
history of philosophy. According to this direction of the biconditional, if it should turn out (for
instance) that it is in the nature of the colors to be causally efficacious, then they will not seem to
be inefficacious after careful reflection on color experience. Again the problem is that reflection
on color experience has made it seem to some theorists that the colors are inefficacious;11 and
again we are left to conclude that one party to the debate has failed to reflect carefully on their
own color experience.
If such diagnoses of controversies over the nature of the colors appear inadequate or un-
charitable, it is because Strong Revelationism commits us to the wrong conception of how the
essential nature of the colors are “revealed” in color experience. It just doesn’t seem plausible
that, if you and I disagree over whether the colors are causally efficacious, or over whether green
is phenomenally compound, it must be because one of us has failed to acknowledge some as-
pect of her color experience. So whether or not some version of the revelation thesis is true, the
1⁰For detailed discussion see Allen 2011, 164–167.
11Apparently including Berkeley; see Allen 2011, 160.
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intuitive appeal that has led Johnston and others to treat it as a desideratum for a theory of color
cannot lie with the idea that experience is sufficient (or even necessary) to give us knowledge of
facts about the nature of the colors.
We get closer to what is intuitively appealing about the revelation thesis if we consider what
color experience seems uncontroversially to give us, namely mastery of the color vocabulary.12
Competence with color terms might imply the appreciation of a large body of facts about the
colors, for instance facts about the higher-order similarity and difference relations that struc-
ture the familiar color solid. If so, then appreciation of these facts would plausibly ground the
disposition of speakers possessed of color vision and a mastery of the color vocabulary to assent
to a sentence like ‘canary yellow is more similar to scarlet than to sky blue’, but not to a sentence
like ‘canary yellow is a shade of blue’. Yet competence with color terms need not consist in the
grasp of these facts. For not only is explicit knowledge of these facts unnecessary for mastery
of the color vocabulary, it is also logically independent of the knowledge in which mastery of
the color vocabulary consists. Absent knowledge of the connection color terms have to visual
experience, one could learn (for instance) all of the facts describing the structure of the color
solid but yet fail to understand them as facts about the colors.13 What the connection to visual
experience gives us, and what mastery of the color vocabulary consists in, is not knowledge of
facts about the colors but of the colors themselves, a grasp of which properties we are talking
about when we talk about the colors.
This is the perspective from which Weak Revelationism views the revelation thesis. On the
Weak Revelationist version, the revelation thesis elaborates a central feature of the naïve con-
ception of sense experience we mentioned earlier, according to which the visual experience as
of a canary yellow object seems to present us directly with its canary yellowness. TheWeak Rev-
elationist version of the revelation thesis fleshes out this aspect of the naïve conception, adding
that being directly presented with canary yellow is being presented with its essential nature, with
12See Campbell 2005 and Gert 2008, who develop this point in different ways.
13See Campbell 2005, 109–110 for a fuller statement of this argument.
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what canary yellow essentially is. Our access to the nature of the property is direct in this ex-
perience because it is unmediated by grasp of a proposition describing some limited aspect or
mode of presentation of it. And precisely because our experience is unmediated in this way,
there can be nothing in what canary yellow is that is not present in the experience of it.
The Weak Revelationist version of the revelation thesis coheres with the passages Johnston
initially adduced in support of the idea that it is an intuitive desideratum for a theory of color.
Consider, for instance, this passage from Russell:
The particular shade of colour that I am seeing may have many things said about it . . . .
But such statements, though they make me know truths about the colour, do not make me
know the colour itself any better than I did before: so far as concerns knowledge of the
colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and
completely when I see it, and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible.
(Russell 1912, 47; my emphasis)
In contrasting knowledge of truths about a color and knowledge of the color itself, Russell is
claiming that the sort of knowledge corresponding to experience of the color is a kind of ac-
quaintance with it, a total awareness of the color itself that does not depend on propositional
knowledge of truths about it.1⁴ That colors and other perceptually accessible properties are pre-
sented in sense experience in this way is the idea that Weak Revelationism takes to be captured
by the revelation thesis. The Weak Revelationist’s formulation of the thesis is weak in the sense
that it does not entail that we acquire explicit propositional knowledge of the essential nature of
the properties we seem directly to be presented with in experience, but only a direct awareness
of, or acquaintancewith, those properties. But for all its comparative weakness, this formulation
of the revelation thesis is non-trivial. In particular, it is open to objection to the extent that it
relies on the naïve conception of sense experience and the ontological assumptions implicit in
that account.
1⁴Cf. Russell 1912, 46. Russell’s way of drawing the distinction receives support from the personal testimony of
Knut Nordby, a vision scientist who happens also to be a complete achromat: “Although I have acquired a thorough
theoretical knowledge of the physics of colours and the physiology of the colour receptor mechanisms, nothing of
this can help me to understand the true nature of colours. From the history of art I have also learned about the
meanings often attributed to colours and how colours have been used at different times, but this too does not give
me an understanding of the essential character or quality of colours” (Nordby 1990, 305).
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Incompatibility arguments against Weak Revelationism
To denyWeak Revelationism for a given range of perceptible properties is to insist on a discrep-
ancy between how those properties essentially are and how they are manifest in sense experi-
ence. One way to argue for such a distinction is to suggest that verbs like ‘looks’ or ‘appears’ in
reports of the form ‘x looks/appears F’1⁵ introduce non-extensional contexts.1⁶ In at least some
cases, substitution of (logically or metaphysically) co-extensive expressions into the predicate
position fails in looks/appears-reports of this form. In some cases, moreover, substitution fails
when the name of a perceptible property is substituted with a description expressing what it is
to be that property. For example, to be wet is to have one’s surface covered in a certain way by
H₂O, yet it seems false to say in general that if x looks/appears wet then x looks/appears to have
its surface covered in a certain way by H₂O. (Things presumably looked wet even before water
was discovered to be H₂O.) If this example illustrates a general feature of looks/appears-reports
of this form, and if expressions of this formmay be used to report sense experiences, we should
be able to ask of any perceptible property whether it looks/appears in sense experience in a way
that would satisfy a description of what that property essentially is.
These considerations place an explanatory burden onproponents ofWeakRevelationism. As
we saw, Weak Revelationism holds that the properties with which experience seems to present
us directly are presented to us directly, in the sense that our access to them is unmediated by
any limited mode of presentation of those properties. However, the above considerations show
that at least some of the properties we are presented with in experience are not presented to
us directly in this way. They moreover show that it is possible to distinguish the essence of any
property from theway it ismanifest in experience, and to askwhether the two coincide. To retain
the idea that we are acquainted with the essential nature of colors and other properties with
1⁵Or, perhaps, ‘x looks/appears F to subject S in circumstances C’. For the sake of simplicity, I suppress the latter
two variables in what follows.
1⁶Cf. Cohen 2009, 164–166, 170–171, to whom I owe the example of wetness given below. The connection to
opponents of the revelation thesis is also noted by Logue 2016b, 228n16.
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which experience (on the naïve conception) seems to present us directly, it needs to be shown
that these properties, unlike properties like wetness, are not manifest in experience under some
limited mode of presentation. It needs to be shown, in other words, that how these properties
are manifest in experience is how they essentially are.
According to opponents of Weak Revelationism, this is an explanatory burden that cannot
be met. On their view, the ontological facts about the properties with which experience seems
to present us directly do not cohere with their manifest appearance. The surface colors of solid
bodies, for example, appear qualitative, constant, and as attributes of the colored bodies them-
selves. If it should turn out that the colors are not—or are not entirely—as they appear to be,
then we would be committed to denying that colors are presented directly in experience in the
way Weak Revelationism suggests. If, for instance, it turns out that the colors are in fact excita-
tions of dispositions to appear a certain way (as on dispositionalist theories) or configurations
of micro-physical properties (as on certain physicalist theories), then we would be committed
to saying that at least some aspects of the essential nature of colors are not manifest in visual
experience, and that, at best, the colors are presented in visual experience under some limited
mode of presentation. Or if it turns out that colors as a rule are not attributes of the bodies that
we experience as colored (as on eliminativist theories), then we would be committed to saying
that aspects of our color experience are positively misleading and, to that extent, illusory. Each
conclusion imports a very different conception of color experience, one according to which we
must recognize a contrast between colors as they are manifest in experience and colors as they
are in themselves, and another according to which we must regard color experience as to some
extent systematically deceptive. But both entail the falsity of Weak Revelationism for the same
reason, namely that the ontological facts concerning color are incompatible with the idea that
experience gives us unmediated access to what the colors are.
Wemay state these incompatibility arguments against Weak Revelationism schematically as
follows. Let the value of ‘BEING(Qi)’ denote, roughly, the being (or essence, or nature) of a
determinate perceptible qualityQi. It is a constraint onWeak Revelationism aboutQi that there
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Premise 1: Weak Revelationism is true for Qi only if there are conditions under which:
(a) o looks/appears Qi, and
(b) o looks/appears BEING(Qi).
Premise 2: Under any experiential conditions: if (a) then not-(b).
Conclusion: Weak Revelationism is not true for Qi.
Argument 0.1 Incompatibility arguments against Weak Revelationism
exist conditions under which an experience satisfying a description like ‘o looks/appears Qi’
(for arbitrary o) also satisfies a description like ‘o looks/appears BEING(Qi)’—intuitively, it re-
quires that there exist conditions under whichQi looks like what it essentially is. Incompatibility
arguments purport to show on ontological grounds that this constraint cannot be met (see ar-
gument 0.1). There are at least two versions of the argument. Realist versions claim that the
constraint cannot be met because experiences as of Qi only manifest aspects of BEING(Qi).
Eliminativist versions, by contrast, claim that the constraint cannot be met because experiences
as of Qi positively obscure aspects of BEING(Qi), manifesting features which are not included
in BEING(Qi).
∗ ∗ ∗
This dissertation argues that Aristotle’s theory of basic sensory cognition constitutes a defense of
Weak Revelationism, and in particular the view that the subject of sense experience is presented
with the being and essence of the qualities specially perceived by the senses: colors, sounds,
odors, flavors, and tangible qualities such as temperatures and moistures. In constructing this
theory, Aristotle takes himself to be responding to both types of incompatibility argument,
which he takes to be implicit in the perceptual ontologies defended by certain of his predeces-
sors. To appreciate this aspect of Aristotle’s theory of basic sensory cognition, it will be helpful
to consider the arguments to which he is responding, and the threat he takes them to pose to a
satisfactory account of sense perception.
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Aristotle, Weak Revelationism, and the teleology of the senses
In contrast to its contemporary supporters, the considerations driving Aristotle’s support for
Weak Revelationism have to do, not with explaining our competence with terms for perceptual
qualities, but with how perceivers come to grasp these qualities as genuine attributes of the ob-
jects to which they appear to belong. For Aristotle, to be an animal is to be a perceiver, and
it is a central task of psychology to explain why different types of animal have been endowed
with the specific perceptual capacities they have.1⁷ The explanation he proposes is teleological,
connecting the animal’s possession of a given perceptual capacity to an end or set of ends whose
achievement is necessary for the animal’s survival or well-being:
Text 0.1 Now, perception must belong to animals insofar as each is an animal, for it is by this that we
distinguish what is an animal and what is not an animal. But with respect to each [class of animal]1⁸
in particular, touch and taste are consequent upon all of necessity: touch for the reason we gave in our
remarks on soul,1⁹ and taste on account of food—for with it [the animal] discriminates between the
pleasant and the painful in respect of food, so that it avoids the one and pursues the other—and generally
[because] flavor is an affection of what nourishes [the animal]. But the distance senses, namely smell,
hearing, and vision, [are consequent of necessity only] upon those among those that roam. They belong
to all that have them for the sake of survival, so that they may pursue food and avoid what is bad and
destructive by perceiving them in advance. But to those who also have intelligence [they belong] for the
sake of well-being, for they report many differences, from which arises intelligence about the objects of
thought and of practical activity.2⁰ (Sens. 1, 436b10–437a3)
The teleological role of the senses is to put the perceiving animal in touch with certain features
of perceptible bodies. Most fundamentally, the contact senses—touch and taste—are needed
1⁷See An. 413b4–10, 414bb28–415a6.
1⁸Square ‘[ ]’ brackets indicate that the enclosed text is my own insertion, added either to name the antecedent
of a pronoun phrase or, as in this case, to clarify how I interpret ambiguous bits of the Greek.
1⁹Namely, because “all bodies are tangible, and what is tangible is perceived by touch” (An. 434b12–13);
cf. 414b7–14, 435b4–19.
2⁰τοῖς δὲ ζῴοις, ᾗ μὲν ζῷον ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν αἴσθησιν· τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι καὶ μὴ
ζῷον διορίζομεν. ἰδίᾳ δ' ἤδη καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ μὲν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἡ μὲν
ἁφὴ διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, ἡ δὲ γεῦσις διὰ τὴν τροφήν· τὸ γὰρ ἡδὺ διακρίνει
καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκειν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ χυμός ἐστι τοῦ
θρεπτικοῦ πάθος. αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοὴ
καὶ ὄψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν
τροφὴν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εὖ ἕνεκα·
πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ ὧν ἥ τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν.
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to put the animal in touch with tangible features vitally important to its survival, on the one
hand features such as nutriment (τροφή) that nourish and grow the animal,21 and on the other
features such as extreme heat and cold that destroy it.22 The distance senses—vision, hearing,
and smell—do not directly perceive features of bodies that preserve and destroy the animal,23
but nevertheless they contribute to their possessors’ survival and flourishing by “reporting dif-
ferences” among the bodies they perceive. Vision’s contribution to practical animal intelligence
(φρόνησις) serves as a model:
Text 0.2 Among these [sc. the distance senses] vision in itself is the most authoritative in relation to
[practical] necessities . . . . For the power of vision reports many and various differences, on account of
the fact that all bodies partake of color, which is why the common [perceptual qualities] (by ‘common’ I
mean [for instance] size, shape, motion, number) are mostly perceived through this [sensory power].2⁴
(Sens. 1, 437a3–9)
The other distance senses likewise “report differences” among perceptible bodies, both within
and beyond the range of qualities they uniquely or “specially” perceive.2⁵
On its own, this conception of the teleological role of the senses in promoting animals’ sur-
vival and flourishing does not require accepting the Weak Revelationist conception of sense
experience. To be sure, it could be that sense experience promotes nutrition, survival, and other
practical goals by being a state in which the perceiver is presented with perceptual qualities as
21See An. 414b6–9, 434b18–19.
22See An. 435b13–19.
23See An. 414b9–11, 434b19–21.
2⁴αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα κρείττων ἡ ὄψις καθ' αὑτήν . . . . διαφορὰς μὲν
γὰρ πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἡ τῆς ὄψεως εἰσαγγέλλει δύναμις διὰ τὸ πάντα τὰ σώματα μετέχειν
χρώματος, ὥστε καὶ τὰ κοινὰ διὰ ταύτης αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα (λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μέγεθος, σχῆμα,
κίνησιν, ἀριθμόν).
2⁵In addition to special perceptual objects objects and the “commons”mentioned in text 0.2, Aristotle recognizes
a class of “incidental” (κατὰ συμβεβηκότα) perceptual objects. The special and common objects of perception
are both said to be perceptible “as such” (καθ' αὑτά,An. 418a8–20), and where at least special perceptual objects are
perceived by producing perceptual affection in a perceiver—though see 435a5–8 for evidence that the commons as
such also affect the perceiver—the incidental objects as a class cannot cannot affect the relevant perceptual power
except incidentally (An. 418a25). Incidental objects include the special objects of other senses, such as determinate
shades of color and flavor, which as such can act on only one sense but which may be perceived incidentally by
others; attributes such as being the son of Diares, which as such are efficacious with respect to no perceptual power;
and even universals such as color (cf. Met. 1087a19–20). The interesting and controversial issues concerning the
character of incidental perception and its role in Aristotle’s psychology of perception are sadly beyond the scope of
the present study, whichwill focus narrowly on the cognitive and epistemic aspects of episodes of special perception.
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they essentially are, as Weak Revelationism states. This would be to claim that the teleological
connection between animals’ practical goals and sense perception is based in the latter’s capac-
ity to furnish the animal with an accurate representation of the world, one in which objects are
presented to the animal as they are independent of observation. However, as Aristotle knew,
even if one accepts that practical goals like nutrition and survival somehow explain why ani-
mals perceive in the ways they do, one may still deny that the means by which sense perception
contributes to the achievement of these goals is anything like presentational accuracy. It might
be that perception promotes the animal’s practical goals by systematically misrepresenting its
environment to render potential sources of food or danger more salient against the perceptual
background, as some evolutionary models have been taken to suggest.2⁶ Or, to take an alterna-
tive with which Aristotle would have been familiar, it might be that perception promotes these
goals simply by causing the animal to experience appetitive pleasure and pain, which would be
sufficient for motivating pursuit and avoidance as approproate but insufficient for giving the
animal an accurate representation of its perceptual environment.2⁷
What signals Aristotle’s commitment toWeak Revelationism in articulating this teleological
picture is rather his additional claim that sense perception contributes to animals’ practical goals
because it is a type of cognition (γνῶσίς τις).2⁸ In one respect, this characterization emphasizes
the distinctiveness of perception among the psychological capacities possessed by living things.
Like all forms of organic life, that for which animals ultimately strive, and for whose sake they
do everything they do by nature, is to reach reproductive maturity and generate offspring like
themselves (An. 415a26–b2). But animals are distinctive in the means they employ in pursuit of
this ultimate goal. For instance, whereas plants acquire the nourishment necessary for growth
2⁶It has in fact been argued that evolution couldn’t have selected for perceptual accuracy, since survival under
veridical perception strategies decreases to zero as the complexity of the strategy increases. For a summary of this
research, see e.g. Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash 2015.
2⁷Cf. Plato’s account of sensation in plants at Tim. 77b–c. The Timaeus (46e–47c) also attributes to vision a role
in enabling philosophy and astronomy, but his account of visual perception seems conspicuously to disregard the
question of its accuracy or truth. Cf. Cornford (1935/1997, 153n1), who notes that this account is compatible with the
decidedly irrealist theory of vision from theTheaetetus (156d–e); for a recent critical discussion of these passages
of the Timaeus, see Johansen 2008, ch. 8.
2⁸GA 731a30–b9; cf. APo. 99b37–39, An. 427a17–21,Met. 981b10–13.
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and sustenance simply by being rooted in the right kind of soil, animals must select food from
their environment, which requires that they engage in such behaviors as hunting and foraging.
In Aristotle’s view, success at these endeavors imposes distinctively “cognitive” demands on the
animal, for instance that it be able reliably to tell whether something is edible or potable, so that
what the animal pursues is, at least in most cases, what in fact grows and sustains it.2⁹ Other
demands arise from the animal’s need to identify and, to the extent that it can, react to potential
sources of bodily harm; and still others arise from the need of sexually reproductive animals to
locate potential mates among conspecifics. In characterizing perception as a cognitive capacity,
Aristotle is asserting that it is a means for animals to satisfy these cognitive demands.
In another respect, however, Aristotle’s characterization of sense perception as a type of cog-
nition emphasizes the connection between even the most basic sensory capacities and the so-
phisticated cognitive capacities distinctive of rational animals—capacities like intellect (νοῦς),
the capacity responsible for cognitive states like scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), in which ra-
tional subjects intellectually cognize the causes explanatory of necessary and universal truths
(APo. 71b9–12). For Aristotle, perception and intellect are both capacities whereby the soul en-
gages in cognition (An. 427a19–21), but what unites these capacities as types of cognition is not,
as the previous paragraph might suggest, that there is a common teleological explanation for
their presence in animals endowed with them. Rational animals, for instance, have the senses
ultimately for the sake of nutrition and reproduction but theoretical intellect for the sake of the-
oretical contemplation (see e.g. EN 1177b26–1178a2); so we can appeal neither to nutrition and
reproduction nor to contemplation to explain why perception and theoretical intellect are alike
cognitive capacities.
What unites perception and intellect as cognitive capacities seems rather to be that there
2⁹Contrast Moss (2012, 34), who treats the ways in which plants and animals pursue food and other goods as
the same in kind, different only in the degree of complexity manifest in animal modes of pursuit. That there is no
botanical correlate to a cognitive function in Aristotle’s psychology seems to me to tell strongly in favor of taking
distinctively animal modes of pursit and avoidance to be different in kind from the non-cognitive modes proper to
plant life. In this respect Aristotle departs substantially from Plato, who seems to accord to plants the capacity to
perceive, thereby allowing for the apparently intention-guided behavior of plants to be explained on the model of
animal behavior; see note 27 above.
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is a common mechanism whereby each contributes to the practical and theoretical ends that
explains its presence in the animals endowed with it. The senses contribute to nutrition and
reproduction in the same way that the intellect contributes to contemplation: namely, by accu-
rately presenting the subject with the relevant range of cognitive objects. In order to judge only
what is true and to avoid being persuaded of what is not the case (cf. APo. 72a37–b4), the subject
inquiring in pursuit of scientific knowledge must have some means of grasping what explains
the truth of scientifically knowable facts. Similarly, in order to have appetites for and pursue
only what will in fact nourish and sustain it, the animal must have some means of telling which
potential sources of food will nourish and not cause harm. In describing as cognitive the capaci-
ties that furnish the required means in both cases, Aristotle makes clear that the mechanisms by
which these ends are realized are the same in kind. Intellect enables the inquirer to contemplate
necessary and universal truths from a position of certainty because it gives rise to states, like sci-
entific knowledge, that consist in a grasp of universal causes that the subject understands better
than the truths they explain. Similarly, perception enables the animal to tell which objects are
potential sources of food because it presents those objects to the animal as having the perceptual
features they actually have, features which moreover make a difference to their nutritional value
for the animal. In both cases the norm governing the relevant cognitive capacity’s teleological
contribution is truth—or, as we might put it, presentational accuracy—for which reason Aris-
totle regards both intellect and perception as “having authority over truth” (κύρια ἀληθείας,
EN/EE 1139a18).
Of course, Aristotle realizes that perceivers sometimes suffer perceptual illusions, in which
the subject misperceives an object’s qualities owing to illness, suboptimal perceptual conditions,
or other circumstances distorting her perceptual connection to the perceived object.3⁰ He also
recognizes an extensive range of quasi-perceptual phenomena, for instance after-images, hal-
lucinations, dreams, and imaginings, in which the character of the subject’s (quasi-) percep-
tual phenomenology is not determined by an occurrent perceptual connection to an external
3⁰See Ins. 428b31–33, 459b18–20 (cf. 460b26–27), 460b20–22; An. 422b3–10 (cf.Met. 1010b20–26), Sens. 439b5–6.
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object.31 But to the extent that truth is the norm governing perception’s contribution to an
animal’s survival and flourishing, Aristotle is committed to regarding these cases as deviations
from standard cases in which the perceiver is presented with the stable, qualitative attributes
actually possessed by the perceived body. Thus even chronic inaccuracies or distortions in an-
imals’ sensory experiences cannot be attributed to a formal feature of the relevant sense, as if
the animal had been endowed with a sensory power whose function is to present the relevant
features of perceptible bodies inaccurately or imperfectly. They must rather be explained by
reference to certain features of the matter of the sense organ, features that make it an imper-
fect instrument for realizing the sense’s alethic function. For instance, chronic inaccuracies in
vision are traceable to material defects in the eye: colored objects will appear darker or lighter
than they are if the eye jelly is too dense (and hence too dark) or too sparse (and hence too
light) (GA 779b14–780a13). Similarly, the inability of some animals to perceptually distinguish
(διαισθάνεσθαι) qualitatively similar shades of color, sound, and flavor is caused by impuri-
ties in the relevant organ, such as wrinkles in the transparent membrane containing the eye
jelly (780a25–b3, cf. 781a14–20). In no case, however, will the animal be endowed with a sensory
capacity whose function is not to present the perceiver with qualities as they actually are.
Aristotle on incompatibility arguments against Weak Revelationism
We’ve so far seen evidence for Aristotle’s commitment toWeak Revelationism from his concep-
tion of the teleological role of perception, which I’ve suggestedmakes crucial use of the idea that
the senses accurately present the perceiver with objects and their qualities. Aristotle’s commit-
ment toWeak Revelationism is also reflected in his reception of accounts of perceptual qualities
that he takes to be incompatible with the truth of the senses. Aristotle’s attitude toward these
accounts is often harsh, but his harshness seems to be less the result of a hasty or uncharitable
judgment of his opponent’s views than a keen awareness of his own dialectical position. Aris-
31After-images: Ins. 459b8–18; hallucinations: Ins. 460b28–32; dreams: Ins., esp. 460b28–462a7; imaginings: An.
427b17–20, 428b27–429a2.
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totle knows that he cannot accept any account, realist or eliminativist, that divorces the nature
of perceptual qualities from how they are presented to the perceiver in experience. For any ac-
count of this sort could serve as a basis for an incompatibility argument that would undermine
the teleological connection he envisions between the senses and grasp of the qualities on which
a perceiver’s survival and flourishing ultimately depend.
Nowhere does Aristotle appearmore sensitive to his dialectical position than in his appraisal
of Democritus’ atomist account of perceptual qualities. Democritus’ account of perceptual qual-
ities may be viewed as an instance of the ancient atomists’ general strategy in natural science,
namely to explain macroscopic phenomena in terms of the interaction of microscopic atoms.32
For example, Aristotle reports that according to Democritus things are colored “by turning”
(GC 316a1–2 [= Dmc128 Graham = 68A123 DK])—that is, by the rotary orientation of the atoms
entering the visual organ (cf. Met. 985b16–18). Such a view might plausibly be interpreted as
a dispositional account of color, according to which colors are dispositions of objects (macro-
scopic aggregates of atoms) to appear visually a certain way (under certain circumstances and
relative to certain types of perceiver).33 Remarkably, however, Aristotle takes this account to
show that Democritus in fact denies the existence of color.3⁴ What may have led Aristotle to this
extreme appraisal of the atomist view of color is the recognition that it entails that macroscopic
bodies lack the stable, qualitative attributes they are presented in sense experience as having. Far
from having any share in truth, then, visual experience on theDemocritean account is positively
misleading about what macroscopic bodies are like, as Democritus implicitly acknowledges in
his famous dictum: “by convention (νόμῳ) sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by
convention cold, by convention color, but in reality (ἐτεῇ) atoms and void” (7.135 [= Dmc136
32Theophrastus, Sens. 49–78 (= Dmc131 Graham = 68A135 DK) gives a detailed overview of this account.
33See Taylor 2010, 175–179 for a dispositionalist reading of Democritus; for a more cautious approach that makes
room for the more extreme Peripatetic interpretation, see Lee 2005, esp. chs. 8–9, and Lee 2011. (There is an inter-
esting parallel between this interpretive controversy and one between the traditional relationalist interpretation of
Locke and one that reads him as an eliminativist about colors and other secondary qualities. For the latter view,
see Boghossian and Velleman 1989, 95).
3⁴See GC 316a1–2 andTheophrastus, Sens. 63.
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Graham = 68B125 DK]).3⁵ To this extent Aristotle plausibly regards the atomist view of color
and other perceptual qualities as grounds for an eliminativist incompatibility argument against
Weak Revelationism. For, from the perspective of the view that colors must essentially be how
they are presented in experience, adopting even a dispositionalist view of color is tantamount
to denying that there are colors at all.3⁶
Aristotle’s dissatisfaction with certain realist accounts of perceptual qualities seems likewise
attributable to a sensitivity to his own dialectical position. Realist accounts hold that percep-
tual qualities for the most part are the stable attributes of perceptible bodies they are presented
in experience as being. But, as we saw, even a realist theory can generate an incompatibility
argument to the extent that it acknowledges essential features of a perceptual quality that are
not manifest in the experience of it—in other words, to the extent that it posits a gap between
how the quality is presented in experience and what the quality essentially is. Aristotle sees the
threat any such gap would pose for the perceptual teleology he defends, and for this reason he
unequivocally rejects the idea that aspects of a perceptual quality’s essential nature are hidden
from sense experience.
The realist incompatibility argument that would have beenmost salient for Aristotle appears
in Plato’s discussion of perception and knowledge in the first part of theTheaetatus:
Socrates. Hold on: won’t it be through touch that [the soul] will perceive the hardness of
what is hard, and in the same way the softness of what is soft?
Theaetetus. Yes.
Socrates. But yet their being, and the fact that they are, and their opposition in relation to
one another, and the being again of this opposition, [these] the soul itself tries to determine
(κρίνειν) for us by rising up and comparing them with one another?
Theaetetus. Certainly.
3⁵Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives 9.72 (=Dmc 141 Graham= 68B117 DK). By ‘convention’ Democritus probably does
not mean to imply that observable objects appear sweet or colored by some sort of agreement or common consent,
but rather, as some ancient interpreters suggest, that they so appear only “in relation to us” or “by means of our
affections”; see Galen,Med. Exp. 15.7 (= Dmc 137 Graham = 68A49 DK), and Aetius, S. 1.50.24 (= Dmc 138 Graham
= 67A32 DK).
3⁶Cf. Sextus,M. 7.136 (= Dmc 136 Graham = 68B9): we perceive “change in the disposition of the body as [atoms]
enter and press against it”;M. 7.137 (= Dmc 136 Graham = 68B6): “one must know that the human being is cut off
from reality by this standard (κανών)”.
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Socrates. So then, won’t there be some things that humans and animals alike are natu-
rally able to perceive as soon as they are born—namely those experiences [or: affections]
that reach the soul through the body—but the calculations regarding their being and ad-
vantageousness come about, in those in whom they even do come about, with difficulty and
time through a good deal of trouble and education? (Tht. 186b–c)3⁷
Socrates offers this argument in support of his conclusion (argued for at 184b–186e) that percep-
tion is not knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) because perception does not attain to either truth or being
(οὐσία). The argument depends on a distinction agreed to earlier between the bodily “experi-
ences” (or affections,παθήματα)made available by sense perception and the processeswhereby
the soul calculates and reasons about those experiences. The distinction leads Socrates and his
interlocutor to agree that, while the soul gets hold of some things via the senses, namely per-
ceptual qualities, it gets hold of what is common to these qualities, including importantly their
being, sameness, and difference, all on its own. From this, and from the argument quoted above,
Socrates’ conclusion follows quickly: nothing that fails to get at being can get at truth, and noth-
ing that fails to get at truth can have knowledge (186c); knowledge must therefore be, “not in
the experiences, but in the process of reasoning about them” (186d).
It is controversial exactly what connection to being and truth Socrates is denying to the
senses.3⁸ But any interpretation should have Socrates positing a gap between what is presented
to the perceiver in experience—what is present “in the experiences”—and what is required for
knowledge of what she perceives: grant that you feel the hardness of what is in fact hard and the
softness of what is in fact soft; even so, these experiences do not put you in a position to know
that the hard thing is hard or that the soft thing is soft.
Aristotle could certainly agree with the letter of Socrates’ conclusion that perception is dis-
3⁷All translations from theTheaetetus follow Levett-Burnyeat, with at most minor modifications.
3⁸There seem to be two interpretive options. According to one, Socrates’ claim is that when the soul is affected by
the hardness of a rock or the softness of lambswool, it perceives only that the rock feels hard and the wool feels soft;
what it does not perceive, and what can only be determined through a process of reasoning, is that is that the rock
is hard or that the wool is soft (see Cooper 1970). According to the other, perceptual affection lacks the resources
even to formulate the judgment that the stone is hard or that the wool is soft: experience of the rock may put us
in touch with its hardness, and experience of the wool may put us in touch with its softness, but judgments such
as that the stone is hard and that the wool is soft, and generally any predicative judgment of the form ‘x is F’ (for
some perceptual predicate ‘F’), require the independent operation of the soul. (See Burnyeat 1976, Frede 1987, and
Lorenz 2006, 74–94.) For an overview of the interpretive issues, see Burnyeat 1990, 52–61.
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tinct from ἐπιστήμη—a term he reserves for scientific knowledge, a state he believes must be
sharply distinguished from perception.3⁹ But he would have good reason to interpret it in spirit
as a challenge to the thesis that sense experience puts the perceiver in contact with features of
perceptible bodies. A clue to how hemight have conceived of the challenge is found in Socrates’
remark that the soul itself must determine (κρίνειν) the being of the hardness of the hard thing
or the softness of the soft thing. In using this term Socrates is recalling a point he made in
his earlier discussion of Protagoras’ homo mensura doctrine, which famously holds that “of all
things man is the measure: of things that are that they are, and of things of not that they are
not” (152a [= Prt17 Graham = 74B1 DK]). As Socrates understands it, the doctrine amounts to
the view that each person is a measure because she is the “decider” (κριτής) of what is and is
not the case for her (160c).⁴⁰ Specifically, with respect to perceptible qualities like “white and
heavy and light and all that kind of thing without exception”, it amounts to the claim that each
person “has the criterion (κριτήριον) of these things within himself, so when he regards them
to be as he experiences (πάσχει) them, he regards them as true and as what is for him” (178b).
The qualification “for him” may indicate that Socrates takes the Protagorean doctrine to be
coherent only in the context of a relativist theory of truth, as well as an ontology according to
which being and not-being—or rather, as Socrates insists, coming-to-be and coming-not-to-
be—are thoroughly (perhaps completely) relative to the perceiver.⁴1 Having already rejected
these latter theories on independent grounds,⁴2 Socrates turns in our passage to consider how
Protagoras’ doctrine fares in the context of an objective theory of being and truth. On this sort
3⁹See APo. 1.31. There is moreover evidence that Aristotle associates with Socrates a notion of ἐπιστήμη that
departs from his own official conception. See esp. EN/EE 1147b15–17, which contains a single tantalizing reference
to αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη; cf. Gerson 2009, 67n9.
⁴⁰Cf. 170d: “Well, suppose you come to a decision (κρίνας τι) and then express a judgment about something to
me. Let us assume with Protagoras that your judgment is true for you. But isn’t it possible that the rest of us may
criticize your verdict (σῆς κρίσεως). Do we always agree (κρίνομεν) that your judgment is true? Or does there
rise up against you, every time, a vast army of persons who think the opposite, who hold that your decisions and
your thoughts are false (ἡγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι)?”. Cf. also 179a.
⁴1According to another interpretation, however, Socrates is only committed to the view that Protagoras’ doctrine
is complemented by a relativist theory of being and truth; for discussion, see Burnyeat 1990 and Lee 2005, esp. ch. 5.
⁴2See 177c–179d, 181c–183b; for discussion, see Burnyeat 1990, 39–52.
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of theory, Socrates argues, it would no longer be plausible to maintain that perceivers as such
have the criteria within themselves of qualities like hardness and softness. For, on this sort of
theory, things do not come to be hard or soft only in relation to a perceiver; they are hard or
soft, and their being such does not depend on their being perceived as such. However, for all that
is presented to the perceiver in the tactile experience of a hard or soft thing, it may not be the
case that the object is hard or soft in itself; it may yet be the case that the object is hard and soft
only for the perceiver, as on the relativized ontology developed earlier in support of Protagoras’
doctrine. For Socrates this shows that the being of these qualities is not present in the perceptual
affections, but can be accessed (if at all) only by means of the soul itself, and even then only after
careful, sustained reflection on the content of one’s own experience.
On this interpretation, then, Socrates’ denial that the senses “determine”, or κρίνειν, the
hardness of hard things and the softness of soft things relies precisely on the sort of realism
Aristotle cannot accept. To the extent that tactile perception does not present hardness and
softness as perceiver-independent attributes of hard and soft things, but at best as attributes that
belong to things that are (or come to be) hard or soft for the perceiver, there is a gap between
the being and essence of these qualities and how they are presented in experience—a gap that
moreover prevents perception from having any share in truth or knowledge of them. This is a
conclusion Aristotle rejects in no uncertain terms:
Text 0.3 In relation to one another [hard and soft] are indeterminate in respect of more and less. But
since we discriminate (κρίνομεν) all perceptual objects in relation to the [relevant] sense, it is clear that
we determine what is hard and soft without qualification in relation to touch, since we use touch as a
mean state. For this reason we call what exceeds it [sc. touch⁴3] hard and what falls short [of it] soft.⁴⁴
(Meteor. 4.4, 382a16–21)
⁴3The antecedent of the αὐτὴν at a20 could be either μεσότης or ἁφή, but we make much better sense of the
passage’s logical structure if we construe ἁφή as the antecedent: Aristotle’s point is that we call what exceeds touch
hard and what falls short of touch soft because we use it as a mean state, not that we call what exceeds the mean
state hard and what falls short of themean state soft because we use touch as one.
⁴⁴πρὸς μὲν οὖν ἄλληλα ἀόριστά ἐστιν τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν πάντα
κρίνομεν τὰ αἰσθητά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἁπλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἁφὴν ὡρίκαμεν,
ὡς μεσότητι χρώμενοι τῇ ἁφῇ· διὸ τὸ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον αὐτὴν σκληρόν, τὸ δ' ἐλλεῖπον μαλακὸν εἶναί
φαμεν.
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The point is not simply that we call those objects hard and soft without qualification which
respectively exceed or fall short of the mean state occupied by touch. Nor is it that absolute
hardness and softness are defined in terms of the tactile “mean state”.⁴⁵ It is that objects that
appear hard or soft to touch are hard or soft, so that by perceiving the hardness of hard things
and the softness of soft things we “discriminate”, or κρίνειν, their hardness and softness.
Aristotle’s remarks thus represent a decisive rejection of the gap Socrates posits betweenwhat
is present in a perceiver’s experience of qualities like hard and soft and the being or essential
nature of those qualities. But if these remarks are also meant to relate Aristotle’s reasons for
rejecting the gap Socrates posits, they stand in need of clarification. I’ve suggested that the gap
consists in a contrast between what is present in sense “experience”—the affections reaching
the soul via one of the senses—and what is external to those experiences. Socrates argues that
an ontology that treats hardness and softness as perceiver-independent attributes of perceptible
bodies is an ontology onwhich the being and essence of these arenot present in sense experience.
Aristotle, I’ve suggested, is sympathetic to this sort of ontology. Does he then have a response to
the Socratic argument? Does his theory of perception have the resources to show that the being
and essential nature of attributes like hardness and softness can be both perceiver-independent
and present in sense experience? Does it have the resources to specify the experiential conditions
under which the perceiver is actually presented with the perceiver-independent nature of these
qualities, the conditions under which the subject is in a position to discriminate the hardness
and softness of things?
Discrimination and the conditions for perceptual knowledge
These questions pose a challenge to Aristotle’s theory of basic sensory cognition. On the one
hand, we have seen that Aristotle’s support for the Weak Revelationist idea that the essential
⁴⁵Meteor. 382a21–23. In this context Aristotle defines absolute hardness as the quality of having a surface that
does not yield into itself, and absolute softness as the quality of having a surface that yields but not simply by
displacement, as a liquid does (a11–15).
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natures of perceptual qualities are presented to the perceiver in sense experience is driven by a
certain conception of the teleological role of sense perception. In his view, the norm governing
the senses’ contributions to animal survival andflourishing is truth, understoodhere as the norm
of presenting the perceiving animal with perceptual qualities as they essentially are. On the
other hand, we have also seen that there are substantial dialectical challenges to this conception
of sense experience, challenges which fit the mold of incompatibility arguments against Weak
Revelationism. Chief among these is a challenge Aristotle finds in theTheaetetus, according to
which sense experience has no share in knowledge or truth because the soul by itself, and not
by means of the senses, must determine (κρίνειν) the being of perceptual qualities.
Aristotle has a response to this challenge, and the task of the following chapters is to detail
its most salient features. As I argue in Chapter 1, Aristotle’s response is built on a distinctive
conception of the nature of perceptual qualities. It is commonly assumed that Aristotle regards
colors, sounds, and other perceptual qualities as essentially dependent on perceivers, so that a
world without perceivers would also be a world in which nothing was colored, sounding, or
flavored in the fullest sense. But this assumption wrongly conflates what it is to be a perceptual
quality (e.g. a color)withwhat it is to be a perceptual object (e.g. an object of vision). InAristotle’s
viewperceptual qualities arenot essentially perceptible, but objective features of theworldwhose
nature and existence are wholly independent of the presence of perceivers.
In Chapter 2 I argue that Aristotle accepts a physicalist account of perceptual qualities, ac-
cording to which the essential nature of a determinate quality (e.g. Sky Blue or Middle C) is
identical to the attribute whereby objects produce sensory affections of that type—an attribute
that Aristotle analyzes as a mixture of extreme contraries, as e.g. a color is a mixture of opaque
and transparent, and a sound is amixture of low and high pitch. But despite ascribing to percep-
tual qualities a perceiver-independent nature rooted in the physics of causation and affection,
Aristotle nevertheless maintains that the nature of a perceptual quality can be fully present in
the sensory affection it produces in a perceiver. For, unlike contemporary physicalist accounts,
Aristotle’s physicalism takes the quality as it inheres in an object to be identical in nature to
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the quality as it inheres in the perceptual motion that affects a perceiver; the same quality, in
Aristotle’s view, is both “mixture and motion”.
With this conception of perceptual qualities in place, all thatAristotle needs to respond to the
incompatibility argument he finds in theTheaetetus is an account of the conditions under which
the nature of a perceptual quality (so understood) is present to the perceiver in sense experience.
In Chapters 3 and 4 I argue that Aristotle develops a general theory of discrimination within
which he articulates these conditions. Commentators disagree over what it is, in Aristotle’s view,
for the senses to discriminate. Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence he takes that sensory
discrimination to consist precisely in the sort of access to the essential nature of perceptual
qualities that, according to Plato, is unavailable to the senses. The strongest evidence comes
from a difficult passage in which Aristotle purports to show that the senses discriminate their
special qualities (An. 2.11, 424a4–7). His argument turns on the idea that each sense is a “mean
state” (μεσότης) of the contrariety present in the qualities it perceives: vision is a mean state
between opaque and transparent, hearing between low and high pitch, and so on. In Chapter 3
I argue that the senses’ status as mean states reflects their hylomorphic status as the form of an
organ that, qua organ, is compounded in amean proportion of the same opposites that compose
the qualities it perceives. (So, for instance, vision is the formof the eye, which qua organ of vision
is compounded from a mean proportion of opaque and transparent stuff.) On the basis of this
obscure detail of the physiology of perception, Aristotle concludes that each sense occupies a
perspective fromwhich the affection produced by a quality reflects how that quality is essentially.
As I show in Chapter 4, Aristotle’s argument in this passage is illuminated by a parallel with
his account of the character virtues. The ability of perceivers to discriminate perceptual qual-
ities is analogous to the ability of virtuous agents to distinguish virtuous and vicious states of
character. Just as it is only from the perspective of the courageous person that the rash person
appears rash and the coward appears cowardly, it is only from the perspective of a sense occu-
pying the visual mean state that contrary qualities like Sky Blue and Scarlet Red appear as they
essentially are. This parallel is moreover of interest quite apart from the light it sheds on Aristo-
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tle’s understanding of sensory discrimination. For, as my account shows, it is wrong to say that
Aristotle accepts a single Doctrine of the Mean; if any, he has at least two, one ethical and one
discriminative.⁴⁶
As I also argue in Chapter 4,⁴⁷ a major implication of Aristotle’s doctrine of the discrimina-
tive mean is that the senses turn out tomeet the condition on knowledge theTheaetetus alleged
they could not. Pace the Socrates of that dialogue, it is the senses themselves that discriminate
(κρίνειν) and grasp the being and essential nature of the qualities they specially perceive, since
cases of sensory discriminate are precisely cases in which the perceiver is presented with the be-
ing and essential nature of these qualities. While, as we’ve seen, this sort of acquaintance is on
some contemporary views sufficient for knowledge of perceptual qualities, on the view Aristotle
finds in theTheaetetus it expresses only a necessary condition for such knowledge. It belongs to
a different study to consider whether the same is true for Aristotle himself, and so I conclude
by sketching some prospects for further research recommended by the present interpretation.
⁴⁶See ch. 4.6.
⁴⁷See esp. chs. 4.5 and 4.7.
1Perceptual Qualities, Perceptual Objects, and
Aristotle’s Realism
Aristotle is typically, and I think rightly, read as a realist about perceptual qualities. His is a world
inwhich objects for themost part have the colors, sounds, odors, and flavorswe experience them
as having, and in which objects moreover have these qualities irrespective of whether they are
experienced as having them.1 This realist picture is typically, and again I think rightly, seen to
underly central commitments of Aristotle’s theory of perception. It seems implicit, for instance,
in his view that perception of a quality like color is a process of assimilation, in which what
perceives, which is potentially such as what it perceives, comes to be such as what it perceives
is actually.2 It is arguably also implicit in his views on perception’s cognitive value, for instance
in his claim that vision makes an important contribution to practical intelligence because “all
bodies partake of color” (Sens. 437a7, quoted in text 0.2).
Yet the realist picture of perceptual qualities Aristotle endorses is typically held to be subject
to an important restriction. Aristotle’s intellectualmilieuwas dominated by irrealist conceptions
of perceptual qualities, according to which objects do not have colors, sounds, odors, or flavors
1See e.g. An. 418a11–16, 428b18–22 for remarks on the reliability of the senses with respect to these qualities.
Aristotle takes the same view of the qualities specially perceived by touch, primarily temperature (hot and cold)
and moisture (wet and dry); but since these qualities correspond to the fundamental elements of material bodies,
there is less of a question concerning their perceiver-independent reality (cf. 423b26–29).
2See An. 418a3–6, 417a17–21, 423b31–424a2.
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in the absence of our experience of them. In an apparent concession to the irrealists, Aristotle
admits that perceivers do in a way encounter features that objects would not have in the absence
of such perceptual encounters. It is of course false to say without qualification that there is no
color without vision or soundwithout hearing. But in his view the irrealists are right in thinking
that there cannot be an actual object of vision without an actual observer, or an actual object of
hearing without an actual auditor:
Text 1.1 But the earlier physical theorists who thought that nothing is white or black without vision,
nor that there is flavor without taste, did not state this [matter] well. For they spoke in one way correctly
but in another incorrectly, since the sense and its object (αἰσθητόν) are spoken of in two ways: some
[are spoken of] as potential and some as actual, so that concerning the latter [sc. perceptual objects in
actuality] what they said applies, but in the case of the former [sc. perceptual objects in potentiality] it
does not apply. But those [theorists] spoke without qualification about what is spoken of not without
qualification.3 (An. 3.2, 426a20–27)
It is unclear how, if at all, these remarks curtail Aristotle’s commitment to the perceiver-inde-
pendence of perceptual qualities. Perhaps it demonstrates sympathy for a subjectivist view ac-
cording to which colors, sounds, etc. are perceiver-independent features of objects, but in the
absence of active perceivers they are not (or are not most fully) how we experience them. If so,
however, this concession starts to look like an embarrassment for Aristotle.⁴ Howmuch can we
subtract from colors or sounds as we experience them before we are left with nothing but a bare
disposition or causal tendency to affect perceivers in a certain way? And if a that is all that is left
when we subtract the perceiver-dependent aspects of perceptual qualities, what remains of his
view that perception is a matter of the perceiver being assimilated to what she perceives? What
remains of the idea that perception of qualities such as color is a means of learning about the
objective features of material bodies?
Some commentators have embraced a thoroughly dispositionalist interpretation of Aristo-
3ἀλλ' οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι
ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς· διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης
τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων
οὐχ ἁπλῶς.
⁴See Irwin 1989, 313–14 and Taylor 1990, 137–141 for especially clear statements of this worry.
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tle’s realism.⁵ Others, however, have attempted to present Aristotle’s concession as articulating
only a very thin kind of subjectivism: while objects only look green or taste sweet in the context
of actual vision or taste, they are green and sweet in all other important respects—including
the respects relevant to perceptual assimilation and cognition.⁶ Still others have denied that
Aristotle’s realism is compatible with any form of subjectivism, arguing instead that his appar-
ent concession to irrealism is the result of confusion, for instance an elision of the disposition
to cause perception and the categorical grounds of that disposition.⁷ I propose a different ap-
proach to reconciling the objectivist tendencies of Aristotle’s realism with this apparent conces-
sion to the irrealists. Aristotle is committed to the objective, perceiver-independent reality of
perceptual qualities. Not only do colors, sounds, odors, and flavors belong to material bodies
independently of our experiencing them as so belonging, they belong to material bodies as we
encounter them in experience, and the admission that there are no objects of perception without
actual perceivers does nothing to mitigate this commitment. To the extent that there appears to
be a tension, it is because we have failed to distinguish two essentially distinct potentialities of
material bodies, namely that which makes the body perceptually qualified (colored, or sound-
ing, or flavored, etc.) and that which makes it perceptible (visible, or audible, or tasteable, etc.).
The former potentiality characterizes a perceptually-accessible quality (ποιότης), an attribute
whose presence in a perceptually qualified body does not depend on a perceiver’s experience
of it. By contrast, the latter potentiality characterizes a perceptual object (αἰσθητόν), and in
Aristotle’s view this potentiality may be actualized only in the presence of a perceiver.
Despite appearances to the contrary, Aristotle consistentlymaintains the distinction between
perceptual qualities and perceptual objects. Passages in which he seems to treat the actuality of
a perceptual quality as identical to actual perception—passages which have consequently led
commentators to take the actuality of a perceptual quality to be dependent on the actuality of
a perceiver—must be understood in light of the subtle distinction between the actuality that
⁵See Broadie 1993.
⁶See Silverman 1989 (endorsed by Lee 2005), Marmodoro 2014.
⁷See Broackes 1999, esp. 67–69; cf. Everson 1997, 29–30.
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determines the essence of a perceptual quality and the actuality of the relevant type of perceptual
object. Aristotle relies heavily on this distinction in De Anima, though it is not here that we
find his most explicit statement of it. For that we have to look elsewhere, and especially to the
accounts of of perceptual qualities presented in the Categories and De Sensu. These passages, as
we shall see, form the basis for De Anima’s discussion of colors, sounds, flavors and the rest as
objects of sense perception.
1.1 Perceptual qualities as perceiver-independent attributes
In speaking of perceptual qualities Imean to pick out the range of attributes that are perceptually
accessible within only one sense modality. This range of attributes coincides with what Aristotle
in De Anima calls the “special perceptual objects” (ἴδια αἰσθητά), which are marked under
this description by two features: each is a per se efficient cause of perception relative to just
one sense, and that sense is immune to error concerning it (An. 418a11–12). Aristotle’s interest
in these qualities in De Anima is for the most part limited to their role in causing perceptual
affection and defining the senses specially perceptive of them (cf. 415a14–22). Taken alone, then,
the De Anima discussion may give the impression that Aristotle takes perceptual qualities to
be essentially characterized in terms of their role as objects of perception, or even that being
an object of perception is all there is to being a perceptual quality. But there is considerable
evidence outside of De Anima that, in Aristotle’s view, perceptual qualities may be understood
quite independently of their role as special perceptual objects.
The first important piece of evidence comes from Aristotle’s introductory remarks to the
ontology of perceptual qualities he presents in De Sensu 3–5:
Text 1.2 Now, concerning the objects of each of the sense organs—I mean for instance color, sound,
smell, flavor, and touch [i.e. the tangibles]—we stated in general in our remarks on soul what their func-
tion is and what being in actuality is [for them] in respect of each of the sense organs. But what we should
say any one of them is—for instance what color is, or what sound is, or what odor or flavor are, and simi-
larly in regard to touch—we should [now] examine, and first of all in regard to color.⁸ (Sens. 3, 439a6–12)
⁸περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον, οἷον λέγω χρώματος καὶ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς
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Aristotle is asking us to distinguish perceptual qualities insofar as they are objects of percep-
tion and perceptual qualities as they are in themselves. As objects of perception, they should
be understood in terms of their function (ἔργον) and actuality (τὸ ἐνεργεῖν) as per se causes
of sensory affection. In themselves, however, they are not likewise to be understood strictly in
terms of their role in sense perception. What colors, flavors, and odors are, according to the
account Aristotle goes on to give, is not specified in terms of any causal or definitional relation
to their special senses, but rather in terms of certain compositional facts about bodies possess-
ing those qualities. Aristotle’s account analyzes these qualities as values of a scale of attributes
defined by a pair of opposites, the nature of each determinate quality fixed by a ratio (λόγος)
of those opposites that simultaneously characterizes the “mixture and motion” specific to that
quality.⁹ With this sort of account Aristotle claims to have identified perceptual qualities, not
with their role in sense perception, but with what enables them to play that role—with, as he
puts it, “what each of them is being which it will produce perception and actuality” (439a16–17).
Another important piece of evidence comes from Aristotle’s discussion of perceptual quali-
ties in Categories 8, which in many ways complements the account from De Sensu 3–5 sketched
above. Viewed from the comprehensive ontological perspective Aristotle adopts in the Cate-
gories, perceptual qualities are “affective qualities” (παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, Cat. 9a29–31). They
are qualities because they are attributes in virtue of which “the things that have received them
are said to be qualified somehow” (τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ λέγεται κατ' αὐτάς, a34–35).
The language of receiving recalls Aristotle’s discussion of primary substances—objects such as
Socrates and Bucephalus and a drop of honey—as the ultimate subjects of predication, the ul-
timate substrata receptive of and subject to change between opposites in non-substance cate-
gories.1⁰ But here Aristotle’s emphasis is on the perfective nature of an object’s reception of a
perceptual quality. Objects that are qualified in respect of (say) color or flavor have received
καὶ χυμοῦ καὶ ἁφῆς, καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, τί τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τί τὸ ἐνεργεῖν
καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων. τί δέ ποτε δεῖ λέγειν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν, οἷον τί χρῶμα ἢ τί ψόφον ἢ τί
ὀσμὴν ἢ χυμόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ χρώματος.
⁹Cf. Sens. 442a15, quoted in text 2.2. See ch. 2 for detailed discussion of this account.
1⁰See Cat. 4a28–34, b16–19.
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these attributes, in the sense that their being colored or flavored as they are is not simply the re-
sult of some temporary affection from an external agent, as a trip to the beachmight temporarily
redden an otherwise pale complexion (cf. 9b19–33 = text 1.13). Affective qualities (as opposed to
temporary affections, πάθη) are characteristically stable (παραμόνιμα), both in the sense of
being long-lasting and in the sense of being hard to change (δυσκίνητα). This is true even if
the quality was initially received in a process of affection or alteration (a change in how a thing
is qualified: 15b11–12), so it must be kept in mind that perceptual qualities are called affective
qualities only because they are productive of affections in other bodies:
Text 1.3 For instance, honey is called sweet because it has received sweetness, a body is white because
it has received whiteness, and the same is true in the other cases. These are called affective qualities not
because the things that have received the qualities have been somehow affected, for honey is not called
sweet because it has been affected somehow, nor has any other such thing. In the same way as these
both hotness and coldness are called affective qualities not because the things that have received them
have been affected somehow. It is rather because each of the aforementioned qualities is productive of
an affection of the senses that it is called an affective quality. For sweetness instills a kind of affection of
taste, hotness of touch, and so on in the other cases.11 (Cat. 8, 9a33–b9)
Note the high threshold this account places on the possession of a perceptual quality. In
order to be perceptually qualified in some way, it is not enough merely to manifest the relevant
quality. Turning red-faced from embarrassment or pale from fear is not enough to possess the
qualities of redness or pallor. Nor is being placed over a stove-top flame enough to give a kettle
the quality of heat. For soon the feeling of embarrassment or fear will subside, and the flame
under the kettle will be extinguished; and at that point what was being affected will begin to lose
the relevant attribute. Perceptual qualities, like all affective qualities, belong only to the objects
that have received them, and so possess them in a way that is hard to change and long-lasting.
These underlying ontological distinctions hold even if we attribute a quality like hotness to fire
11οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι λέγεται γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δεδέχθαι·
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. παθητικαὶ δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς
ποιότητας πεπονθέναι τι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ
τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπονθέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων
πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται· ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν
ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι.
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on the same basis that we attribute the corresponding temporary affection to the heated kettle,
namely because both produce tactile perceptions of hotness. The fact that we call both ‘hot’
shows that we have a common basis for attributing qualities and temporary affections, but it
does not follow in Aristotle’s view that things genuinely possess a given quality if, or even only
if, they are observed to produce the relevant type of perceptual affection. Fire would be hot,
snow would be white, and honey would be sweet even if there were no perceivers around to
feel or see or taste them; and in general the possession of a perceptual quality is ontologically
independent of the availability of perceivers suitably equipped to be so affected: “if the animal is
destroyed perception (αἴσθησις) is destroyed, but there will still be the perceptible (αἰσθητόν),
for instance body, heat, sweet, bitter, and everything else that is perceptible” (Cat. 8a4–6).
1.2 A concession to irrealism?
Whenwe look beyondDe Anima, then, we find discussions of perceptual qualities that range far
beyond their role as special objects of the senses. Theontology ofDeSensu 3–5 and the account of
affective qualities in Categories 8 in different ways commit Aristotle to the view that possession
of a perceptual quality does not depend on the presence of perceivers, the first by distinguishing
what perceptual qualities are from their role as perceptual objects, and the second by arguing di-
rectly for the ontological independence of perceptual qualities from perceivers. In light of these
discussions, we may be tempted to interpret Aristotle’s scolding of the irrealists, who according
to text 1.1 “spoke without qualification about what is spoken of not without qualification”, as an
admonition to respect the distinction between perceptual qualities and perceptual objects. This
interpretation has Aristotle agreeing with the irrealists that perceptual objectswould not exist in
the absence of perceivers, but denying the implication that perceptual qualities would therefore
not exist in the absence of perceivers. To be a perceptual quality is not (or is not only) to be a
perceptual object, so even if nothing would be visible in a world without observers, it does not
follow that nothing would be colored.
But this interpretation does not get things quite right. In Aristotle’s view, the irrealist’s error
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is not in conflating being visible and being colored, but in failing to recognize a certain sort of
ontological complexity in attributes such as being visible and being sighted, and in general being
an object of perception and being a perceiver. What the irrealist says is that is that nothing is
white or black without vision. For Aristotle this is incorrect as it stands, since it fails to recognize
the distinction between the potentiality and the actuality of a perceptual object. Like the sense
(αἴσθησις) that perceives it, the object of perception (αἰσθητόν) may be spoken of in either
of two ways, namely as potentially or as actually perceived. Applied to perceptual objects in
potentiality, the irrealist’s claim is false: objects are visible, tastable, and in general perceptible
even if there is no one seeing, tasting, or in general perceiving them.12 But applied to perceptual
objects in actuality, it is true: without anyone seeing, tasting, or in general perceiving, nothing
is ever actually seen, tasted, or in general perceived.
So Aristotle is not accusing the irrealist of conflating perceptual qualities and perceptual
objects. But whether we take Aristotle’s remarks in text 1.1 to weaken the commitment to real-
ism he expresses in De Sensu 3–5 and Categories 8 depends on whether we take his argument
to presuppose the distinction between perceptual qualities and perceptual objects. Given that
Aristotle regards perceptual qualities as perceptual objects, his remarks may indicate that there
are no perceptual qualities in actuality without perception in actuality. But given that he also
distinguishes what perceptual qualities are from their role as objects of sense perception, his
remarks may also indicate that there are no perceptual objects in actuality without perception
in actuality, where this leaves it open whether perceptual qualities may be actualized without
being perceived.
On the first reading, but not on the second, Aristotle would be committed to denying the
perceiver-independence of perceptual qualities we saw defended in Categories 8. For on the first
12Would Aristotle also reject the version of the irrealist’s claim according to which nothing is visible, tastable,
and in general perceptible in a world without seers, tasters, and in general without suitably equipped perceivers—
i.e. a version applied also to perceptual subjects in potentiality? Admittedly, the passage quoted at the end of sect.
1.1 (Cat. 8a4–6) suggests he would, but elsewhere he refines his position: in the counterfactual scenario in which
there are perceptible-in-the-actual-world bodies but no suitably equipped perceivers, nothing would be visible,
tastable, etc., though there would yet be colors, flavors, etc., the underlying features by virtue of which bodies are
perceptible-in-the-actual-world. SeeMet. 1010b30–1011a2 (= text 1.9) and, for discussion, sect. 1.5.
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reading, but not on the second, to be an object of perception would be part of what it is to be a
perceptual quality. Aristotle takes the essence of a potentiality to be determined by its actuality,
by what it is a potentiality for. If, then, Aristotle’s conclusion in text 1.1 is that there is no actuality
of a perceptual quality without the actual perception of it, he is committed to the idea that part
of what it is to be a perceptual quality is to be able to be perceived—to be, in other words, an
object of perception. But if being an object of perception is part of what it is to be a perceptual
quality, it follows that being a perceptual quality is, at least in part, just being able to produce a
certain type of perceptual affection: “if the object of smell (ὀσφραντόν) is odor (ὀσμή), [then]
if it produces anything, odor produces smelling” (An. 2.12, 424b5–6). It becomes hard to resist
the conclusion that perceptual qualities are essentially dependent on perception, for in that case
we could not specify what a quality like color or flavor is without reference to its special sense.
This would be a far more impoverished version of realism than we saw articulated in texts 1.2
and 1.3. For even if objects could be potentially colored, sounding, or flavored in the absence of
perceivers, they could not actually be such in a world without seeings, hearings, or tastings.
However, Aristotle’s discussion in De Anima gives us good reason to think he intends the
second reading of text 1.1. This reading, unlike the first, does not commit him to the perceiver-
dependence of perceptual qualities in actuality. What Aristotle concedes to the irrealists in text
1.1 is that perceptual objects are perceiver-dependent in actuality, but in doing do so he does not
concede much. True, nothing can be seen without someone seeing it. But in Aristotle’s view
being visible forms no part of the essence of color, so it does not follow that nothing can be
actually colored in the absence of observers. As I shall presently argue, there is an actuality of
color and other perceptual qualities that is independent of the actuality of the perceiver, and so
independent of its role as an object of perception.
1.3 Dual actualities of sense and perceptual quality
Thebest evidence for a perceiver-independent actuality of perceptual qualities comes fromAris-
totle’s account of the relation between perceptual subject and object in actuality inDeAnima 3.2,
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in a passage that is sometimes read as articulating the distinction between perceptual subject and
object in actuality and potentiality we encountered in text 1.1:13
Text 1.4 So the actuality of that which produces sound is sound or sounding, and the [actuality] of that
which hears is hearing or hearkening, since hearing is twofold and sound is twofold. The same account
[applies] also in the case of the other senses and perceptual objects.1⁴ (An. 3.2, 426a6–9)
Using hearing as his example, Aristotle has been arguing for the thesis that the actuality of a
perceptual object and its sense is “one and the same, though they differ in their being”:
Text 1.5 I mean for instance sound in actuality and hearing in actuality [are one and the same, though
different in being]. For it is possible, while having [the sense of] hearing, not to hear, and that which
has sound does not always sound. But whenever that which is capable of hearing is active and that
which is capable of sounding sounds, then hearing in actuality and sound in actuality come about
at the same time, of which [pair] one should say the one is hearkening and the other is sounding.1⁵
(An. 3.2, 425b25–426a2)
Now, one might read text 1.4 as making explicit an underlying assumption of this passage,
namely that both the perceptual subject and the perceptual object may be spoken of as potential
or as actual. But in fact it seems to be making explicit a different assumption, namely that there
are two actualities of both the sense and the quality it specially perceives. To see this, notice
that in the bolded portion of text 1.5 Aristotle is careful not to say that every actual sounding is
the same in number to an actual hearing. All he commits himself to is that whenever the au-
ditor and the sounding object are both active, then their respective actualities are the same in
number. From this it follows neither that every actual sounding is the same in number as an
actual hearing, nor indeed that every actual hearing is the same in number as an actual sound-
ing. Aristotle’s view that a sounding object produces perception in the auditor may commit him
to the claim that every actual hearing is identical to an actual sounding, but nothing rules out
13SeeHicks 1907, note ad loc., and Ross 1961, note ad loc., who nevertheless acknowledges the passage’s exegetical
difficulty. Contrast Polansky 2007, 387–389.
1⁴ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι ψόφος ἢ ψόφησις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ἀκοὴ ἢ ἄκουσις·
διττὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν ὁ ψόφος. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν.
1⁵λέγω δ' οἷον ὁ ψόφος ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀκοὴν ἔχοντα μὴ
ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ, ὅταν δ' ἐνεργῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ δυνάμενον
ψοφεῖν, τότε ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφος, ὧν εἴπειεν ἄν τις τὸ μὲν
εἶναι ἄκουσιν τὸ δὲ ψόφησιν.
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that there may be an actual sounding that is not identical to an actual hearing. On the reading I
am suggesting, the point of text 1.4 is to acknowledge this implication of his claim in the bolded
portion of text 1.5.
Read in this way, text 1.4 states that there are two actualities of both that which sounds and
that which hears. In both cases one actuality, what Aristotle calls ‘sound’ (ψόφος) and ‘hear-
ing’ (ἀκοή) respectively, is homonymous with its corresponding potentiality, since we can say
equally of what is only potentially hearing that it has hearing and of what is only potentially
producing sound that it has sound. But in both cases there is another, “heteronymous” actual-
ity, what Aristotle calls ‘sounding’ (ψόφησις) and ‘hearkening’ (ἄκουσις) respectively. In the
bolded portion of text 1.5 he identifies the heteronymous actualities of that which sounds and
that which hears as actualities of a single auditory perceptual episode. He then goes on to draw
conclusions about their connections based on his general account of action and passion:1⁶
Text 1.6 If indeed the motion and the acting and the affection are in what is affected, both the sound
and the hearing in actuality must be in that which is in potentiality. For the actuality of what produces
and sets in motion comes about in what is affected—hence it is not necessary for what moves to be itself
moved.1⁷ (An. 3.2, 426a2–6)
Now, if there were just a single actuality of sound, Aristotle’s remarks would entail that each
actualization of soundmust be present in a hearer, and hence that each actualization of sound is
the same in number as a “hearkening”. As if to guard against this misunderstanding, he follows
up these remarks with text 1.4, which suffices to clarify that the above account applies only to
the heteronymous actuality of sound—that is, to “soundings”.
It is therefore no surprise that Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that the actuality of the
perceptible (αἰσθητόν) and the perceptive (αἰσθητικόν) are located in the perceiver only after
clarifying that it applies to just one of the perceived quality’s actualities, namely the heterony-
mous actuality that arises simultaneously with and is the same in number as the actuality of the
1⁶See Phys. 3.3 and, for specific application to affection in the category of quality, GC 323a17–20.
1⁷εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν
ἀκοὴν τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῷ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ
πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται· διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι.
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relevant sense (An. 426a9–11). Nor is it a surprise that Aristotle holds off discussion of the other,
homonymous actuality of the perceived quality. His concern in this part ofDe Anima 3.2 is with
the relation between the sense and its object in actuality, and this concern extends to percep-
tual qualities only insofar as they play the role of perceptual objects. As we saw above, and as
Aristotle himself indicates in text 1.2, consideration of perceptual qualities in themselves is not
a task for the psychology of perception, but rather for the sort of ontological inquiry we find
in De Sensu. This is not to say, however, that Aristotle’s more narrow focus on the role of per-
ceptual qualities in De Anima does not provide important clues to the ontological assumptions
underlying his psychology of perception.
1.4 Are perceptual qualities essentially perceptible?
Aristotle’s account of the unity of perceptual subject and object in De Anima 3.2 leaves it open
whether the actuality of a perceptual quality is independent of the actuality of a perceiver, since
the account acknowledges an actuality of perceptual qualities that is neither simultaneous with
nor the same in number as an actual perceiving. To show that Aristotle is in fact committed
to the perceiver-independence of perceptual qualities in this respect, it needs additionally to be
shown that the perceiver-independent actuality of a perceptual quality is in his view the one that
determines what it essentially is. Aristotle does not address this question directly in De Anima,
and according to a number of interpreters he is in fact committed to denying that perceptual
qualities are essentially perceiver-independent. Nevertheless, as I’ll argue in this section, the
best interpretation of the relevant passages favors the radical independence of perceptual qual-
ities. Once again, Aristotle’s view depends on the distinction between perceptual objects and
perceptual qualities. In his view, perceptual qualities are perceptual objects, but this status is
neither essential nor even necessary to being a perceptual quality.
To see why, consider first the contrary hypothesis that the actuality that determines the na-
ture of a perceptual quality is identical to the actuality of the relevant sort of perceptual object.
Broadie (1993) has argued for such a view in detail, on the basis of a principle she calls the
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“restricted efficacy of sensibilia”. The principle states that perceptual qualities (excepting the
qualities specially perceived by touch) are productive of only one kind of effect: “the perception
of them by animals” (Broadie 1993, 146). Viewed in this way, perceptual qualities just are poten-
tialities for the production of a determinate kind of perceptual affection. To be colored, on this
view, would be to possess the power to appear visually in a certain way, say as red. And color in
general would be defined as the way in which an object is visible, as e.g.
color as object of vision
color := the potentiality to produce a color perception1⁸
Applied generally, the restricted efficacy principle straightforwardly entails that the nature of a
perceptual quality is exhausted by its being an object of the relevant sense. In the absence of
suitably equipped perceivers, then, perceptual qualities could make no causal difference in the
world; they would be, as Broadie puts it, “idle and as if dead” (ibid.).
What of the other, perceiver-independent actuality of a perceptual quality, which is not iden-
tical to an episode of actual hearing? Broadie does not deny that sound and the other qualities
specially perceived by the senses can be active in the absence of perceivers, only that their actual-
ity in the absence of perceivers makes any causal difference in the world: “[t]hough the breakers
actually sound unheard on the shore, they make no more difference, in the absence of suitable
perceivers, than would be made by a calm and only potentially sounding sea” (1993, 155).
One may wonder whether someone who accepts a view like Broadie’s is entitled to speak
of a sound that is in actuality yet unheard: if sound is nothing but the power to produce an
auditory perception, sound in actuality would just be its being heard. Moreover, as has become
well-known from the considerable response Broadie’s interpretation has generated, there is good
reason to deny that perceptual qualities should be defined in the way required by the restricted
efficacy principle. In several passages Aristotle seems happy to characterize perceptual qualities
1⁸CompareMet. 9.8, 1049b13–16: “What is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it
to become actual. For instance, I call ‘capable of building a house’ that which can build a house, ‘capable of seeing’
(ὁρατόν) that which can see, and ‘visible’ that which can be seen”.
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without reference to the affections they produce in perceivers. Here, for instance, is how he
characterizes color in De Anima 2.7:
Text 1.7 Now, every color is capable of setting inmotion the actually transparent, and this is its [sc. color’s]
nature.1⁹ (An. 2.7, 418a31–b2)
The mention of color’s “nature” (φύσις) suggests that the ability to set the actually transparent
in motion is at least part of what it is to be a color. Similar, apparently definitional language
appears later in the chapter, where Aristotle reminds us that
Text 1.8 Being for color is for it to be this, [i.e.] to be capable of setting in motion the actually trans-
parent.2⁰ (An. 2.7, 419a9–11)
Neither passage makes explicit reference to perception or the effect color has on a perceiver,
but rather to a capacity to move that which is actually transparent. This suggests that, if we
were to posit any definition on the basis of Aristotle’s De Anima discussion of color, it would be
something like this:21
color as mover of transparent
color := the power to set in motion what is actually transparent
This characterization of color is not equivalent to the one given in terms of its ability to cause
color vision, for whereas the actuality of a power to be seen is actually being seen, the actuality
of a power to move what is actually transparent is actuallymoving the actually transparent.
De Anima’s discussions of the other sensory modalities also contain characterizations of
perceptual qualities that make no explicit reference to their effect on a perceiver. Sound, for
instance, is characterized as themotion of air that has been prevented fromdispersing (420a7–9),
and as the motion produced by an object capable of bouncing off a smooth surface (a21–23).
Even qualities such as odor and flavor, which receive far less detailed treatment in De Anima,
1⁹πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις.
2⁰τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς.
21Although, as I’ll argue further in ch. 2, we actually get no definition of color or any other perceptual quality in
De Anima.
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are nevertheless described in terms of powers that extend beyond the production of a type of
perceptual affection: the objects of taste, for instance, must be potentially or actually moist and
easily soluble in order to cause the perception of flavor (422a17–19).
These apparent violations of perceptual objects’ restricted efficacy are only to be expected.
As many commentators have pointed out, they are in fact required to make sense of the me-
chanics of perception, specifically the role of the medium.22 In Aristotle’s view all causal con-
tact between perceivers and perceptual qualities is carried out via some medium. This is most
apparent in the case of the so-called distance senses: vision, hearing, and smell. Each of the
distance senses is affected by perceptual qualities at a distance via some external medium. The
medium of vision, for instance, is what Aristotle calls the “transparent” (διαφανές). When a
transparent medium is illuminated it becomes actually transparent. A colored body immersed
in an actually transparent (aerial or aqueous)medium produces a visual perception by setting in
motion the air or water insofar as they are transparent, which then sets in motion the visual or-
gan of a perceiver immersed in the same actually transparent medium (An. 419a12–15). It is not
the case, however, that the medium when set in motion thereby sees color. So the actuality by
which color acts on the transparent cannot be the actuality specified in terms of the perceptual
affection it causes in a perceiver. The same account applies to the respective media of hearing
and smell, and indeed also to the media of the contact senses, touch and taste, which are not
external but belong to the body of the perceiving animal (see e.g. 419a25–b3).
The distinction between perceptual qualities and perceptual objects offers a clear way to rec-
oncile Broadie’s restricted efficacy principle with Aristotle’s evident support for the idea that the
essence of perceptual qualities may be spelled out without reference to their effect on a suitably
equipped perceiver. The restricted efficacy principle is an accurate characterization of special
perceptual objects but it is an incorrect characterization of perceptual qualities. What it is to
be a perceptual object is to have the power to produce a certain sort of perception. Perceptual
qualities have the power to produce a certain sort of perception, but what it is to be a perceptual
22Cf. Broackes 1999 and Marmodoro 2014.
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quality does not consist in having this power. The objects of vision, for instance, have the power
to produce certain sorts of visual perception. Colors have the power to produce certain sorts
of visual perception, and to that extent they number among the objects of vision. The colors
however neither exhaust the class of visual objects (An. 418a26–29), nor does having the power
to produce a certain sort of visual perception constitute what colors essentially are. Rather, col-
ors are objects of vision owing to what they essentially are, namely what ground colored objects’
powers to move the actually transparent.
In insisting on this distinction between perceptual qualities and perceptual objects, then,
Aristotle is insisting that being a perceptual object forms no part of what it is to be a perceptual
quality. To the extent that perceptual qualities are objects of the various senses, it is because they
exist in a world of perceivers endowed with organs suitable for perceiving them. But it makes
no difference at all to the existence or nature of these qualities whether there exist perceivers
suitably equipped to perceive them. For this reason Aristotle argues elsewhere that the essential
nature of perceptual qualities is modally more robust than their status as objects of perception.
In a world without perceivers there would be no perceptual objects, but there would be color,
sound, flavor, etc., the underlying qualities that would, in a world of perceivers, be productive
of perceptual affections:23
Text 1.9 So in general, if the objects of perception were all there were, there would be nothing if there
were no ensouled things, since [in that case] there would be no perception. Now it is perhaps true that
there would be no perceptual objects nor percepts, since this is an affection of what perceives. But it is
impossible that what underlies, [i.e.] that which produces the perception, should also not exist without
perception. For it is not the case that perception is of itself. Rather, there is also something else apart
from the perception, which must be prior to the perception. For what moves is naturally prior to what is
moved, and this no less if these are said in relation to one another.2⁴ (Met. 4.5, 1010b30–1011a2)
This passage refines Aristotle’s account of the ontological independence of perceptual objects
23Cf. Broadie 1993, 156–157 and Broackes 1999, 93.
2⁴ὅλως τ' εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν μόνον, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντων τῶν ἐμψύχων· αἴσθησις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν
εἴη. τὸ μὲν οὖν μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα ἴσως ἀληθές (τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθανομένου πάθος
τοῦτό ἐστι), τὸ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ
δὴ ἥ γ' αἴσθησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον
εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως· τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι, κἂν εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα
ταῦτα, οὐθὲν ἧττον.
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perceptual quality perceptual object sense in actuality
potential sound
actual sound = potential object of hearing
sounding = actual object of hearing = hearkening
Table 1.1 Relation of perceptual quality, perceptual object, and sense in actuality
from perceivers in the Categories. It retains the idea that perceptual qualities such as color,
sound, and flavor would remain in a world without perceivers. But it also acknowledges that in
such a world perceptual qualities would not be justly characterized as perceptual objects. What
is presupposed in such an account, of course, is that a color can cease to be visible and a sound
audible without thereby ceasing to be a color or a sound; that, in short, perceptual qualities
needn’t be perceptible.
1.5 Is there a second actuality of perceptual qualities?
I’ve argued that Aristotle accepts both the perceiver-independence of perceptual qualities and
the perceiver-dependence of perceptual objects, but that there is no tension between these claims
since perceptual qualities are not essentially perceptual objects. Rather, given that ours is a world
of perceivers, i.e. that there exist subjects capable of being perceptually affected by colors, sounds,
flavors, and the rest, these qualities are objects of their respective senses. The actuality that gives
perceptual qualities their essence also, in a world of suitably equipped perceivers, makes them
potential objects of perception. But since this actuality is contingent on there actually being
suitably equipped perceivers, the actuality that consists in the actual perception of a given quality
amounts to a distinct actuality additional to the one that defines its essence (see table 1.1).
Fundamental to the interpretation I am proposing is the claim that perceptual qualities are
not perceptible essentially, but in virtue of what they are essentially. I therefore owe an account
of how it is in virtue of what a perceptual quality is essentially that it is perceptible. That is,
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I owe an account of the relation between the perceiver-dependent and perceiver-independent
actualities of a perceptual quality. I will begin to sketch such an account in the next section. But
before that, it will be helpful to consider a prominent family of interpretations this account rules
out.
The thesis uniting this family of interpretations is that the perceiver-independent actuality
of a perceptual quality stands to its perceiver-dependent actuality as first to second actuality.2⁵
Aristotle draws the distinction between what has come to be known as first and second actu-
ality in De Anima 2.5, in an effort to clarify different ways in which animals may be said to
be perceivers in actuality. On the one hand, animals may be said to actually perceive because
they have the capacity to be affected in the appropriate way by perceptual objects; in Aristotle’s
view this first stage is achieved before birth, wrought by the agency of spermatic motions on
the menses in gestation.2⁶ On the other hand, animals who are capable of but are not currently
suffering affection by a perceptually qualified object are also potential perceivers, since they are
not currently realizing their capacity to be so affected. Thus a second and fuller way of actually
perceiving is to be suffering affection by a determinate perceptual quality.
Aristotle furthermore distinguishes the nature of the transition from potentiality that char-
acterizes the process of coming into each stage of actuality. The transition to first actuality per-
ception resembles an ordinary destructive change in which one contrary in a range of attributes
is replaced with another. Akin to how the learner replaces ignorance with an item of knowl-
edge, the perceiver transitioning into first actuality replaces “anesthesia”, or the incapacity to be
affected by perceptual qualities, with the capacity to be so affected. The perceiver’s transition
into second actuality does not likewise involve the replacement of one contrary with another. It
is rather akin to the knower’s transition frommerely having to actually using an item of knowl-
edge:
2⁵See e.g. Osborne 1983, 407, Kosman 1975, 513–514, Polansky 2007, 386–391, Marmodoro 2014, esp. ch. 3. The
interpretation of Silverman 1989 is an interesting variant on this thesis; I discuss it below, at the end of this section.
2⁶See An. 417b16–18; cf. GA 735a12–25 with 743b18–744b27. For detailed discussion, see Johansen 2012, 137–145.
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Text 1.10 Which is either not altering—for the progression is into itself and into its completion—or
it is a different kind of alteration [sc. than that which characterizes a knower’s transition from a state of
ignorance]. This is why it is not well to say that the thinker, when he is engaged in thinking, alters [sc. in
that respect], just as it is neither [well to say that] the house builder [alters in that respect] when he builds
a house.2⁷ (An. 2.5, 417b6–9)
The point that is important for present purposes is that the first and second actualities of a per-
ceiver are serial actualities of a single potentiality, the first representing a stage on the way to the
second and most complete actuality.2⁸ It is this final actuality that determines the essence of the
common capacity, for at this stage, as Aristotle puts it in a parallel passage, “it is most of all in
accordance with its nature (κατὰ φύσιν)” (Phys. 246a14–15).2⁹
Although passages like text 1.4 admittedly suggest a parallel between the dual actualities of
sense and object, Aristotle never explicitly appeals to a distinction between first and second actu-
ality in the case of perceptual qualities. Nevertheless, commentators have found it illuminating
for understanding the connection between the perceiver-dependent and perceiver-independent
actualities of a perceptual quality. Marmodoro (2014) has recently extended the distinction to
perceptual qualities on the grounds that the perceiver-dependent actuality of a perceptual qual-
ity parallels the second actuality of a sense, since both have further actualities whose realization
does not require a change in the predicative subject to which it belongs:
What characterizes a further actuality as opposed to a new first actuality, according to Aris-
totle’s distinction, is whether the actuality of the power changes the subject it belongs to or
not. For instance, if a surface is painted green, it is subject to a change in color; if, after
2⁷ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὑτὸ γὰρ ἡ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος
ἀλλοιώσεως. διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονῇ, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν
οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ.
2⁸See sect. 3.3 for further discussion of this and related passages.
2⁹For a recent discussion of this passage see Coope 2011. Coope raises a worry whether Aristotle is making the
same point in the two passages, observing that in the Phys. passage “Aristotle also wants to maintain that acquir-
ing a defect is not an alteration. Acquiring a defect is certainly not a development into a thing’s true self ” (70).
However, as Coope also notes, there is a parallel reason why defects as well as completions or perfections are not
alterations: “. . . just as becoming excellent is manifesting a property that I already have, but to a greater degree, so
becoming defective is manifesting a property I already have, but to a lesser degree” (71). In both passages, then,
Aristotle want to distinguish processes in which a subject moves, as it were, horizontally between items on a scale of
contrary attributes from processes in which the subject moves, as it were, vertically betweenmore and less complete
realizations of a single nature. And in both passages Aristotle wishes to reserve ‘alteration’ in its strictest sense for
processes of the former variety; cf. An. 2.5, 417b32–418a3.
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having been painted green, the surface is illuminated by bright clear light, its appearance
is altered somewhat—the way in which it looks green is different—but its color has not
changed. Similarly, being seen is a second actuality of the color of the green surface, not a
change. (Marmodoro 2014, 133; her emphasis)
For Marmodoro a perceptual quality’s perceiver-independent actuality (i.e. the illumination of
the green surface), as well its perceiver-dependent actuality (i.e. its actually being seen), are
stages in the realization of a single capacity (i.e. the one associated the affective quality given by
the predicate ‘green’). Of the two it is the perceiver-dependent actuality that marks the fullest
realization of the quality: “[t]he colorwe see, or generally the qualities we perceive, ‘reveal’ what
these qualities can be, and are, when perceived” (ibid., her emphasis).
This ontology of perceptual qualities amounts to whatMarmodoro calls a “subtle” realism on
which perceptual qualities, while in some respect objective, perceiver-independent attributes of
perceptually qualified bodies, nevertheless depend on perceivers for their fullest realization: “for
Aristotle perceptible qualities are in the world such as we perceive them, but only while we per-
ceive them, because they require a perceiver in order to reach their fullest actualization” (Mar-
modoro 2014, 102). However, in marking the perceiver-dependent actuality as the second and
fullest actuality of a perceptual quality, this view treats perceptual qualities as essentially powers
to produce perceptual affection. So although Marmodoro’s view can accommodate perceiver-
independent features of perceptual qualities (for instance, their ability to act on the medium) by
appeal to their first or perceiver-independent actuality, it undermines their ontological indepen-
dence. As we’ve seen, Aristotle is prepared to accept that a world without perceivers is a world
without perceptual objects. Given that, on this view, the fullest expression of a perceptual qual-
ity is its being perceived, he should also be prepared to accept that a world without perceivers
is a world without colors, sounds, odors, and flavors. Yet he does not, but instead asserts that
these qualities, which in a world of perceivers would produce perception, would nevertheless
exist. And he in no way indicates that their existence in such a world would be hobbled, alien-
ated from the conditions that would enable the fullest expression of their nature—a nature that
moreover would be intelligible in that world only by reference to a counterfactual state of affairs
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in which there are suitably equipped perceivers. These considerations strike me as difficulties
for Marmodoro’s view, and indeed for any view that takes the perceiver-dependent actuality of
a perceptual quality to determine any part of its essence.
Silverman (1989) attempts to reconcile the second-actuality approach with the ontological
independence of perceptual qualities, but this view seems to me to fare little better. Silverman
illustrates the approach using the example of color, which is the focus of his discussion:
. . . Aristotle preserves the asymmetry [i.e. the priority of perceptual qualities to the senses
perceptive of them] in the De Anima by adjusting his account of the relation between the
first actuality of the sensible and its second actuality. Instead of defining the essence of red,
for instance, in terms of its second actuality, being seen, he treats the second actuality as the
realization of what in the Posterior Analytics andMetaphysics he calls a necessary accident:
a property belonging to a subject in virtue of its essence but not found in an account of that
essence . . . . That is, in virtue of what, for instance, red is, it is able to cause the perception
of red. Since it is the realization of this necessary accident that is one and the same as the
second actuality of the sense, the sense and sensible are related in a καθ' αὐτό [i.e. per se
and necessary] fashion. (Silverman 1989, 272–273)
Silverman claims that ontological independence is preserved because the perceiver-dependent
actuality of color is distinct from its essence but nevertheless a necessary consequence of it. Vis-
ibility isn’t essential to color, but it is necessary, a consequence of what color essentially is. Thus,
to generalize Silverman’s view, the actuality in terms of which a perceptual quality is defined
is not its “second”, perceiver-dependent actuality but its “first”, perceiver-dependent actuality.
Hence the “adjustment” Silverman sees Aristotle making to the relation between first and sec-
ond actuality is nothing short of denying that the second actuality of a capacity is the fullest
realization of its nature: the complete realization of knowledge may be the contemplation of it,
but the complete realization of a perceptual quality is not likewise the perception of it.
One may well object to Silverman’s use of the labels ‘first actuality’ and ‘second actuality’,
which Aristotle distinguishes precisely in order to identify the latter as the fullest realization of
a potentiality such as those for knowing and perceiving.3⁰ Yet, perhaps surprisingly, Silverman
insists that Aristotle “clearly holds” that the perceiver-dependent actuality is the second actu-
3⁰This, I take it, is the substance of Marmodoro’s objection to Silverman’s interpretation; see Marmodoro 2014,
129–130.
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ality of perception (Silverman 1989, 280). The reason, I suspect, is that Silverman does not see
Aristotle’s terms for the objects of vision and his terms for the qualities that, in a world of visual
perceivers, are objects of vision as tracking essentially different potentialities. That is, Silver-
man wants to hold on to the idea that visibility is follows from the essence of color even though
visibility cannot be admitted into an account of what it is to be colored. His solution is to say
that the status of color as an object of vision is a “necessary (or essential) accident” of color, a
property that is not the essence of color but which is true of it in virtue of its essence.
The problem with this suggestion is that it gets the per se connection between being a per-
ceptual quality and being a perceptual object wrong. In saying that visibility is a “necessary
accident” of color, Silverman is setting up a comparison between the per se connection between
color and visibility and the per se connection between the terms in demonstrable propositions
such as ‘all triangles have interior angles equal to two right angles (2R)’ and—Silverman’s exam-
ple of choice—‘all humans can learn grammar’. These attributes are demonstrable because they
belong to their respective subjects in virtue of what those subjects are. As a sign of this, notice
that in each case the subject cannot be what it is without possessing the relevant attribute: take
away the attribute given by the predicate ‘has interior angles equal to 2R’ and the subject ceases
to be a triangle; take away the attribute given by the predicate ‘is (always or for the most part)
able to learn grammar’ and the subject ceases to be human. The same test fails, however, when
we consider the proposition ‘all colors (or all colored things) are visible’: take away the attribute
given by ‘is an object of vision’ and the subject does not cease to be a color (or colored). The
reason, I suggest, is that visibility holds of color, not in virtue of what color is, but in virtue of
what visibility is. On this view, to posit a per se connection between color and visibility is to set
up a comparison with the terms in demonstrable propositions such as ‘all broad-leafed plants
are leaf-shedders’, which in Aristotle’s view holds in virtue of what the attribute is. Hence, on
this view, visibility could not be what it is without its being an attribute of color. But this account
of their per se connection also erases any temptation to treat visibility as a “second” actuality of
color, since there is no suggestion that color could not be what it is if it were not visible.
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Nevertheless, there is something importantly right about Silverman’s view. The explana-
tory direction must run from the essence-giving, perceiver-independent actuality of a percep-
tual quality to its perceiver-dependent actuality. Our question, then, must be how it is that an
attribute like color, understood as the quality by which an object is able to set in motion the
actually transparent, makes colored objects visible in a world of perceivers.
1.6 Same cause, different effects
In the closing lines ofDe Anima 2.12 Aristotle raises and arguably answers a question that bears
directly on the present discussion. He has just observed that imperceptive bodies are “affected in
someway” (παθών τι) by perceptible qualities, as for instance air that has been affected by odor
becomes, not smelling, but smelly (424b16). The observation raises an important question: how
does perceptual affection differ from the sort of effect perceptual qualities have on imperceptive
bodies?
Text 1.11 What then is smelling apart from being in some way affected? Isn’t it that smelling is perceiv-
ing, while air suddenly affected becomes perceptible?31 (An. 2.12, 424b16–18)
The passage has been the subject of intense controversy and a notorious crux of the 20th cen-
tury debate between materialist and so-called spiritualist interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of
perception.32 In recent years, however, something of a consensus has arisen that text 1.11 at the
very least reflects Aristotle’s commitment to something like the following principle:
kinetic homogeneity
The motion produced in the sense organ by the actuality of a perceptual quality is of type T
iff the motion it produces in the medium is of type T.33
31τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ παθὼν
ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται; Following Kosman 1975 and many others, I omit καὶ at b17.
32See e.g. Burnyeat 1992, criticized by Sorabji 1992, 219–220, criticized by Johansen 1997, 279n30, criticized by
Caston 2002, 756n10.
33See Burnyeat 2001, 133, Caston 2002, 755–756.
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The grounds for attributing such a principle to Aristotle come from the prepositional phrase
παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι, which I translated “apart from being in some way affected”. While in
Aristotle’s usage an assertion of the form ‘X is something apart from (παρά) Y ’ needn’t entail
that X is Y,3⁴ it does entail that there is Y as well as X. It seems therefore to be an implication
of text 1.11 that, whatever it is that distinguishes smelling from becoming smelly, it is over and
above an affection that is common to both cases. This constrains how we account for the differ-
ential impact of a perceptual quality on themedium (which does not perceive) and the perceiver
(who does): whatever accounts for the difference must be a component external to the common
motion suffered by the medium and the perceiver at the hands of the perceptual quality.3⁵
The reason why kinetic homogeneity is acceptable to all parties to the debate is that it
carries no implications about the nature of perceptual affection. The principle states an equiva-
lence relation, so all that is required of an interpretation according to which perceptual affection
is a purely formal or “spiritual” change is that the motion in the medium also be a purely for-
mal or “spiritual” change. Likewise an interpretation according to which perceptual affection is
a material or “matter-involving” change must maintain that the motion in the medium is also
a material or “matter-involving” change. What I intend to say about the relation between the
perceiver-independent and perceiver-dependent actualities of a perceptual quality is also neu-
tral on the nature of perceptual affection, though I think my proposal will remove some of the
difficulties sometimes associatedwithmaterialist accounts of the perceiver’s transition to second
actuality perceiving. My claim will be that what differentiates a perceptual quality’s perceiver-
independent and the perceiver-dependent actuality in Aristotle’s view is just this: the latter is
the same in number as a perception of the relevant quality, whereas the former is the same in
number as a motion in the medium. In accordance with kinetic homogeneity, the agency of
the perceptual quality in both cases consists in the production of the same type of motion. Yet
3⁴See Johansen 1997, 279n30.
3⁵Cf. Caston 2002, 756: “[i]f perceiving is a special case of undergoing a change [=being in some way affected,
παθών τι] . . . it can only be because of what else is true of the event, and not because it involves a distinct sense of
‘undergoing a change”’ (his emphasis).
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the same motion produces, and is moreover numerically identical to, different types of affec-
tion, and to mark this difference Aristotle calls them different actualities of the same perceptual
quality.
How can the same motion produce distinct actualities? Starting with the medium, I’ll argue
that the difference consists wholly in the nature of the affected patient.
1.6.1 Affection of the medium
In the chain of causes linking a perceptually qualified body to a perceiver, the medium plays
the role of a moved mover: the active quality produces a motion in the medium, which in turn
moves the relevant sense organ and produces perception.3⁶ I’ve argued that the mediummay be
moved by a perceptual quality in this way even in the absence of a perceiver, and in such cases
too its activity may be understood on the model of a moved mover. Take color, an attribute the
possession of which enables an object to move an actually transparent medium. Transparency
is a nature (φύσις) common to air and water, by virtue of which each is subject to a distinctive
sort of affection at the hands of fiery bodies, namely illumination: actual transparency brought
about by the presence of fire is light, and potential transparency brought about by its absence is
darkness. Sowhen a colored body comes to be present in an illuminatedmedium, its potentiality
to move the actually transparent is activated.
It is not necessarily the case, however, that all parts of the medium are affected directly and
immediately by the actualized quality. This is most evident in the case of the qualities specially
perceived by the other distance senses, where it is evident that a perceiver closer to the source
of a sound or an odor will perceive it before one more distant from it (cf. Sens. 446a20–25).
Indeed, in such cases the sound or the odor will often be more intense for the more proximal
perceiver. What explains such phenomena in Aristotle’s view is the fact that the medium is
continuous, so that its motion is divisible into parts. The parts of the medium directly adjacent
to the source of the sound or smell are moved first, and their motion produces further motion
3⁶See e.g. An. 2.7, 419a13–15, a25–31; 3.12, 434b29–435a2.
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in parts of the medium continuous with them. This outward propagation of the motion set up
by the actuality of the perceptual quality presupposes relations of efficient-causal priority, first
of the actualized quality to the parts of the medium directly adjacent to the qualified body, and
then of these to more distal parts of the medium. The directly adjacent parts of the medium are
set in motion only if the perceptually qualified body sets them in motion, and the more distal
parts of the medium are set in motion only if the more proximal parts are in motion. In cases
of local movement efficient-causal priority implies temporal priority, so Aristotle concludes it
is reasonable that in the case of sound and odor too what is closer to the source will be affected
first. These parts are also affected more intensely, since the force of an external motion in such
cases tends to dissipate as it propagates outward from its source.3⁷
Color appears disanalogous to sound and odor in this respect. As Aristotle acknowledges, it
is less obvious that there is a discernible difference in time or intensity in the visual experience
of the observers at different distances but with equally clear perspectives on a colored object; it
is obvious neither that the color reaches the closer observer first, nor that her experience of it
is any more vibrant or intense. Aristotle attributes this apparent disanalogy to a difference in
the kind of motion color produces in comparison with a quality like sound: sound in actuality
seems to be a kind of local movement, whereas color in actuality, if any kind of motion at all,
is an alteration of the medium (Sens. 446b29–447a1). It is not uniformly true of alterations that
they propagate in the way local movements do, but neither is it impossible for alterations to
unfold in that way:
Text 1.12 For it is possible [for what is altered] to be altered all at once, and not one half of it before [the
rest]; e.g. [it is possible] for water to freeze simultaneously in every part. However, if what is heated or
frozen is vast, what has it is affected by what has it, but the first part changes on account of itself having
3⁷This account conforms to the model Aristotle provides at Phys. 267a2–10: “. . . what first produces motion is
able to move the air or the water or something else which is of such a nature as to move and be moved. But its
moving and being moved do not cease at the same time; rather, its being moved ceases at the same time as what
moves it ceases moving it, though it is still moving. For this reason too it moves something else adjacent to it—and
to this the same account [applies]. But [the moving] stops when power to produce motion (ἡ δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν)
comes to be in each case lesser in what is adjacent to it, and finally comes to a stop whenever the prior [mover] no
longer imparts moving, but only being moved”.
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been altered, and the whole thing need not be altered at the same time.3⁸ (Sens. 6, 447a1–6)
There ismoreover good reason to think the alteration set up by color propagates sequentially. As
is the case for sound and smell, Aristotle acknowledges that there is a maximal distance beyond
which the actually colored object is no longer visible (Sens. 449a27–34). Explaining this sort of
phenomenon would be difficult if the parts of the mediummore directly adjacent to the colored
body did not have some causal priority over the more distant parts. More generally, there is
no reason to think that air or water operating as the medium for color is any less continuous
or divisible than when it is operating as the medium for sound or odor. That the colors are
not observed to propagate over time is therefore no evidence that they don’t. (Aristotle may
think that the distance it would have to propagate in order for the interval to be noticeable
exceeds the maximal distance of visibility, or that the visible object would have to be massive on
a inconceivable scale and so visible at inconceivably vast distances.3⁹)
Even in the absence of perceivers, then, the medium operates as a moved mover.⁴⁰ This role
of the medium is the key to understanding the sort of motion it suffers by the agency of a per-
ceptual quality. As the moved mover in the chain of causes linking a perceiver to a perceptual
quality, the medium acts as what we, on the basis of Aristotle’s discussion of affective qualities
in Categories 8, may call an “affective” affection. Recall from our discussion of that chapter that
Aristotle distinguishes affective qualities from what he calls “affections” (πάθη). By ‘affections’
3⁸ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἥμισυ πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἂν ᾖ πολὺ τὸ θερμαινόμενον ἢ πηγνύμενον, τὸ ἐχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχομένου πάσχει, τὸ δὲ
πρῶτον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος μεταβάλλει καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ ἀθρόον. Reading
καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη at a6 with EM and most editors/translators, as is required by the sense of the text.
3⁹Aristotle does however insist that light does not travel, arguing that it is not a motion but a sort of presence of
a fiery body; see Sens. 446a27–28, cf. An. 418b20–27. This observation occasions an extremely difficult passage in
which Aristotle claims that the parts of a perceptual medium are not affected at the same time “except in the case
of light for the aforementioned reason [sc. that light is not a motion but a presence], and for the same reason in the
case of seeing, since light produces seeing” (447a9–11). The remark may seem to contradict the interpretation I’m
proposing. But note that Aristotle does not state explicitly that color affects the transparent as a whole. Moreover,
Aristotle’s remark that light produces vision is curious, since his official position is that color is the per se efficient
cause of vision. Light is however a precondition for color vision, so Aristotle’s point may be that the medium of
vision is affected all at once insofar as it is illuminated, which is a cause of vision. It would not follow from this
point, however, that the alteration of the medium produced by color does not propagate.
⁴⁰This can be true even of the last portion of the medium to be affected, which may be the terminus of the series
only because themotion set up by the activated quality is by that point too weak to impart motive force; see note 37.
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hemeans attributes like the temporary coloration of a face that has become red from embarrass-
ment or white from fear, which in Aristotle’s view may be mistaken for affective qualities but
which nevertheless have a very different ontological basis in the object possessing the relevant
attribute.⁴1 We saw that the principal contrast between affections and affective qualities is not
that the former are engendered through a process of affection (he notes that many objects can
acquire qualities like color in that way, 9b9–11). Nor is it that these attributes lack the power
to produce an affection in something else (he observes that the same sort of coloration as that
exhibited by the embarrassed or frightened person could come about naturally, b16–19). It is
rather because, unlike affective qualities, which are uniformly stable, long-lasting, and hard to
change, affections are unstable, ephemeral, and depart soon after the process of affection pro-
ducing them subsides:
Text 1.13 Those attributes that have their source in certain hard to change and stable affections are
called qualities. For if pallor or darkness should have come about in the thing’s natural constitution they
are called qualities, since in respect of them we are said to be qualified. Or if pallor or darkness should
result from a lengthy illness or from a sunburn, and aren’t easily gotten rid of or even remain for life,
they are called qualities—for in the same way we are said to be qualified in respect of them. But those
[attributes] that come about from what is easily gotten rid of and quickly restored are called affections.
For no one is said to be qualified in respect of them. For one who has turned red from embarrassment
is not called ruddy, nor is one who has turned pale from fear [called] pale, but rather they have been
somehow affected. Thus such [attributes] are called affections, not qualities.⁴2 (Cat. 8, 9b19–33)
Aristotle is making a familiar point. We don’t say of a Callias blushing from embarrassment
that he has a ruddy complexion. We don’t because we don’t mistake the redness in Callias’
face for his actual complexion. Rather than attributing the redness to Callias, it is much more
natural to attribute it to his embarrassment. We say we can see the embarrassment on his face,
⁴1See sect. 1.1 above.
⁴2ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν
ἀρχὴν εἴληφε ποιότητες λέγονται· εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία γεγένηται,
ποιότης λέγεται, ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα, εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα συμβέβηκεν
ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ
αὐταὶ λέγονται, ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα. ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ
ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταῦτα· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ
ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.
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affective quality affective affection affection
embarrassment redness from embarrassment perception of redness
perceptual quality moved medium affected sense organ
Table 1.2 Structural parallel between agency of the medium and “affective affections”
as if acknowledging that the source of the coloration is not Callias but his emotion. Yet it is
nevertheless the case that Callias, as much as the person with a naturally ruddy complexion,
appears red. Both are productive of a perception of redness, but only one does so by virtue of
having the quality of redness.⁴3
There is a striking structural parallel between a medium set in motion by a perceptual qual-
ity and such “affective” affections (see table 1.2). First, like an affective quality, the medium is a
moved mover, an actuality simultaneously dependent on a causally prior actuality and produc-
tive of further, causally posterior actualities. Second, the causal agency of the medium, like that
of the sort of affective affections we’ve been considering, is dependent on the causal source of
its actuality. Just as the ruddy appearance of a blushing Callias lasts only as long as embarrass-
ment has a grip on him, the ability of the medium to produce further motions of the sort set
up by the perceptual quality lasts only as long as the motive force set up by the relevant qual-
ity remains. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the moved medium, like the subject of the
affective affection, retains its natural character even while suffering affection. Just as a blushing
Callias retains his complexion, themovedmedium does not acquire the quality whosemotion it
helps to propagate. An actually transparent medium propagates the motion set up by a colored
body, but in so doing it does not thereby cease to be transparent.
This proposal captures two important desiderata for an account of the medium’s causal role.
⁴3A slightly more technical way of putting the point would be to make use of Aristotle’s account of inherence in
Cat. 2, according to which an attribute present in something as subject is one “which, being in something not as a
part, cannot be separate from what it is present in” (1a24–25). Aristotle’s point in distinguishing affective qualities
from affections seems tome to clarify that while qualities are inherent in their possessors, affections are not. To this
extent the proposition that Callias is red (or red-faced) is false on the truth conditions for in-predications, whereas
an equivalent proposition predicating redness of someone with a ruddy complexion would be true.
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First, it allows us to say that the impact of a perceptual quality on the medium is more than a
“Cambridge” or relational change.⁴⁴ There are several reasons to resist such an interpretation.
For starters, Aristotle uniformly and consistently describes a perceptual quality’s impact on the
medium in terms of “motions” (κινήσεις), as for instance the actuality of color in the medium
is a motion and sound itself is a kind of motion. Further, we’ve seen that Aristotle thinks the
motions in the medium propagate, with one part of the continuous medium being affected prior
to another. Such an account would be hardly intelligible if a perceptual quality had no non-
relational effect on themedium. In contrast, by treating themotion set up by a perceptual quality
in the medium as an affective affection, we can say that the effect a perceptual quality has on the
medium is that of acting on it such that it becomes itself able to produce perceptual affection.
Second, the proposal allows us to say that effect produced in the medium by a perceptual
quality is nonetheless that of a temporary affection. It would be too strong to claim that an af-
fected part of themedium has thereby acquired the relevant perceptual quality. The transparent,
for instance, is “receptive” (δεκτικὸν) of color precisely because it is colorless even in actuality,
and the same sort of account applies to the other perceptual media:
Text 1.14 The colorless is receptive of color, the soundless of sound. Now, the transparent is colorless,
as is the invisible or scarcely visible, as e.g. darkness seems to be. Such [sc. dark] is the transparent, but
not when it is transparent in actuality, rather in potentiality. For this nature is sometimes darkness and
sometimes light.⁴⁵ (An. 2.7, 418a26–429a1)
A medium in actuality that has been affected by the proper perceptual quality does not cease
to be receptive of that sort of quality. The transparent, for instance, becomes “incidentally” or
“indeterminately” colored.⁴⁶ Such descriptions signal that although the affected medium has
acquired the potential to produce further affections of that sort, as though it had become e.g.
colored or sounding or odorous, this potential is not due to its having actually acquired the rele-
⁴⁴Pace Alexander apud Burnyeat 1995, 424; for criticism, see Johansen 1997, 136–145.
⁴⁵ἔστι δὲ χρώματος μὲν δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφου δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. ἄχρουν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ
τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ διαφανὲς μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅταν
ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅταν δυνάμει· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις ὁτὲ μὲν σκότος ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς ἐστιν.
⁴⁶See Sens. 439a18–19, b1–5.
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vant quality. Rather, its potency is dependent on the activity of the perceptually qualified body.
So the character, intensity, and duration of the motion produced in the medium is dependent
on the character, intensity, and duration of the actuality of the relevant perceptual quality. The
motion, in other words, is a temporary affection of themedium in actuality, an effect that instills
the potency to produce further such affections. But it does so only given the sustained activity of
the relevant perceptual quality, which remains the ultimate or “primary” (πρῶτον) cause of the
resulting affection. Treating the perceptual quality’s movement of the medium as an affective
affection provides a plausible model for understanding this type of motion or alteration.
The present proposal has some affinity to Marmodoro’s recent account of medial “distur-
bances”, according to which the medium is not “changed” by the activity of a perceptual quality,
but “suffers only what is required to enable the perceptible form to be ‘commuted’ to the per-
ceiver” (Marmodoro 2014, 149, cf. Scaltsas 1996). On my view too the medium is not changed,
if what one means by “changed’ is equivalent to becoming qualified in the same way as the per-
ceptually qualified body. However, my view does not require the medium to suffer “only what
is required to enable affection of the perceiver”, whatever that may turn out to be. Nothing in
the present account rules out that the affection of the medium by a perceptual quality may bring
about effects that do not bear on the affection of a perceiver. Further, in light of our above result
that being perceptible is a non-essential feature of perceptual qualities, the restriction seems en-
tirely arbitrary. Aristotle in fact explicitly recognizes the possibility of non-perceptual effects,
at least in the case of odor: fumes from charcoal may cause asphyxiation in humans, and those
of brimstone death in some animals (Sens. 5, 444b30–445a4). There thus seems to me to be no
reason to limit the impact of a perceptual quality on themedium towhat is necessary for percep-
tion; and if affective affections give a plausible model of the operation of the medium, nothing
does so limit the impact of a perceptual quality.
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1.6.2 Affection of the perceiver
I’ve argued that the actuality of a perceptual quality is a motion, either a local movement (as in
the case of sound) or a distinctive kind of “alteration” (as in the case of color and likely smell and
the objects of the contact senses). Applied to the medium, the motion or alteration set up by the
quality is numerically identical to an affection of themediumwhereby it acquires the potency to
set up further motions without thereby acquiring the relevant quality. By kinetic homogene-
ity it should follow that a sense organ continuous with a medium activated in this way suffers
the same sort of affection. What is the evidence Aristotle saw this sort motion involved in the
affection of a perceiver?
The best evidence comes from Aristotle’s account of the composition of the sense organs.
As we’ve seen, to be receptive of a perceptual quality a subject must lack qualification in the
relevant dimension. In Aristotle’s view this principle extends as much to the perceiver as it does
to the medium. Part of what makes a sense organ receptive to a genus of perceptual quality
is that it is composed of the same type of stuff as the medium proper to that genus of percep-
tual quality (An. 3.1, 424b31–34). For example, the eye as the organ of vision must be made of
transparent stuff, either air or water.⁴⁷ Likewise the ear as the organ of hearing is composed of
confined, motionless air because air, when suitably confined, possesses in actuality the nature
that mediates auditory perception, a nature subsequent commentators dubbed “the transonant”
(τὸ διηχές).⁴⁸
One reason why Aristotle takes the sense organs to be receptive to perceptual qualities in the
same way as the relevant medium is that perceptual qualities affect the sense organs in the same
way as they do their respective media.⁴⁹ Thus Aristotle refers in an important set of passages to
the transparent fluid in the eye being moved “qua transparent” by light and by visible objects,
⁴⁷See Sens. 438a12–16: the eye happens to be composed of water because water is more easily confined and con-
densed than air.
⁴⁸See e.g. Themistius, in De an. 62.31, 70.15–21.
⁴⁹There are in fact several reasons why the sense organs must qua organs be composed in this way. See chs. 3.2
and 4.6.1 for detailed discussion.
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and he associates certain visual pathologies (e.g. hypersensitivity to light) to the eye being in-
ordinately moved “qua fluid” by light and visible objects (GA 779b35–780a3). Such inordinate
motions are malfunctions of the eye, since vision just is a motion of the fluid in the eye qua
transparent:
Text 1.15 But seeing is the motion of this part [sc. the eye] qua transparent, but not qua fluid.⁵⁰
(GA 5.1, 780a4–5)
To generalize this pattern of explanation, we might say that what it is for a perceptual quality to
cause perception is for it to move the perceiver’s relevant sense organ qua medium.
This preliminary account validates kinetic homogeneity: the motion of the perceptual
quality by which it moves a medium is the same in kind as the motion by which it causes per-
ception in a perceiver. Like the medium, the motion set up in the sense organ by the perceptual
quality is an affection in which it acquires the potency to set up further motions without thereby
acquiring the relevant quality.⁵1 It however remains to be shown how the samemotion can cause
two very different sorts of affection. Why does moving the medium qua medium cause it to be-
come perceptible, while moving the sense organ qua medium cause perception?
The answer, I submit, does not concern how the perceptual quality causes affection in the
two cases, but rather what is affected. In the case of the media, what is affected is something
simple: air or water in the case of the external media, which possess natures which enable them
to be affected by color, sound, and odor.⁵2 These same natures are present in the sense organs,
except that they are present, not as natures of simple bodies, but as a part of a compound organ
⁵⁰ἔστι δ' ἡ τούτου τοῦ μορίου κίνησις ὅρασις ᾗ διαφανὲς ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ὑγρόν. Note the emphasis on
the copula, which Aristotle places at the front of the sentence to highlight the contrast with the pathological case
paraphrased above.
⁵1This consequence is perhaps reflected in Aristotle’s assertion that what is engaged in seeing (τὸ ὁρῶν) is “as
though it had been colored” (ὠς κεχρωμάτισται), so that the subject’s seeing comes to be in a way visible (An.
425b17–24). On the interpretation I’m proposing, the implication would be that affection produced by the actuality
of a color in the transparent sense organ (as well as the transparent medium) is akin to a process of coloration, since
both acquire the potency to set up the sort of chromatic motions produced by the color in actuality. But the process
is only like a process of coloration, since neither the medium nor the organ acquiring a different color quality.
⁵2See An. 424b29–30. Matters are different in the case of flesh and the tongue, the bodily media of the con-
tact senses, which seem to operate simultaneously as media and as peripheral organs; see PA 653b19–27 and, for
discussion, Johansen 1997, 201–212.
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of perception. A sense organ such as the eye, in Aristotle’s view, is an organic structure. That is,
it is (like the living body of which it is a part) a material compound functionally organized for
the realization of a psychological capacity possessed by the organism, namely vision. So unlike
the motion qua medium of the simple aerial or aqueous stuff that mediates perceptual contact
between a perceiver and a perceptually qualified body, the motion qua medium of a sense organ
is the realization of an end for whose sake the organ is composed and structured as it is. To
recall a passage quoted earlier, such a motion when present in the sense organ is a “progression
into itself and into its completion” of the organ insofar as it functionally organized for the sake
of being receptive to such a motion (see text 1.10 above).
In short, when Aristotle equates seeing with the movement of the fluid part of an eye qua
transparent, he is speaking of an ensouled eye, an eye endowed with the power to see. An eye
severed from a living body could be moved qua transparent by a color as long as it retains its
inner moisture, but this motion would not constitute seeing. It is this fact—that the motion qua
medium the quality produces in the sense organ is produced in an ensouled organ functionally
organized for the sake of being so moved—that makes this actuality of a perceptual quality dis-
tinct. Unlike the motion produced in the medium, the motion it produces in the sense organ is
the same in number as a second actuality, a fuller realization of the nature that is the form and
essence of the embodied organ. Because the sense organ, unlike the medium, is functionally
organized for the sake of being so affected by the relevant type of perceptual quality, the same
activity on the part of the quality can bring about different types of affection, one that is and one
that is not the second actuality of a capacity to suffer affection by qualities of that type.
One clear consequence of this interpretation is that Aristotle’s notion of second actuality
is thinner than it is often understood to be. Specifically, this interpretation distinguishes sec-
ond actuality, understood as a transition into a fuller realization of a thing’s nature, from what
are sometimes called “non-destructive changes”.⁵3 These are changes that do not involve the
destruction of a contrary (as e.g. turning from red to green, where these are understood as af-
⁵3See ch. 3.3 for a fuller development of this view of non-destructive changes.
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fective qualities) but rather preserve the potentiality of what is being affected. A non-destructive
change may be the second actuality of some capacity, but it would not on this view be because
it is a non-destructive change. As I’ve tried to illustrate in the case of affective affections, Aris-
totle’s ontology contains many non-destructive changes that are not second actualities. Indeed,
if I am right, the affection produced in the medium by a perceptual quality is a non-destructive
change, but it is also not a second actuality—the air surrounding me is not there for the sake of
mediating color vision. All second actualities however must be non-destructive changes, since
it cannot be a fuller realization of one capacity to be replaced with one contrary to it. This is in
line with what Aristotle says about second actuality in De Anima 2.5: recall from text 1.10 above
that Aristotle adduces the status of active contemplation as a complete realization of knowledge
as a premise to show that it is a non-destructive change. This is consistent with the idea that
these are not both essential features of second actualities.
I claim this consequence as an advantage of the present interpretation. It has long been
claimed, especially by spiritualists but also by materialists, that transitions into second actuality
have something mysterious and “anti-physicalist” about them from the perspective of modern
science. The idea that physical changes of the sort thought to be involved in sense perception
can be accomplished without the underlying matter being altered has been held to suggest that
the relevant sort of change is not material at all, that it is a purely formal or “spiritual” change
with no material component; and it has been a challenge to materialist approaches to show
just how a matter-involving change can be non-destructive in the required way. However, if
I am right, non-destructive changes are much easier to come by than previously thought. A
blushing Callias comes to appear red, but he does not do so by acquiring the quality of redness,
since his underlying complexion has not changed. If, as I’ve suggested, this offers a plausible
model for non-destructive changes in general, there should be nomystery at all concerning how
such a change can be matter-involving. I emphasize that this does not show that Aristotle is a
materialist about perceptual alteration, only that understanding how a non-destructive change
can be matter-involving should pose no barrier to a materialist interpretation of his theory of
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perception.
1.7 Objectivity and experience
On the interpretation I’ve presented in this chapter, Aristotle’s claim in text 1.1 that there are
no perceptual objects in actuality in the absence of perceivers, which has seemed to some as a
concession to irrealism, is really no concession at all. The claim relies on an essential distinction
between perceptual objects and perceptual qualities. To be a perceptual object is to be percepti-
ble by a perceptual capacity, for instance vision or taste. For Aristotle colors, flavors, and other
perceptual qualities are the paradigm cases of perceptual objects, the items most strictly per-
ceived by the individual senses and to which they are in their essence related. But in Aristotle’s
view the status of perceptual qualities as objects of the senses is no part of what it is to be those
qualities, but an attribute they acquire in virtue of what they essentially are, plus the additional
fact that there exist perceivers suitably equipped to be affected by qualities of that sort. The last
section sketched a way to discharge a burden of this account, namely the burden of showing how
it is that perceptual qualities come to be perceived owing to what they are essentially. I argued
that, from the point of view of the quality itself, the (perceiver-dependent) actuality of a per-
ceptual quality relative to a perceiver is no different than its (perceiver-independent) actuality
relative to the medium. The evident difference in the effect produced in the two cases, namely
that the one becomes actually perceptivewhereas the other becomes actually perceptible, is owing
entirely to the nature of the affected subject: in one case, but not in the other, the actuality of the
quality is numerically identical to the actual perception of that quality, the fullest realization of
the subject’s capacity to perceive qualities of that type. So even though it belongs to the essence
of the latter to be related to and receptive of the former, it makes no ontological difference from
the point of view of a perceptual quality whether it exists in a world of perceivers. We are per-
ceptive so that we may perceive the world, but the world is not perceptually qualified so that we
may perceive it.
In concluding, I would like to address a worry that might be raised for an interpretation like
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the one I just sketched. The worry, in short, is that Aristotle’s view as I’ve presented it leaves out
the subjective and qualitative aspects of sense experience. What differentiates the affection pro-
duced by a perceptual quality in the medium and in a suitably equipped perceiver is more than
the fact that the latter, but not the former, is the fulfillment of a nature whose fullest realization
is to be affected by the relevant type of quality. The affection produced in the perceiver is also an
episode of perception. It is, in other words, an experience of a perceiver, which implies that there
is something it is like to be in the perceptual state, i.e. qualities that characterize, in one way or
another, the phenomenal state of the active perceiver. It moreover implies that the perceiver
in being affected by the perceptually qualified object adopts a perspective on that object, so that
there is something subjective about the way the perceiver is affected. These are characteristics
many would be hesitant to attribute to an affection produced in a lifeless medium. Aristotle
would agree: he takes it as a distinguishing feature of alterations suffered by animate things that
they are “not unaware of being affected” (οὐ λανθάνει πάσχον, Phys. 244b15–245a1). What then
is it that imputes these additional experiential features to the affection produced in perceivers?
I think there are a couple of ways to respond to this question. One way is to construe it as a
demand for an account of how a perceptual affection can be a conscious or phenomenal experi-
ence. Admittedly, I have said nothing to account for how the affection of a perceiver gives rise
to these aspects of sense experience. Nor, in keeping with my focus on the nature of perceptual
qualities, have I here essayed an interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of sense (αἴσθησις) as
“what is receptive of perceptual forms [i.e. bodies insofar as they are colored, flavored, sound-
ing, etc.; cf. 424a22–23] without the matter” (An. 423b17–19), a claim that many have taken to
be crucial to Aristotle’s understanding of the experiential aspects of perceiving. Though a full
defense of this claim will have to wait,⁵⁴ I believe what Aristotle means by this claim is fully con-
sistent with the account of perceptual affection presented in this chapter. But note moreover
that nothing I have said so far conflicts with any extant account of consciousness in Aristotelian
psychology. For all I have said, the explanation may be that the matter of a living animal body
⁵⁴See ch. 3.3.
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is “already pregnant with consciousness”, i.e. that consciousness is a primitive feature of matter
functionally organized to be affected by a given type of perceptual quality, one that does not
admit of a more fundamental analysis (Burnyeat 1992, cf. Burnyeat 2001, 149–150). Or, for all
I’ve said, it may be that Aristotle holds a relational account of consciousness, according to which
perceptual awareness is explained by the fact that token perceptual states are reflexively directed
at themselves as well as at the external perceptual object (Caston 2002). In short, what I’ve said
about the nature of perceptual qualities and how they operate on the perceiver is neutral on the
important and extremely controversial question of Aristotle’s views on the conscious elements
of perceptual experience.
There is, however, another way of construing the question that does bear on Aristotle’s con-
ception of perceptual qualities. On this construal the demand is rather for an account of how
perceptual qualities appear as they do in sense experience. Perception, wemay assume, is an ex-
periential state in which perceptual qualities phenomenally appear to the perceiver in a certain
characteristic way. Given that there is a way that perceptual qualities are phenomenallymanifest
in sense experience, we may ask: what explains how perceptual affection by a particular flavor,
or tone, or shade of color produces the phenomenal appearance it does?
This question seems to present a challenge for the sort of account I’ve attributed to Aristo-
tle. I’ve argued that Aristotle accepts a thorough and demanding objectivism about perceptual
qualities, according to which objects could be actually flavored, or sounding, or colored in the
fullest sense even if nothing was suitably equipped to perceive them. These qualities can be fully
actualized in the absence of suitably equipped perceivers because their actuality consists, not
in being perceived, but in certain interactions—motions and alterations of bodies that serve as
the media for perceptual affection—whose nature is fully describable in terms of the general
physical principles governing motion and change. So described, however, the actualities of per-
ceptual qualities do not seem to bewhat we are presentedwithwhenwe encounter them in sense
experience. Colors, in Aristotle’s view, are features of bodies whereby they produce motions in
an illuminated medium; yet we would not be tempted to describe colors as they appear to us
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in experience in the same way. To this extent the account I’ve attributed to Aristotle seems to
commit him to a contrast between perceptual qualities as they are in themselves and percep-
tual qualities as they are manifest in experience. Hence, to the extent that the interpretation
I’ve provided fails to spell out the connection between what a perceptual quality is and how it is
phenomenally manifest in experience, it appears to fall short.
The challenge as I’ve presented it embodies an assumption implicit in many contempo-
rary discussions of the nature of perceptible properties, especially contemporary discussions
of color.⁵⁵ The thesis states that if the perceptible property in question is a physical property,
a property whose nature can be spelled out in terms of the principles and concepts of physics,
there is a difference between how properties of that sort are in themselves and how they are
manifest in experiences as of them. As a result, the physicalist about perceptible properties is
typically held to owe an account of the connection between, on the one hand, the physical prop-
erty with which she identifies the relevant type of perceptible property and, on the other, the
way the property is manifest in experience. For instance, a physicalist about color may hold
that colors are identical to “ways of altering light”, a description which may apply to a physical
disposition of a colored body (or its microphysical grounds), but which would not obviously
extend to the colors as they are presented to us in visual experience. The color physicalist there-
fore seems to owe us an account of the connection between the physical nature of the colors and
how they are manifest in experience, an account that will more often than not take the form of
the view that the limited access color vision affords us of the colors obscures their natures.
Aristotle’s view, on the interpretation I proposed, has affinities to the color physicalist’s. Col-
ors and other perceptual qualities in his view are attributes of bodies whereby they produce cer-
tain types of physical effects; they are “ways of moving the medium”. To this extent he seems
likewise bound to give us an account of the contrast between the physical nature of perceptual
qualities and how they are manifest in experience. Surprisingly, however, Aristotle does not
⁵⁵In particular, the thesis is implicitly accepted by theorists of color who suppose that if colors are identical to
physical properties, then the nature of a color cannot be fully revealed in the experience of it; see e.g. Byrne 2001,
Byrne and Hilbert 2007, Campbell 1997, 2005 and, for discussion, see Introduction, xii–xx.
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share the assumption that physicalism commits one to a contrast between perceptual qualities
as they are in themselves and as they are in experience. That is, Aristotle both accepts that the
nature of a perceptual quality is a physical nature, a way of moving the relevant medium, and
denies that an account of this nature is something that does not extend to the quality as it is
manifest in experience. Understanding why he takes this view will require an examination of
the nuanced ontology of perceptual qualities he develops inDe Sensu 3–5. This examination will
be the task of the next chapter.
2“Mixture and Motion”:
Aristotle on the Nature of Perceptual Qualities
Some metaphysical approaches to perceptual qualities commit us to a distinction between the
quality as we experience it and the quality as it really is. On these approaches, there is the yellow
that we see, and then there is what yellow really is; there is the sweetness that we taste, and then
there is what sweetness really is. One way of committing us to this distinction is to identify
the perceptual quality with features of objects that are not manifest to us in experience, or at
any rate are not manifest in the same way. Yellow and sweet appear to me a certain way in
experience. If it turns out that yellow and sweet are identical to properties that do not appear
to me in experience (or at any rate do not appear to me in the same way), then there must be a
difference between yellow and sweet as they are presented in experience and as they really are in
themselves. Onemetaphysical approach that pretty clearly commits us to this sort of distinction
is physicalism about a type of perceptual quality. Physicalists about color, for instance, identify
yellow with certain physical properties that are causally implicated in standard experiences as
of yellow, like the disposition (or a disjunction of dispositions) to reflect, transmit, or emit light
at certain wavelengths, or the microphysical properties that ground such dispositions.1 On this
1For a defense the first variety of color physicalism, see Byrne and Hilbert 2003; for the second, seeMcLaughlin
2003. Logue 2016a,b offers a helpful overview of the recent philosophical literature on color.
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sort of view, it seems difficult to deny that there is a difference between yellow as we experience
it and yellow as it really is, for it just doesn’t seem true to say that the yellow I am presented with
in experience appears to be a disposition to reflect light at certain wavelengths, much less the
microphysical grounds of that disposition. Yellow, on this view, simply doesn’t look like what it
is.
Aristotle too is a physicalist about perceptual qualities. Understood as attributes of a per-
ceptually qualified body, colors, flavors, and indeed each of the qualities specially perceived by a
sense are identical to the (non-dispositional) causal ground of the body’s ability to produce the
relevant type of affection—in other words, to “what each of them is being which it will produce
perception and actuality [sc. more generally]” (Sens. 439a16–17). Aristotle’s physicalism also
commits us to a version of the distinction between the quality as we experience it and the qual-
ity as it really is. Understood as qualities manifest in perceptual experience, colors, flavors, etc.
are (not attributes present in perceptually qualified bodies, but) motions and affections present
in a perceiver (An. 446a2–6, cf. Phys. 202a13–17). Aristotle marks this ontological difference by
distinguishing the quality in potentiality from the quality in actuality. But in recognizing this
ontological difference between the perceptual quality itself and the quality as we encounter it in
experience, Aristotle does not take himself to commit us to the view that colors, flavors, etc. don’t
look like what they really are. I argued in chapter 1 that Aristotle accepts a demanding form of
realism, according to which the qualities we encounter in perception are perceiver-independent
actualities of a perceptually qualified body. On this view, I suggested, sense perception presents
these qualities as the fullest realization of their essential natures, although their achievement of
this state of realization depends in no way on their being so perceived. A world without per-
ceivers is in Aristotle’s view “a play before empty benches”;2 the performance is not canceled for
lack of attendance.
The exegetical challenge posed by Aristotle’s commitment to this view is to see how, for all
their difference, the actuality of a perceptual quality, the quality as we encounter it in experience,
2Schrödinger 1956/2012, 94
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is nevertheless the same as what it is potentially, namely the causal ground of an object’s ability
to produce that sort of perceptual affection. In this chapter I take up this exegetical challenge.
I’ll argue that in Aristotle’s view the potentiality and actuality of a perceptual quality share a
common essence. They share an essence in the way that two lemons from the same tree or can-
vasses painted with the same pigment might share a shade of yellow. The phenomenal sameness
in these cases is based in a sameness of being or essence: what it is for this lemon or this canvas
to be a given shade of yellow is the same as what it is for that one to be the same shade of yellow.
For Aristotle the same account applies to the potentiality and actuality of a perceptual quality:
whatmakes a perceptually qualified body yellow (ormore generally perceptually qualified in the
ways it is) is the same as what makes themotion and affection it produces in a perceiving subject
yellow (or more generally the perceptual quality it is). Aristotle describes the essence shared by
the potentiality and actuality of a perceptual quality as a type of ratio (λόγος), which in different
ways determines both the causally relevant features of the perceptually qualified body and the
motions and affections produced by that body in actuality. The quality that we perceive, on this
view, is essentially the same as the quality as it inheres in the perceived body. The same quality
is bothmixture andmotion.
In De Sensu 3–5 Aristotle develops a powerful framework for articulating the nature of per-
ceptual qualities in terms of these ratios. The framework draws from his more general account
of the structure of quality genera and the nature of qualitative change, but the application of
this framework to perceptual qualities presents special difficulties. Aristotle, I think, somewhat
falters in his response to these difficulties, but the framework he develops presents a striking
contrast to versions of physicalism familiar from contemporary philosophical discussions of
color and other perceptual qualities.
The Nature of Perceptual Qualities 44
2.1 Review: perceptual qualities inDe Anima and inDe Sensu
The discussion of colors, sounds and the rest inDe Anima gives scant indication that they are to
be thought of as ratios.3 This is because Aristotle’s interest with perceptual qualities in that work
is for the most part limited to showing that it belongs to their essence to be able to produce mo-
tions in bodies possessed of a special type of nature, for instance transparency or “transonance”.⁴
Thus we also find him proposing, in seemingly definitional terms, such characterizations of per-
ceptual qualities as the following:
color as mover of transparent
color := the power to set in motion what is actually transparent
sound as mover of the “transonant”
sound := the power to set in motion appropriately compacted air or water
However, Aristotle makes clear in De Sensu 3 that such accounts are not to be confused with
definitions of the relevant qualities (439a6–17). Characterizing a perceptual quality in terms of
its ability to set inmotion bodies possessed of a certain nature does not statewhat it is but rather
its “function” (ἔργον) and “activity with respect to the sense organs”. The sort of account that
answers a question like ‘what is color?’ will specify, not a power to produce a certain sort of
motion, but a non-dispositional nature of a colored object “being which it will produce per-
ception and actuality [sc. more generally]”. The accounts provided in De Anima help to answer
what colors, sounds, and other perceptual qualities are, namely by specifying what the relevant
actuality is (e.g. moving the actually transparent), but they do not state what the nature is that
produces such an actuality.
3The most explicit evidence occurs in An. 3.2, where Aristotle claims that since voice (a species of sound) is a
kind of harmony (συμφωνία), so too must the hearing of voice must be a kind of harmony (426a27–b7). See ch. 3.3
for detailed discussion of this passage.
⁴See ch. 1.6.2. A notable exception isAn. 2.8, which contains a uncharacteristically detailed discussion of sound
and voice (φωνή), which broadly coheres with the general framework presented in Sens. 3–5; see sect. 2.3. But at
least part of this discussion may be a transposition from material originally commissioned for works like Sens.;
cf. Burnyeat 2004.
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What, then, are these natures? Aristotle begins spelling out a framework for articulating the
nature of perceptual qualities in an extended discussion of color in De Sensu 3. The fascinating
details of Aristotle’s account in that chapter have been the subject of extensive scrutiny in recent
literature.⁵ My aim is rather to expose the most general features of Aristotle’s account, features
which will be implicitly or explicitly applied to all perceptual qualities. With this aim in mind,
let us turn to Aristotle’s account of color in De Sensu 3.
2.2 The nature of color
In De Sensu 3 Aristotle’s focus is on color in potentiality, the features of a colored body whereby
it produces motion in the actually transparent. At 439b11-12 he claims that color is “the limit of
the transparent in a bounded body”. The claim is based on a parallel with the actuality of the
transparent itself. Transparency is a nature that belongs not only to simple bodies like the airy
and aquatic media of color vision; it is present in some degree in all bodies (439a21–25). When
the body is unbounded, as in the case of the media, the actuality of the transparent is light,
and the absence of light is darkness. In De Anima Aristotle compared light to the color of the
medium (An. 418b11), but in this connection he goes further. The actuality of the transparent in
a bounded body, or more precisely in its surface, is color (Sens. 439a26–31).
This conclusion sets up an analogy between light and color. Just as the condition of un-
bounded bodies as actually or potentially transparent is determined by the presence or absence
of something, namely fire (or a fiery body), the coloration of the surface of bounded bodies is
determined by presence and absence:
Text 2.1 Now, that which when present in air produces light may also be present in the transparent
[sc. in the surface of bounded bodies]; it may also fail to be present, but [rather] there may be a privation
[of it]. So as in the former case the one [sc. the presence] is light and the other [sc. the privation] is
darkness, it is in this way that white and black come about in bodies.⁶ (Sens. 3, 439b14–18)
⁵See most recently Kalderon 2015. Earlier studies worthy of mention include Sorabji 1972 and Broackes 1999.
⁶ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ τοῦθ' ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖ φῶς, ἔστι δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἐστερῆσθαι.
ὥσπερ οὖν ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν φῶς τὸ δὲ σκότος, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐγγίγνεται τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν.
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The analogy is imperfect, however, since Aristotle does not want to identify the color black
with the absence of fire in the surface of a colored body. The claim that color is the limit of the
transparent in a bounded body suggests rather that black should be identifiedwith the absence of
transparency. On this reading, the analogy identifies extreme contrary degrees of transparency
in the surface of a bounded body with extreme contrary colors: white turns out to be identical
to the total or maximal presence of transparency in the surface of a bounded body, and black to
its total or maximal absence.
The analogy suggests a straightforward interpretation of the claim that color is the limit of
the transparent in the surface of a body. The genus of colors in potentiality includes all and only
those attributes of which the following may be said:
color as degree of transparency in surface
color := degree of transparency in the surface of a bounded body
The determinate shades or species of color, on this account, correspond to the different degrees
in which transparency may be present in a body’s surface. Thus the nature of each of the deter-
minate species of color will correspond to some determinate degree of transparency that may
be present in a body’s surface, and there will be as many species of color as there are degrees of
transparency in surface.
What determines the degrees in which the transparent may be present in the surface of a
body? Aristotle proposes to explain the proliferation of colors in terms of the interaction of
the extreme contraries, black and white. He considers three models for their interaction: jux-
taposition, superimposition, and mixture. On each model, the limit of transparency in surface
corresponding to each determinate species of color is expressible in some way or other as a ra-
tio (λόγος) of black to white. Some of these ratios will be numerically expressible by means
of integers, but there may be others whose proportions may be expressible only in terms of the
“excess” (ὑπεροχή) of one of the ingredients relative to the other. Evidently impressed by an
analogy with harmonic theory, Aristotle suggests that, if so, the most pleasant colors will be
those that are in numerically expressible ratios, just as the harmonic fifth and octave produce
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pleasant tones.⁷
Hence another way of articulating the nature of color is in terms of a ratio of black to white:
color as ratio of extreme contraries
color := ratio of black to white in the surface of a bounded body
On this account what fixes the limit of transparency in surface corresponding to each determi-
nate species of color is the ratio in which black and white are compounded, whether by juxtapo-
sition, superimposition, or mixture.⁸ Aristotle dedicates considerable space to an exploratory
discussion of these three models of the interaction of black and white. Ultimately, however,
he adopts the model of mixture, arguing that on this model, unlike the others, we can explain
the uniform appearance of surface color without appeal to physical minima or imperceptible
magnitudes.⁹
Aristotle concludes that “there will be many colors owing to the many ratios in which the
ingredients may be mixed with one another” (440b18–21). But only a handful of these will be
among the basic species of color mixed directly from the extremes. This class includes only five
shades in addition to black and white: red, yellow, green, deep blue, and violet. Colors out-
side of this class are derivative, since they must be mixed from the basic species in addition to
black and white (442a20–25). In the course of discussing the three models of interaction Aris-
totle considers two possible ways of explaining the distinction between the basic and derivative
species of color. One possibility is that the basic species correspond to numerically expressible
concords, which are few. Alternatively, it may be that all colors are numerically expressible, but
only some—the basic species—are ordered or regular (τεταγμένας); the derivative colors, on
this hypothesis, would be irregular because they are “impure” ratios of ratios (439b31–440a6,
cf. a12–15). Aristotle however is unsatisfied with either explanation, and he concludes his dis-
⁷Sorabji 1972 offers helpful discussion of Aristotle’s use of mathematics in this stretch of Sens. 3.
⁸The contrary extremes, black and white, will correspond respectively to the “pure” ratios 1 : 0 and 0 : 1. Con-
strued as ratios, black and white must be distinguished from the black and white understood as terms of the ratio,
as Aristotle acknowledges; see below, sect. 2.7.
⁹See Sens. 440b1–17 and, for discussion, Kalderon 2015, ch. 6.
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cussion of color on an aporetic note. The distinction between basic and derivative species is a
problematic feature of Aristotle’s account, and we shall return to it when we turn to the actuality
of perceptual qualities.
2.3 Extending the model: presence, absence, and “agent natures”
In De Sensu 4 Aristotle turns his attention from color to other perceptual qualities, but he does
not make a fresh start from the account he just presented. His strategy is rather to construct
parallels with color to guide his discussion of other perceptual qualities, beginning with flavor:
Text 2.2 Just as the colors are [compounded] from a mixture of white and black, so too are the flavors
[compounded] from sweet and bitter, and [just as in the case of color] each is [compounded] in a ratio
or by the [numerically inexpressible] more and less; [they are also] either of a mixture and motion that
accords with certain numerically expressible ratios, or [some are of a mixture and motion] also in an
indeterminate way. And [in the latter case] the ones that when mixed produce pleasure are only those in
numerically expressible ratios.1⁰ (Sens. 4, 442a12–17)
The passage recalls salient features of the account of color set out in theDe Sensu 3. First, flavors
are mixtures of a pair of contraries, namely sweet and bitter. As Aristotle argues at length in
the lines leading up to text 2.2, sweet and bitter are also related as the presence and absence of
a specific affection in the moistened dry (441b19–21). The relevant affection is “nutritiousness”
(τροφιμότης, cf. b24), the condition of being food for the perceiving animal. Sweetness corre-
sponds to the total or maximal presence of this affection, whereas bitterness corresponds to its
total or maximal absence. Next, the determinate species of flavor correspond to the different
ratios in which bitter and sweet may be mixed. And finally, there remains the question of the
determinacy in number of the flavors, which in terms of their basic species are equal in number
to the colors (a19–20); in this connection Aristotle once again raises the possibility that the basic
species of flavor number among those mixed in numerically expressible ratios.
On the basis of these parallels we may propose the following definition of flavor:
1⁰ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ χρώματα ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μίξεώς ἐστιν, οὕτως οἱ χυμοὶ ἐκ γλυκέος καὶ πικροῦ,
καὶ κατὰ λόγον δ' ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕκαστοί εἰσιν, εἴτε κατ' ἀριθμούς τινας τῆς μίξεως καὶ
κινήσεως, εἴτε καὶ ἀορίστως, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ποιοῦντες μειγνύμενοι, οὗτοι ἐν ἀριθμοῖς μόνον.
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flavor as a ratio of extreme contraries
flavor := ratio of bitter to sweet in the moistened dry
Equivalently, but with reference to the affection whose presence or absence distinguishes the
extremes of flavor, we may circumscribe the genus of flavor as all and only those attributes of
which the following definition may be said:
flavor as degree of nutriment
flavor := degree of nutritiousness (for the perceiver) in the moistened dry
Together these accounts highlight three features that make up the general framework within
which Aristotle articulates the nature of perceptual qualities. The first feature is a pair of ex-
treme contraries. The contraries correspond respectively to the maximal presence and maximal
absence of the second feature, an agent nature whose degree of relative presence or absence in
the relevant sort of body determines the species of that quality genus. Third and finally is the
idea that the presence or absence of the relevant agent nature, which in various degrees deter-
mine the distinct species of the quality genus, are produced through themixture of the relevant
extreme contraries in various ratios.
Each of these features is identified more or less explicitly in the other genera of perceptual
quality. Aristotle is once again quite explicit in the case of odor. The kind of odor perceptible
by all olfactory animals tracks the species of flavor, since the agent nature associated with it is
the “flavored dry” (Sens. 443a6–8; cf. 443b18–26).11 Thus the contrary extremes of odor coincide
with those of flavor, but they are not identical. The extremes of flavor correspond respectively to
themaximal presence and absence of an agent nature responsible for a body’s ability to act on the
tongue. The extremes of odor, by contrast, correspond respectively to themaximal presence and
absence of an agent nature responsible for a body’s capacity to act on a medium, which in this
11Aristotle also recognizes a type of odor perceptible only by humans that is not tied to nutrition, what wemight
call fragrance (443b26–444b2). Whereas the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the former type of odors depends
on the animal’s appetite, not to mention the food it can eat, fragrances are pleasant or unpleasant per se. Aristotle
accords to fragrances a role in promoting the health of human beings, who depend on their warming properties
to regulate the temperature of their atypically large brains. Aristotle does not go into detail about the nature of
fragrances, so I propose to leave this subclass of perceptual quality to one side.
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case is defined by its ability to rinse out the flavored dry (442b29–443a2). This is one reason why
smell and taste are different senses, for though the animal is nourished by the sweet (443a6–8,
cf. b18–26), odor as such does not contribute to nutrition (445a27–29).12
Aristotle is less systematic in isolating these features in the case of sound and the special
objects of touch, which receive no dedicated treatment in the version of De Sensu that we have.
Aristotle’s discussion of sound is mostly confined toDe Anima, a discussion whose considerable
detail is anomalous relative both to Aristotle’s interest in perceptual qualities in that work and
to the amount of detailed discussion he devotes to the special objects of the other senses in De
Anima 2.13 The most complete discussion of temperature and moisture is also found outside of
De Sensu, split between Aristotle’s treatise on the elements in De Generatione et Corruptione 2
and on chemistry inMeteorology 4; and neither text is explicitly concerning with perception.1⁴
Nevertheless, all three features may be identified in the case of these qualities too. The contrary
extremes of sound are sharp and flat in pitch, which reflect extremes in the speed of motion
generated by percussion (An. 420a26–b4).1⁵ The extreme contraries of temperature andmoisture
are, respectively, the hot and cold and the wet and dry, which are respectively identical to the
presence or absence of elemental fire or water.1⁶ Thus we arrive at an exhaustive framework for
perceptual qualities based on the model provided by Aristotle’s account of the nature of color
(see Table 2.1).
12For discussion, see Johnstone 2012 and Johansen 1997, ch. 5.
13Which, again, may suggest that some of this material was originally intended for a work like Sens.; see note 4
above.
1⁴Though see Meteor. 341a13–14 for possible evidence that Sens. was meant to contain a discussion of tangible
qualities like heat; for discussion, see Burnyeat 2004.
1⁵Aristotle is clear that differences in the motion generated in the sonic medium reflect differences in the sound-
ing objects, which would be a much better candidate for agent nature of sound. However it is very unclear, to me
at any rate, what these differences are. For discussion of the location of sounds in Aristotle’s theory, see Johnstone
2013.
1⁶For cold as the absence of heat, seeMeteor. 380a7–8; for dry as the absence of moisture, 381b29–32. For general
discussion of the primary tangibles, see 378b13–26 with GC 2.2
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quality special sense agent nature state privation
color vision light (actual transparency) white black
sound hearing speed of medial motiontime (?) sharp flat
odor smell flavored dry sweet bitter or fetid
flavor taste nutritiousness sweet bitter
temperature
touch
elemental hot hot cold
moisture elemental wet wet dry
Table 2.1 An extension of the model of color to the other perceptual qualities
2.4 A “chemical analysis” model of perceptual qualities
If the interpretation so far is correct, then there is a common structure to the nature of the
attributes falling under any genus of perceptual quality. The nature of each such attribute is
expressible as a ratio of the extreme contraries proper to the genus: black and white, bitter and
sweet, cold and hot, and so on. We’ve so far been considering perceptual qualities in potentiality,
the features of perceptually qualified bodieswhereby they produce the relevant sort of perceptual
affection. Understood in this way, the ratio expressing the nature of a perceptual quality reflects
certain compositional facts about perceptually qualified bodies, specifically, those that pertain to
those bodies’ ability to cause perceptual affection. Considered in potentiality, then, a perceptual
quality is a mixture of contrary extremes opposed as the presence and absence—or, as Aristotle
sometimes puts it, as the “state” (ἕξις) and “privation” (στέρησις)—of some agent nature. The
ratio of a quality’s “constitutive mixture” expresses its nature in the sense of fixing its criteria of
identity: two qualities are homogeneous just in case they are mixed from the same ingredients,
and they are the same in species just if the ingredients are also mixed in the same ratio. On
this picture, determining the nature of a perceptual quality in potentiality is comparable to our
modern notion of chemical analysis: just as a chemist can determine the identity of a solution
by analyzing it into its elemental components, we can arrive at the nature of a perceptual quality
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in potentiality by determining the relative proportions of the contrary ingredients present in its
constitutive mixture.1⁷
We may put this “chemical analytic” approach to perceptual qualities in potentiality more
precisely by introducing three primitive notions. First, for an arbitrary quality Qi, let Q+ and
Q− be the extreme contraries of its genus, Q, such that
Q+ := the “state extreme” of Q, and
Q− := the “privative extreme” of Q.
Next, letMix be a function from arbitrary items in the domain of Q-attributes to a ratio of Q−
to Q+. Thus we may define the state extreme (understood as an extreme value on a scale of
Q-attributes) as the Qi such that
Mix(Qi) = 0 : 1,
and the privative extreme (likewise understood as an extreme value on a scale of Q-attributes)
as the Qi such that
Mix(Qi) = 1 : 0.
These values define the limits of the quality scale. Mix assigns to Q-attributes proportions in
between these extremes, i.e. in the range between 1 : (0< x< 1) and (1> x> 0) : 1.1⁸
Note that there is no non-arbitrary limit to the number of ratios falling within this range.
1⁷I do not intend it to be an implication of this analogy that Aristotle’s notion of chemical mixture is the same as
the modern notion. For Aristotle mixture has occurred when contrary ingredients combine in such a way that the
resulting mixture is (1) homeomerous and so (2) contains neither ingredient in actuality (but both potentially); see
GC 1.10, esp. 327b12–33. This account is indiscriminate between genuine chemical mixture and simple “blends”, e.g.
of salt fully dissolved in a volume of water, which also satisfies (1) and (2) on Aristotle’s conception. The analogy I
have in mind is rather between the Aristotelian idea that the identity of a perceptual quality is given by the ratio of
its constitutive mixture and the modern idea that the identity of a chemical solution may be giving by specifying
its constitutive ingredients.
1⁸This notation is intended to capture how Aristotle applies his conception of mixture to the ontological analysis
of perceptual qualities as ratios of contrary extremes, not to model the mathematical properties of that conception.
For that, see e.g. Fine (1995), who models Aristotelian mixtures as ordered pairs of ratios; while mathematically
more perspicuous, Fine’s model does not cleanly represent Aristotle’s talk of ratios in Sens.
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1 : 0
− +
0 : 11 : 1
1 : (0< x< 1) (1> x> 0) : 1
Figure 2.1 The structure of a perceptual quality scale
We would put this by saying that the range between the privative extreme and the state extreme
is dense. Let ‘≺’ be a binary relation between homogeneous qualities such that
Qi ≺ Qk := Q+ is more dominant inMix(Qi) than inMix(Qk).
Wemay then put this point by saying that, for every Qi and Qk such that Qi ≺ Qk, there is a Q j
such that Qi ≺ Q j ≺ Qk. For Aristotle this is to say that perceptual qualities are “continuous”
(συνεχές), since it is distinctive of continua to be potentially infinitely divisible.1⁹
Attributes in a perceptual quality genus are therefore best conceived as falling along a scale
in which values continuously shade into one another (see Fig. 2.1). The scale may be divided
into two broad regions delimited by three values. In each region the values of the scale are
mixed predominantly from the extreme contrary directly adjacent to it. The common boundary
between each is given by the ratio 1 : 1, the valuemixed from equal portions of the state extreme
and the privative extreme; call this the mean value of the relevant scale. It will be important
to keep this picture of quality scales in mind, since Aristotle commonly refers to intermediate
qualities of a perceptual quality scale metonymously through the dominant ingredient in their
mixture, on the grounds that the character of an intermediate tends toward that of the extreme
dominant in its mixture (cf. Sens. 448a1–8).
1⁹See e.g. Phys. 231b15–18, 232b20–26.
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2.5 The nature of perceptual qualities: a preliminary account
The chemical analysis model of perceptual qualities enables us to state more precisely how the
actuality and potentiality of a quality like color share a common essence, and how this connec-
tion compares with the intuitive way in which (e.g.) identical shades of color share a common
essence. First, however, we must make a clarification. In thinking of the relation of the ratios
generated by theMix function and the essence of a perceptual quality, wemust keep inmind that
we are talking in the latter case about an essence that is an enmattered “natural” form, a form
of something whose essential nature cannot be conceived of apart from the matter to which it
belongs.2⁰ To the extent that a perceptual quality is inseparable from its matter, it cannot simply
be identified with the ratio of its mixture, which (as Aristotle’s discussion in De Sensu makes
clear) is separable in thought frommatter. But neither can the form and essence of a perceptual
quality simply be identified with the ratio of its constitutive mixture, since the actuality of that
same quality is not a mixture but a motion. The account that best accommodates the evidence
from De Sensu about the nature of perceptual qualities, I’ll suggest, is an account on which the
ratios given byMix rather characterize the essence of a quality that cannot be conceived of apart
from the sort of matter to which it belongs, but that in different conditions may be enmattered
in both a certain type of corporeal mixture and in a certain kind of motion. In other words, the
chemical analysis model describes an enmattered form and essence that can be realized as both
mixture andmotion.
Evidence for the separability in thought of the ratios given by Mix comes from Aristotle’s
notion of “coordinates” (σύστοιχα), heterogeneous perceptual qualities that share a ratio. To get
a grip on this notion, consider how the chemical analysis model handles relations of sameness
between homogeneous qualities. Relations of sameness in genus and species may be stated in
2⁰On the distinction between natural and mathematical form, see An. 1.1, esp. 403a3–b15, and Met. 6.1, esp.
1025b19–1026a33. The term ‘natural form’ is due to Peramatzis 2011, 2015. The distinction as I intend it is neu-
tral on the issue of whether natural forms are (as Charles 2008 puts it) essentially “matter-involving”. For criticism,
see Caston 2008.
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terms of the state extreme, the privative extreme, andMix, for instance as follows:
sameness in genus
Qi andUi are the same in genus iff Q+ =U+.
sameness in species
Qi and Q j are the same in species iff: (a) Qi, Q j are the same in genus, and
(b)Mix(Qi) =Mix(Q j).
These formulations reflect a certain interpretation of theMix function. They treatMix as a func-
tion from Q-attributes to an abstract numerical ratio—not, as it could also be interpreted, as a
ratio of amixture of contrary extremes. Aristotle’s notion of coordinatehood offers a compelling
reason to prefer this interpretation. What this notion shows is that the two clauses in the above
formulation of sameness in species are independent. On the one hand, two qualities may be
the same in genus (in satisfaction of (a)) but return different values when inserted as argument
intoMix (in violation of (b)); qualities satisfying these constraints would be homogeneous but
different in species. But on the other hand, two qualities may be different in genus (in violation
of (a)) but nevertheless be mixed in the same ratio of their respective extremes (in satisfaction
of (b)); qualities satisfying these constraints are what Aristotle refers to as coordinates:21
coordinatehood
Qi andUi are the same in species iff: (a) Q+ ̸=U+, and
(b)Mix(Qi) =Mix(Ui).
Coordinatehood is important because it tracks the way (τρόπος) in which the senses discrimi-
nate (κρίνειν) their special qualities, as for instance vision inAristotle’s view discriminates white
in the same way as taste discriminates sweet but opposite to the way taste discriminates bitter.
This notion, and especially clause (b) of the above formulation, would however be unintelligible
if the ratios given byMix could not be thought of independently of the specific matter in which
they are present.
21See Sens. 447b30, 448a13–18.
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A different but equally compelling reason not to interpret the ratio given by Mix as a ratio
of a mixture is that it is not only intended to characterize the corporeal mixtures with which
Aristotle identifies the perceptual quality in potentiality. Rather, as Aristotle puts it in text 2.2,
it is intended to characterize “a mixture and a motion” (μίξις καὶ κίνησις), namely the me-
dial motion with which Aristotle identifies the perceptual quality in actuality. So far we’ve seen
how the chemical analysis model applies to perceptual qualities in potentiality. Each quality is
a mixture of the state extreme and privative extreme that define the scale to which it belongs,
its value and position on that scale fixed by the ratio of its constitutive mixture determined by
Mix. Since Aristotle’s theory also calls for extending the chemical analysis model to perceptual
qualities in actuality, we would need to model to extend, not only tomixtures present in percep-
tually qualified bodies, but tomotions present in what is affected by these bodies insofar as they
are perceptually qualified.
Taken together, these considerations call for a conception of the ratios given byMix as both
numerical and descriptive of a natural form and essence that may be realized in both a mixture
and a motion. This demand can be met if we adopt the following picture. The sort of ratios
generated by theMix function represent mathematical forms, numerical items that may be un-
derstood independently of any conception of the sort of matter to which they belong. Applied
to perceptual qualities, however, they characterize a natural form that in different conditions
must be realized alternatively as corporeal mixtures and as motions present in a certain type of
medium. So, applied to perceptual qualities, these ratios characterize a form and essence that,
while not conceptually or ontologically separable from matter, is nevertheless not fully deter-
minate in the sort of matter in which it must be present. It is a form that in different conditions
is bothmixture andmotion.
On this picture, the potentiality and actuality of a perceptual quality are the same in essence
in much the same way as numerically different objects may have the specifically same color—
namely, inAristotle’s view, because both instantiate the same ratio of the same contrary extremes.
In this way, for instance, the actuality of a single perceptually qualified object may consist in the
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production of several perceptual motions in several numerically different perceivers:
Text 2.3 Isn’t it that everyone perceives numerically one and the same thing, [i.e.] that which first
produced the motion (e.g. the bell, or frankincense, or fire), though of course the peculiar thing [per-
ceived by each] is different in number but same in species, which is why many [perceivers] simultane-
ously see and smell and hear [sc. the same thing]? And these [latter] are not bodies, but an affection
and a sort of motion—otherwise this [phenomenon] would not occur—but nor are they without body.22
(Sens. 6, 446b21–26)
But the actuality of a perceptual quality must be more than just the same in species as the poten-
tiality of that quality; it must be the actuality of that potential. The fact that you and I are looking
at the same object cannot be explained simply by noting that the chromaticmotion affecting you
is the same in species as the chromatic motion affecting me. (It could be that you and I are look-
ing at visually indistinguishable objects that, though some sort of mirror trickery, seem to each
of us to be located in the same place.) What explains the fact that we are viewing the same object
is that the (numerically different) motions affecting you and me are both realizations of a single
chromatic potentiality in the object. Both motions are the fulfillment of a potential of the object
that was actualized when the relevant conditions for actualization obtained—namely, contact
with an illuminated medium. And to the extent that the motions are also the same in species,
this is to be explained by reference to the fact that they are actualizations of the same potential.
It is this picture that I want to capture with the idea that the potentiality and actuality of a
perceptual quality share a common essence, one that is both mixture and motion. As I shall
argue in what follows, the chemical analysis model accommodates both aspects of perceptual
qualities. The same ratio that describes the constitutive mixture of qualities in potentiality also
describes the character of themotions each produces in actuality. Aristotle details the principles
governing the actualization of perceptual qualities near the end of De Sensu. Before that, how-
ever, he has to address a problem. The problem, in short, is that the chemical analysis model
seems to overgenerate qualities. Perceptual quality scales are continua, which means that there
22ἢ τοῦ μὲν κινήσαντος πρώτου, οἷον τῆς κώδωνος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ πυρός, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ
αἰσθάνονται πάντες, τοῦ δὲ δὴ ἰδίου ἑτέρου ἀριθμῷ, εἴδει δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, διὸ ἅμα πολλοὶ ὁρῶσι καὶ
ὀσμῶνται καὶ ἀκούουσιν; ἔστι δ' οὔτε σώματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάθος καὶ κίνησίς τις (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο
συνέβαινεν), οὔτ' ἄνευ σώματος. Cf. Ps.-Aristotle,MXG 981b9–17.
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is a dense infinity of values falling between the privative extreme and the state extreme. There
thus seems to be no a priori limit to the number of species in a perceptual quality genus, since
there are infinite numerical values Mix can assign to distinct species. In Aristotle’s view, how-
ever, the actual quality species we encounter in experience are “determinate and not unlimited”
(Sens. 440b24). If, as the above account of perceptual qualities in potentiality suggests, there is a
dense infinity of qualities on any given scale, why don’t we perceive an infinity of colors, flavors,
odors, etc.? Why, in other words, is our perceptual experience so circumscribed?
As I understand it, this is a problem with extending to the actuality of perceptual qualities
the model that has so far only been applied to those qualities in potentiality. It has not always
been understood in this way, however. Showing that this is Aristotle’s concern will provide
considerable support for the interpretation I’m urging, so I propose to look at the problem (and
Aristotle’s rather disappointing solution) in some detail.
2.6 A problem concerning the actuality of perceptual qualities
When, inDe Sensu 6, Aristotle returns to this question of why perceptual quality species are de-
terminate, it becomes clear that the answer has to do with the distinction between the potential-
ity and actuality of a perceptual quality. Perceptual quality scales are continuous in potentiality,
but in actuality they are limited in their species:
Text 2.4 Everything of which there are extremes must be limited in what is between them. Contraries
are extremes, and every perceptual object admits of contrariety. For instance, in color there is white and
black, in flavor sweet and bitter, and in all the others the contraries are extremes. Now, whereas what is
continuousmay be cut into an unlimited number of unequal [parts] or a limited number of equal [parts],
what is continuous but not per se [may be cut] into a limited number of species. So, since the affections
[sc. produced by perceptual qualities] are spoken of in terms of species, while in every case continuity is
present in these [perceptual qualities], it remains that the [perceptual quality] is different in potentiality
and in actuality.23 (Sens. 6, 445b23–31)
23ὧν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἔσχατα, ἀνάγκη πεπεράνθαι τὰ ἐντός· τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἔσχατα, πᾶν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἐν χυμῷ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις δὴ πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἔσχατα τὰ ἐναντία. τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεχὲς εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνεται ἄνισα, εἰς δ' ἴσα
πεπερασμένα· τὸ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὑτὸ συνεχὲς εἰς πεπερασμένα εἴδη. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ μὲν πάθη ὡς εἴδη λεκτέον,
ὑπάρχει δὲ συνέχεια ἀεὶ ἐν τούτοις, ληπτέον ὅτι τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕτερον.
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In actuality, perceptual qualities are affections produced by a perceptually qualified object, and
in this condition they are spoken of in terms of determinate species. However, even in this con-
dition continuity belongs to each of them, presumably in potentiality, as compounds of extremes
present in perceptible bodies. Considered in actuality, then, perceptual qualities are only inci-
dentally continuous, insofar as they are affections produced by qualities that lie on a continuous
scale.
This much of the position is clear, but its details are difficult to understand. One point at
issue is how the determinacy in number of perceptual qualities in actuality can be reconciled
with a dense infinity of perceptual qualities in potentiality. This point concerns the proper in-
terpretation of Aristotle’s crucial distinction between per se and incidental continuity. Still more
crucial is the proper interpretation of the premise that generates the difficulty in the first place,
namely that “everything of which there are extremes must be limited in what is between them”.
What motivate this premise are not, as some commentators have supposed, observations about
the nature of our experience of perceptual qualities, for instance that we perceive only a limited
number of colors or sounds.2⁴ Instead, it is a general conception of alteration within genera that
exhibit contrariety of the sort exhibited by perceptual qualities. In employing the model of mix-
ture, Aristotle treats perceptual qualities as a special instance of a type of genus in which species
are ranged in between extreme contraries. Aristotle’s primary interest in developing this gen-
eral account is tomake sense of a certain features of change, and in particular qualitative change,
between extremes in such genera. Before offering an interpretation of text 2.4, then, we need
briefly to introduce this account, which serves as necessary background for the discussion to
follow.
2⁴See Kalderon 2015, 129; Sorabji and Kretzmann 1976, 80; G. R. T. Ross 1906 and W. D. Ross 1955, notes ad loc.
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2.7 Interlude: a compositional approach to intermediacy
For Aristotle all qualitative change, or alteration, is between contrary attributes. One type of
alteration, which occurs between contradictory attributes, is binary. The transition between
ignorance and knowledge is an example of this sort of alteration: to assert that a subject has
acquired knowledge of grammar is to assert that she has ceased to be ignorant of it; and if a
subject somehow loses grammatical knowledge we say she has come once again to be ignorant
of it. Other types of alteration are not binary but, as we might put it, gradual. A log placed
on a campfire undergoes an alteration in temperature; it comes to be hot. This is a change
between contraries related as state and privation, in this case hot and cold, but the removal of
one attribute does not entail the possession of the other. Before the log becomes hot, it must first
become tepid, then lukewarm, and so on. These qualities, which the log must serially acquire
and lose before it reaches the contrary extreme, Aristotle calls intermediates (τὰ μεταξύ), and
he proposes a general account of intermediacy in genera that exhibit such gradual change.
In Aristotle’s account there are two features distinctive of intermediates (Met. 1057a18–30).
First, they fall between extreme contraries, in the sense that changes from one contrary to the
other must proceed through them. Second, they are homogeneous with the extremes they fall
between. He proposes a common explanation for these features:
Text 2.5 Since among contraries it is possible for there to be something intermediate, and [since] of
some there is [an intermediate], it is necessary for the intermediates to be from the contraries. For
every intermediate is in the same genus and in between the things of which they are intermediate. For we
call those things intermediate into which something changing must change into first. For instance, if one
were to pass from the highest to the lowest [string] in the shortest time, one will reach the intermediate
strings first; and if among colors [one should pass] fromwhite to black, onewill sooner reach crimson and
gray than black; and so on in the other cases. But it is not possible to change from one genus into another,
for instance from color into figure, except incidentally. Therefore it is necessary that the intermediates be
in the same genus both as one another and as the things they are intermediate between.2⁵
(Met. 10.7, 1057a18–30)
2⁵ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνδέχεται εἶναί τι μεταξὺ καὶ ἐνίων ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι
τὰ μεταξύ. πάντα γὰρ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν ἐστὶ μεταξύ. μεταξὺ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα
λέγομεν εἰς ὅσα μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη πρότερον τὸ μεταβάλλον (οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπάτης ἐπὶ τὴν νήτην εἰ
μεταβαίνοι τῷ ὀλιγίστῳ, ἥξει πρότερον εἰς τοὺς μεταξὺ φθόγγους, καὶ ἐν χρώμασιν εἰ ἐκ τοῦ λευκοῦ
εἰς τὸ μέλαν, πρότερον ἥξει εἰς τὸ φοινικοῦν καὶ φαιὸν ἢ εἰς τὸ μέλαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων)·
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Aristotle goes on to make clear that this compositional account of the intermediates requires
that we distinguish two sorts of extremes. On the one hand, there are the extremes that delimit
the continuum of qualities falling under the genus; on the other hand, there are the extremes
that act as the uncompounded principles of the genus:
Text 2.6 So the contraries are uncompounded from each other; therefore they are principles [sc. of
the genus]. But the intermediates [are compounded], either all or none of them. Now something comes
about from the contraries, so that a changewill be into this before it is into them [sc. the extremes], since it
[sc. what comes about from the contraries] will be both less andmore than each of them. Therefore it will
be also intermediate between the contraries. Therefore the other intermediates will also be compounds.
For what is more than one thing and less than another is in a way compounded from the things of which
it is said to be respectively more and less. And since nothing else of the same genus is prior besides the
contraries, all of the intermediates would be from the contraries, so that everything lower [sc. than these
contraries], both the contraries and the intermediates, will be from the primary contraries.2⁶
(Met. 10.7, 1057b22–32)
Thus, to take up our previous example, absolute hot and cold, understood as extreme contraries
of the temperature scale, will designate both the limits of the temperature scale and the prin-
ciples composing the qualities falling along it. Intermediate temperatures, each of which is to
varying degrees hotter than absolute cold and colder than absolute hot, are compounds of these
extremes, so that the differences each manifests in the degree of heat or cold is traceable back to
differences in their composition.
It should be clear howAristotle’s framework for articulating the nature of perceptual qualities
draws on this compositional account of intermediacy. As the chemical analysis model shows,
the identity of a genus of perceptual quality is determined by a pair of primary contraries, what
I have been calling the state extreme and the privative extreme. And the values of the scale of
attributes falling under the genus are composed of the primary contraries: the extreme values
μεταβάλλειν δ' ἐξ ἄλλου γένους εἰς ἄλλο γένος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἐκ χρώματος
εἰς σχῆμα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὰ μεταξὺ καὶ αὑτοῖς καὶ ὧν μεταξύ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι.
2⁶τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐναντία ἀσύνθετα ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ὥστε ἀρχαί· τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἢ πάντα ἢ οὐθέν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν
ἐναντίων γίγνεταί τι, ὥστ' ἔσται μεταβολὴ εἰς τοῦτο πρὶν ἢ εἰς αὐτά· ἑκατέρου γὰρ καὶ ἧττον ἔσται
καὶ μᾶλλον. μεταξὺ ἄρα ἔσται καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ τἆλλα ἄρα πάντα σύνθετα τὰ μεταξύ·
τὸ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ δ' ἧττον σύνθετόν πως ἐξ ἐκείνων ὧν λέγεται εἶναι τοῦ μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ
δ' ἧττον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερα πρότερα ὁμογενῆ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἅπαντ' ἂν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἴη τὰ
μεταξύ, ὥστε καὶ τὰ κάτω πάντα, καὶ τἀναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐναντίων ἔσονται.
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of the scale are composed solely of one or the other primary contrary, whereas the intermediate
values of the scale contain portions of each.
The principles Aristotle takes to govern mixture generally validate this account of the re-
lation of the intermediates to the primary contraries. First, mixture can occur only between
items that are homogeneous and so admit of contrariety (GC 328a32–36). This condition appro-
priately confines intermediates and their contrary ingredients to the same genus. Second, the
character of the resulting compound is a function of the relative portions of the initial contrary
ingredients, according to which “each [ingredient] changes from its own nature into that of the
stronger, not however becoming the other but intermediate and common [to both]” (328a29–31).
Thus the character of the resulting compound comes to resemble one ingredient or another ac-
cording to the degree to which it dominates over the other in the mixture. This condition nicely
accounts for the behavior of changes from one extreme to its contrary on a scale of qualities of
the sort we’ve been considering. Finally, on Aristotle’s theory the initial ingredients are not de-
stroyed in the process of mixture; rather, they are preserved “in potentiality”, such that they are
in principle entirely recoverable (327b22–26). This allows for the characterization of mixtures in
terms of their constitutive ratio, the relative portions of initial ingredients forming the resulting
compound.2⁷
2.8 The determinacy of perceptual quality species
Viewed against the background of this account of intermediacy, it is clear why what comes in
between contrary extremes must be finite. The intermediates represent stages in an alteration
between extreme contraries. If the intermediates were unlimited, the change would have to
proceed in an unlimited number of stages, which could not be carried out in a limited amount
of time. How, then, do we introduce appropriate constraints on the number of intermediates on
a perceptual quality scale?
2⁷See Fine 1995 for detailed discussion of the role of this compositional account of intermediacy in Aristotle’s
theory of mixture.
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One might try to introduce the necessary constraints in a way analogous to how Aristotle
responds to one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion (Phys. 233a21–31). One could, for instance, say
that the “quality space” traversed in such a change, though potentially infinitely divisible, may
be parceled into a finite number of stages. Kalderon has recently defended an interpretation
of this sort, according to which “perceptual discrimination imposes a discontinuous chunking
on a sensible continuity . . . but a continuity always subsists in these since there are infinitely
many potential discriminations to be made, perhaps in other, more fortuitous, potential cir-
cumstances of perception” (Kalderon 2015, 129). This however appears to be precisely the solu-
tion Aristotle wishes to rule out by denying that perceptual qualities in actuality are continuous
per se. Aristotle is no doubt alive to the possibility that the character of a perceptual expe-
rience depends on external conditions. Violet, for instance, appears differently against white
and dark backgrounds, and the appearance of a colored object shifts with differing conditions
of illumination (Meteor. 375a23–28). He also acknowledges that different species of animal may
differ in the range of differentiae they can discriminate within a genus of perceptual quality (GA
780b13 ff.). Perceivers differing either in the conditions of perception or in the range of discrim-
inable species will discriminate only a finite number of species in a given genus of perceptual
quality. Yet Aristotle resists identifying the species of a perceptual quality genus with the differ-
entiae discriminable by an arbitrary species of perceiver in arbitrary perceptual conditions. Part
of what makes perceptual qualities in actuality incidentally continuous is that they are divisible
into a limited number of determinate species, but on this interpretation it appears arbitrary how
perceptual quality scales are to be divided.
I suspect Aristotle’s commitment to the determinacy in species of a perceptual quality in
actuality has less to do with the putative discreteness of a perceiver’s experience of perceptual
qualities than with the theoretical role of the basic species. For Aristotle it is not arbitrary that
the extremes of the color scale generate five intermediate species of color, and that the extremes
of flavor likewise generate five intermediate species of flavor. He posits that the interaction of
the state extreme and the privative extreme alone generates only a finite number of basic species,
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and in turn gives a role to the basic species in the generation of the derivative species, precisely
because this framework provides a principled way to distinguish a finite number of intermedi-
ates.
Aristotlemay be also relying on empirical support for the distinction, which is once again ex-
trapolated from the case of color to cover all perceptual qualities. Consider the rainbow. InAris-
totle’s color vocabulary there are three colors in a rainbow, red (φοινικοῦν), green (πράσινον),
and violet (ἁλουργόν), although yellow (ξανθόν) sometimes appears between red and green
(Meteor. 371b33–372a10). Aristotle seems to have understood that rainbows are caused by the
reflection of the sun,2⁸ and he proposes to account for the appearance of the rainbow’s colors
in terms of an alteration brought about by the reflection’s progressive weakening of the visual
motion:
Text 2.7 For it happens that when a cloud is near the sun it does not appear colored but white to one
looking at it, whereas to one observing the same [cloud] in water it appears in a way to have the color
of the rainbow. Therefore it is clear that, on account of its weakness, reflected sight makes black appear
blacker, as it also [makes] white [appear] less white, and pushes it toward black. Now, stronger sight
changes color to red, then to green, and still weaker sight changes [the color] to violet. Nothing further
appears apart from these three, and just as in most other cases, the completion [of the series] is with
these—change into the rest is imperceptible. For this reason too the rainbow appears tricolored . . .2⁹
(Meteor. 3.5, 374b24–375a1)
Translated into an intromission theory of vision,3⁰ the rainbow seems to display simultaneously
the serial stages of the process by which an initially white visual motion weakens to that of a
2⁸See Wilson 2013, ch. 6 for a recent critical evaluation.
2⁹συμβαίνει γὰρ ὅταν ᾖ τοῦ ἡλίου νέφος πλησίον, εἰς μὲν αὐτὸ βλέποντι μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι
κεχρωματισμένον ἀλλ' εἶναι λευκόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕδατι αὐτὸ τοῦτο θεωροῦντι χρῶμά τι ἔχειν τῆς ἴριδος.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ ὄψις ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μέλαν κλωμένη δι' ἀσθένειαν μελάντερον ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι, καὶ
τὸ λευκὸν ἧττον λευκόν, καὶ προσάγει πρὸς τὸ μέλαν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἰσχυροτέρα ὄψις εἰς φοινικοῦν χρῶμα
μετέβαλεν, ἡ δ' ἐχομένη εἰς τὸ πράσινον, ἡ δὲ ἔτι ἀσθενεστέρα εἰς τὸ ἁλουργόν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι
φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς τρισίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ πλεῖστα, καὶ τούτων ἔσχεν τέλος· τῶν δ'
ἄλλων ἀναίσθητος ἡ μεταβολή. διὸ καὶ ἡ ἶρις τρίχρως φαίνεται . . .
3⁰The account as stated presupposes an extramission theory of vision. What suffers alteration through refraction
is not a visual motion from the sun but a visual ray (ὄψις) emitted from the eye. This sort of theory contradicts
the intromissive account Aristotle develops in De Anima, which is also presupposed throughout De Sensu and the
rest of Parva Naturalia. However, the context surrounding text 2.7 makes clear that the account on offer is meant
to be agnostic both about the scientific facts concerning vision and about the location of the change, whether the
alteration is of the subject’s vision or of the seen object; see 374b15–18, 22–24.
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darker color. What is remarkable about the process is that it seems to occur in discrete stages:
red, green, violet, and ultimately, as the visual motion gives out, black (cf. 374b13–15). Though
there are colors in between these primary species, the change into them is “imperceptible”, which
is why they don’t appear in the rainbow.
It is no coincidence that in De Sensu Aristotle reckons red, green, violet, and yellow (which,
recall, sometimes does appear in the series) among the basic species of color. Rather, these col-
ors are basic because they are the observable intermediates in changes between the extremes of
black and white. (The remaining basic color is deep blue (κυανοῦν), which does not appear
in the rainbow but seems also to be a perceptible stage in the series from white to black; this,
for instance, is a color one experiences when looking into a deep chasm into which little light
reaches: cf. Meteor. 342b14–16.) In this light Aristotle’s appeal to the distinction between the
potentiality and actuality of colors and other perceptual qualities in text 2.4 looks to be an at-
tempt to reconcile the scientific account he has been developing, according to which the nature
of a perceptual quality locates it on a continuous scale, with a particular conception of quali-
tative change as discrete and noncontinuous, a conception that also coheres with certain facts
about our experience of perceptual qualities. As is often the case, Aristotle’s solution is to say
that these seemingly conflicting reports are not really in conflict, since they pertain to different
aspects of perceptual qualities. Continuity is a feature of perceptual qualities understood as at-
tributes of perceptually qualified bodies, whereas discreteness is a feature of perceptual qualities
understood as affections or motions in the medium or in a perceiver.
Of course, the challenge faced by this approach is to explain how a continuous alteration
could produce such a discontinuous series. One proposal, due to Sorabji and Kretzmann (1976,
80), draws a comparisonwith themovement of a stopper along a vibrating string: “as the stopper
moves along the vibrating string, we hear the sound all the time, but we do not hear a change
of pitch, until the stopper has moved the distance that corresponds to a quarter tone”. Similarly,
though the continuously weakening visual motion does not at any point cease alteration, no
change in color is visible until it has been weakened to the point at which it reaches the next
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basic color in the series. Of course, it is not that there are no qualities intermediate between
the basic species. There are, it is just that in alterations of the type we are considering they are
present only potentially. The semitone is present as the stopper moves to the distance at which
it reaches the quarter tone, but it escapes notice (Sens. 446a1–6). Similarly, we might say that
orange is present as the visual motion changes from red to yellow, but it goes unnoticed. The
imperceptibility of these derivative qualities is not attributable to a failure of the perceiver to
discern them, but to their being only potentially present in the series. There is a position in the
series corresponding to the ratio definitive of the derivative quality. But unlike the basic species,
it is never actualized in alterations along the scale, so it never produces amotion that could affect
the medium or a perceiver. In order to be so actualized, the qualities must first be separated out
by mixture.
Other empirical observations may have led Aristotle to the conclusion that the derivative
species of color require separation via mixture. For example, he reports that painters can obtain
almost all of the colors by mixing (κεραννύναι) except red, green, and violet—the colors of the
rainbow (Meteor. 372a5–8); this lends support to the idea that these colors are somehow more
basic, and perhaps that the colors the can be obtained by mixing are somehow dependent on
them. And anyway it is true that some colors, like brown, never appear in spectra produced by
refracted light; if one were like Aristotle committed to a scalar conception of perceptual qual-
ities, this might lend support to the idea that such colors must be merely potentially present
on the scale. In general, however, it must be conceded that conclusive evidence for this picture
is lacking. Aristotle is wrong to think that perceptual qualities in actuality are discontinuous.
The rainbow is not tricolored but a prismatic spectrum. Nor indeed does the rainbow provide a
satisfactory mapping of color space: the familar color solid differentiates the shades along three
dimensions, whereas Aristotle’s scalar theory only captures one, the dimension of lightness.
These inadequacies are not simply the result of careless observation, however. They stem
from commitments much more central to Aristotle’s theory. Perceptual qualities are conceived
as two-dimensional scales not only on the basis of phenomena such as the rainbow, but because
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Aristotle conceives of perceptual qualities in potentiality as attributes of perceptually qualified
bodies and therefore as subject to analysis in terms of his general account of qualitative change.
Similarly, Aristotle adopts the model of mixture not only because it better handles phenomena
such as color constancy at various distances, but because the more general principles governing
mixture allow him to trace qualitative differences in the affections produced by specifically dif-
ferent perceptual qualities to quantitative differences in their constitutive mixtures. This is the
most substantial upshot of Aristotle’s chemical analysis model, and I will devote the remainder
of this chapter to exploring it. The lesson of text 2.4 is not that Aristotle’s theory of color and
other perceptual qualities were arrived at on the basis of careful (or careless) empirical obser-
vation. The lesson is that, however the theory was arrived at, Aristotle held it as a condition of
adequacy that it respect the observed phenomena.
2.9 Perceptual motions on the chemical analysis model
In defending the determinacy of the species of a perceptual qualities in actuality Aristotle is not
denying that perceptual quality scales are continuous.31 Rather, he is acknowledging a datum he
thinks must be accommodated by any credible account of the nature of perceptual qualities. He
remains committed to the chemical analysis model he used to describe perceptual qualities in
potentiality, and to the dense (potential) infinity of qualities it generates. And having dealt to his
satisfaction with the problem thismodel poses for the evident determinacy of perceptual quality
species, he turns inDe Sensu 7 to applying this model to the actuality of perceptual qualities. As
with the corporealmixtures withwhich he identifies the qualities in potentiality, Aristotle argues
that the qualitative differences among the motions they generate in actuality are determined by
quantitative differences in the ratios of extreme contraries that characterize the motions. With
the important exception of the mean, it turns out that each of the potentially infinite values of a
perceptual quality scale has its own actuality; each, in other words, is productive of a distinctive
31Contrast G. R. T. Ross 1906, note ad 445b24, and, perhaps, W. D. Ross 1955, note ad 445b27–29.
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type of motion. This section elaborates the principles governing this extension of the chemical
analysis model.
Let’s first get clear on the explananda. Recall from section 2.4 that a perceptual quality scale
divides into two regions bordered by three limits, the state extreme, the privative extreme, and
the mean. As we observed, Aristotle is in the practice of referring to qualities in terms of the
extreme that dominates in their constitutive mixture; thus, for instance, gray and deep blue are
dark colors, red and yellow light. This suggests that the values of a perceptual quality scale can
be divided into three types: whereQi is a value on an ordered perceptual quality scaleQ1 . . .Qn,
exactly one of the following will be true true ofMix(Qi):
(1) Mix(Qi) = (0< x< 1) : 1, so that Qi belongs to the “stative” region of Q1 . . .Qn,
(2) Mix(Qi) = 1 : (0< x< 1), so that Qi belongs to the privative region of Q1 . . .Qn, or
(3) Mix(Qi) = 1 : 1 so that Qi is the mean value of Q1 . . .Qn.
Intuitively, the values of the color scale that satisfy (1) are the dark colors, and the values that
satisfy (2) are the light colors. (Which quality, if any, satisfies (3) will be considered separately,
in sect. 2.9.3.) Moreover, the values in which one extreme dominates to a greater extent over the
other, and so lie closer to the dominant extreme on the scale, are intuitively qualitatively more
similar to the relevant extreme: colors that contain more black appear darker, whereas colors
that contain more white appear lighter. To validate these intuitions, Aristotle introduces three
principles that together explain how themanifest qualitative differences among perceptual qual-
ities in actuality depend on underlying quantitative difference in the ratios of their constitutive
mixtures.
Although the context in which Aristotle articulates these principles is highly aporetic, it can
nevertheless be shown that Aristotle accepts each principle in propria persona. For not only
does he appeal to them outside of De Sensu 7, but each is based in the same theory of mixture
he adduces to spell out the nature of perceptual qualities in potentiality. In fact, the relation
between perceptual qualities in potentiality and in actuality entailed by these principles is such
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that, all things being equal, the ratio that determines the character of the quality in potentiality
also determines its character in actuality.
2.9.1 Principle 1: contraries produce contrary motions
Perceptual quality scales have the same structure. Each is delimited by two extreme contraries
opposed as the state and privation of some nature. This nature, which I have been calling the
agent nature of the relevant quality scale, may be present in various degrees in perceptually
qualified bodies, and the degree to which it is present or absent in a perceptually qualified body
is determined by the ratio in which the extremes of state and privation are mixed. So one role of
the agent nature is to differentiate the values of a quality scale in terms of its degree of presence.
But the agent nature also has a role in the production of perceptual affections. Consider again
the analogy between light and white (text 2.1 above). In an unbounded transparent medium
the presence of fire causes illumination, the state of actual transparency. In the transparent
determinately located in the surface of a solid body, by contrast, the presence of fire causes
coloration, the actuality of the object’s potential to move an illuminated transparent. Thus it is
“illumination” or actual transparency in the object’s surface that brings it to actuality and enables
it to produce a motion in an actually transparent medium.
Generally, then, the degree of presence of the agent nature in the perceptually qualified body
is responsible for the motion it produces in the medium. This explains the efficacy of the state
extreme for each genus of perceptual quality. But what of the efficacy of the privative extreme,
which corresponds to the total absence of the agent nature but is nevertheless a perceptual qual-
ity? Bodies that approximate the privative extreme lack the nature that would enable them to
cause the relevant sort of perceptual affection. To this extent they are imperceptible, but Aris-
totle denies that they are thereby inaccessible to the relevant sense:
Text 2.8 Now just as vision is of the visible and the invisible (for darkness is invisible, but sight discrim-
inates this as well), and furthermore of the excessively bright (for this too is invisible, but in a different
way than darkness); and [just as] hearing is of sound and silence, of which the former is audible and the
latter not audible, and of great sounds as sight is of bright [colors] (for just as a small sound is inaudible, in
a way [so too are] great and violent [sounds])—and though invisible is in general said in the same way as
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impossible in other cases, it is also said, if something should not have or have weakly what it is by nature
such as to have, in the same way as footless or pipless32—so too, then, is taste of the tasteable and the un-
tasteable, i.e. what has a minute or weak flavor or what is destructive of the taste.33 (An. 2.10, 422a20–31)
A precursor to this position appears in Aristotle’s discussion of the rainbow in Meteorology,
where he describes black as a sort of denial (ἀπόφασις) and a extinguishing (ἔκλειψις) of sight
(374b12–14). Aristotle’s considered view in De Anima and De Sensu conforms to this character-
ization, with one important difference: the perception of black, no less than the perception of
white, is an affection of an active perceiver. To capture this point, it is better to describe the pri-
vative extreme, not simply as an absence or privation, but as a distinctive motion of the relevant
medium caused by the absence of the appropriate agent nature. So the way Aristotle prefers to
put it in De Sensu 7 is that the state extreme and the privative extreme correlate with contrary
motions in the medium; that is:
contrariety
Themotions of contraries are contraries. (448a1–2)
2.9.2 Principles 2 and 3: the interaction of contrary motions
The principle of contrariety provides the basis of the remaining two principles. Given the
chemical analysis model, we need to know what effect the admixture of the primary contraries
has on themotionproduced by the resulting quality. The last twoprinciples are designed to relate
the qualitative character of the motions produced by such quality mixtures back to quantitative
facts concerning the ratio in which they’re composed.
The principles are highly intuitive, but they also have an ontological basis in themetaphysics
of mixture. In De Sensu 7 Aristotle introduces them as a special case of a familiar phenomenon
32Accepting Ross’s conjecture of τὸ δ' ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως at 422a28; cf.Met. 1022b27–28
33ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου (τὸ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ
τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τε τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους),
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀκουστὸν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀκουστόν, καὶ μεγάλου ψόφου
καθάπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ λαμπροῦ (ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μικρὸς ψόφος ἀνήκουστος, τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁ μέγας τε καὶ
ὁ βίαιος), ἀόρατον δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλως λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων τὸ ἀδύνατον, τὸ δ' ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ
ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄπουν καὶ τὸ ἀπύρηνον – οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦ γευστοῦ τε καὶ ἀγεύστου,
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἔχον χυμὸν ἢ φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως.
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(447a14–20). We all know what it is like to be so immersed in some mental activity, whether it
is in thought, passion, or with some captivating perceptual stimulus, that we fail to notice even
what is right before our eyes. In Aristotle’s view the visual affection’s inability to capture our
attention in such cases is attributable to the fact that its motion is drowned out or repelled by
the competing intellectual, emotional, or perceptual affection currently consuming us. And if
the overwhelmed visual motion should turn out to get our attention, the force of the resulting
affection will necessarily be diminished by that of rival affections. It is just like, when honey is
added to water, it becomes more difficult to see either the honey or the water distinctly: to the
extent that we can still see the honey, its appearance is “watered-down”, less vivid than it would
have appeared on its own.
Similarly, when we encounter a color mixed from white and black, the resulting affection
is unlike either seeing white or seeing black. It is rather something different from both, an
affection whose character reflects the degree to which the white or black in the color compound
dominates over its contrary. These observations suggest that the resulting motion respects the
following constraints:
magnitude
The greater motion cancels out the lesser. (447a14–15)
purity
Everything is more perceptible unalloyed than mixed (κεκραμένος). (447a17–18)
There is no question that Aristotle accepts these principles in propria persona. We find appeals
to magnitude elsewhere in Parva Naturalia (e.g. at Div. 464b5) as well as in Aristotle’s compar-
ative anatomy of the eye, which explicitly draws on the results of his psychological investigation
of perception (GA 5.1 780a8–9). Further, both principles parallel certain of the features of Aris-
totle’s theory of mixture that also recommend it as a model for the composition of intermediate
perceptual qualities.3⁴ One such feature was that in compounds each of the contrary ingredients
3⁴See sect. 2.7. Cf. GC 327b22–26, 334b9–15,Meteor. 381b29–382a8.
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changes from its own nature, so that the compound comes more to resemble the character of
the stronger ingredient. This reciprocal alteration on the part of the ingredients coheres with
magnitude and purity, for the compoundwill (by magnitude) come to resemble the stronger
ingredient, but only to the extent that its effect has not (by purity) been diluted by the weaker
ingredient.
Taken together, magnitude and purity explain the differences in how distinct quality mix-
tures impact the medium as well as perceivers. Because, by purity, the extreme contrary in-
gredients obscure (literally ‘make unapparent’, ἀφανίζει) one another, the motion produced by
a mixed quality will be determined by the degree to which the dominant ingredient exceeds, in
the way specified by magnitude:
Text 2.9 This [result] is produced in the [motions] from which some one thing is generated. If indeed
it is the case that the greater motion obscures the lesser [= magnitude], it is necessary, when they occur
simultaneously, that it [sc. the greater motion] be less perceptible than if it were on its own. For the lesser
[motion] with which it is mixed diminishes it to some degree, if indeed everything is more perceptible
in its pure form [= purity].3⁵ (Sens. 7, 447a20–24)
Since, according to Aristotle’s theory ofmixture, the ingredients of amixture remain present po-
tentially in the resulting compound, the motion produced by a mixed quality can be conceived
as the simultaneous actuality of contrary motions. When the state extreme and the privative ex-
treme constituting the quality compound act simultaneously, the resulting “compound” motion
is the product of neither on its own but of both together. Like honey mixed in water, the affec-
tion will be a “watered-down” version of the dominant motion. What vividness the dominant
motion retains in the resulting affection will depend on the degree to which it is obscured by its
contrary: as the magnitude of the dominant motion relative to its contrary increases the result-
ing affection comes to resemble the product of the dominant motion in its “pure” or unalloyed
form.
3⁵τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι γίγνεται. εἰ δὴ ἡ μείζων τὴν ἐλάττω κίνησιν ἐκκρούει, ἀνάγκη, ἂν ἅμα
ὦσι, καὶ αὐτὴν ἧττον αἰσθητὴν εἶναι ἢ εἰ μόνη ἦν· ἀφαιρεῖται γάρ τι ἡ ἐλάττων μειγνυμένη, εἴπερ
ἅπαντα τὰ ἁπλᾶ μᾶλλον αἰσθητά ἐστιν. See LSJ, § III s.v. ἀπλόος, for the translation of ἁπλᾶ as ‘pure’ in this
context.
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2.9.3 The mean
Thus purity and magnitude validate our intuitions concerning at least two of the three cases
mentioned above. Suppose, for instance, that Qi is a value of the color scale. If Qi satisfies
condition (1), such that white dominates over black in its mixture, magnitude tells us thatQi is
a bright color. By purity, moreover,Qi’s impact on a perceiver will resemble that of pure white
to the extent that the portion of white exceeds that of black, as indicated inQi’s ratio. By contrast,
ifQi satisfies (2), such that black dominates over white in its mixture, magnitude requires that
Qi be a dark color, one whose darkness (by purity) corresponds to the degree to which black
exceeds white in the mixture. There remains one further case, namely (3) thatMix(Qi) = 1 : 1,
so that Qi is what I earlier called themean of the relevant quality scale. How do we understand
the impact of qualities that fall into this category?
If neither extreme dominates in a quality mixture, magnitude gives no indication of which,
if either, of the contrarymotions affects the perceiver. Nor does purity tell us the extent towhich
the efficacious motion (whichever it is) impacts the perceiver, since each motion obscures and
is obscured reciprocally. Aristotle too is vexed by this question, as the following lines from De
Sensu 7 attest:
Text 2.10 So if there should be distinct [motions] that are equal, there will be perception of neither.
For each obscures the other to the same extent, and it is impossible to perceive [either] in its pure form.
Therefore there will either be no perception, or there will be a different [perception] compounded from
both. This in fact is precisely what seems to happen in the case of things blended together in whatever
they are mixed.3⁶ (Sens. 7, 447a25–29)
Two options are considered: either the simultaneous equal motions produce no perception,
or, as in cases in which one of the motions exceeds its contrary, there will be some singular
perception produced in both, onewhose character is presumably determined by a third principle
specific to equal perceptual motions. However, it is unclear what such a principle might be,
3⁶ἐὰν ἄρα ἴσαι ὦσιν ἕτεραι οὖσαι, οὐδετέρας ἔσται αἴσθησις· ἀφανιεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ὁμοίως τὴν ἑτέραν,
ἁπλῆς δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὥστε ἢ οὐδεμία ἔσται αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλη ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ὅπερ καὶ γίγνεσθαι
δοκεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν κεραννυμένων ἐν ᾧ ἂν μειχθῶσιν.
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and Aristotle seems to accept the former option, according to which simultaneous contrary
perceptual motions which are equal in magnitude produce no perception in the perceiver.3⁷
This is a reasonable conclusion, since (given contrariety) the state extreme and the priva-
tive extreme are productive of mutually exclusive motions, and since the only other alternative,
namely that the patient is simultaneously affected by incompatible motions, seems impossible.3⁸
The conclusion however carries some surprising and counterintuitive implications, chief among
which is that the mean value of a perceptual quality scale seems not to be a perceptual quality.
A perceptual quality is an affective quality. As such, it is in potentiality the non-dispositional
causal base for a perceptually qualified body’s ability to produce the motions in which the qual-
ity consists in actuality. There is however no motion in which the mean value of a perceptual
quality scale consists in actuality, so bodies that instantiate the mean value in that respect lack
the ability to produce the type of motion characteristic of that genus of quality. So it would
be more apt to say that bodies that instantiate the mean value of a perceptual quality scale lack
qualification in the relevant scale; what is meanly colored is in fact colorless, and what is meanly
flavored is in fact flavorless.
This may seem paradoxical. I’ve argued that Aristotle defines, for instance, color as the de-
gree of transparency in the surface of a body or, equivalently, as a ratio of black to white. On
either formulation themean of the color scale appears to be a color: 1 : 1 is after all a ratio of black
to white, and a 1 : 1mixture of black and white does determine some degree of transparency in
surface. If this is right, then, in apparent contradiction of Aristotle’s conclusion in text 2.10, we
seem committed to treating meanly colored items as somehow colored. However, it would be
wrong to think that this conception of the mean is a flaw in Aristotle’s view. To the contrary, it
is a feature of central importance, and one that Aristotle exploits in arguing for the conclusion
3⁷See e.g. 447b4–6; cf. Alexander, in De sens. 136.22–137.15.
3⁸This indeed is the substance of the problem Aristotle is discussing in De Sensu 7. To the arguable extent that
Aristotle allows for the simultaneous perception of contrary homogeneous qualities, it is by distinguishing different
subjects for the relevant affections. See Gregorić 2007, 145–162 for one recent interpretation that attempts to make
room for a perceptual “field” in Aristotle’s theory. Though I cannot substantiate my suspicions here, I myself am
dubious whether Aristotle does allow for simultaneous affection by homogeneous qualities, as he clearly does for
the case of heterogenous qualities.
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that the senses both perceive and discriminate the qualities they specially perceive. Over the
course of the next two chapters, we shall explore this aspect of Aristotle’s ontology of perceptual
qualities in considerable detail. For the moment, let me just summarize how I think Aristotle
avoids contradiction in claiming, for instance, that meanly colored objects are colorless. Meanly
colored objects are of course not colorless in the sense that they do not instantiate some ratio of
black to white; to that extent, they have generic color. But because mean objects are incapable
of producing perceptual affection, there is no determinate species of perceptual affection asso-
ciated with the quality it instantiates. In other words, the mean is a value of the color scale, and
as such it is a color in genus, but it corresponds to no color in species.3⁹ This condition moreover
characterizes the illuminated transparent medium, which Aristotle describes variously as “col-
orless”, as having color “incidentally”, as “colored” and as visible “through a borrowed color”, as
well as the condition of the visual organ in first actuality.⁴⁰ And the same account applies to the
mean value of the other perceptual quality scales. Themean, though clearly a special case, poses
no special problem for chemical analytic approach I am attributing to Aristotle.
2.10 Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal qualities
Oncewe arrive at an adequate understanding of the puzzles Aristotle raises concerning the actu-
ality of perceptual qualities, we can appreciate the unity of the account he offers inDe Sensu. To
summarize, the account contains two basic components. First, it contains a common framework
for articulating the nature of perceptual qualities in potentiality, what I have called the chemical
analysis model. Second, it contains a set of principles that relate the qualitative character of the
motion produced in the actuality of a perceptual quality to the ratio of the mixture that charac-
terizes it in potentiality: contrariety, magnitude, and purity. Together, these components
3⁹Compare Aristotle’s views on mules, which he thinks belong neither to the species horse nor the species don-
key, but rather to their (anonymous) common genus: Met. 1033b33–34. Perhaps like mules, the mean value of a
perceptual quality scale is on this view a member of the genus, but not by virtue of being any one of its species. For
further discussion, see ch. 3.2.3.
⁴⁰See ch. 1.6.1.
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imply that there is a single nature and essence common to the potentiality and actuality of a
quality, a nature and essence Aristotle conceives of as kind of ratio of contrary qualities that
may be variously realized in corporeal mixtures andmedial motions. Applied to corporeal mix-
tures, the ratio characterizes a perceptual quality in potentiality. Applied to medial motions,
it applies to the actualization of those potentialities, an actualization whose character is deter-
mined by the degree to which one or the other contrary ingredient dominates in the quality’s
constitutive mixture.
An appealing way to put this point would be to say that this ratio, which may be realized
either in a perceiver or in the perceived object, and which may take the form of a mixture or a
motion, defines what it is to be the relevant species of perceptual quality.⁴1 Such a perspective
on Aristotle’s account would moreover allow us to see what is distinctive about his physical-
ist approach to perceptual qualities. In general, physicalism about a given range of perceptual
properties is the view that properties within that range, which manifest in distinctive ways in
sense experience, are identical to certain “physical” properties. What is usually mean by “phys-
ical properties” are properties that may be described using the canonical vocabulary of physics,
without the need to advert to irreducibly qualitative notions proper to that range of qualities,
such as those figuring in “purely chromatic” propositions (‘pink is desaturated red’) or “purely
sonic” propositions (‘middle C is consonant with G4 but not with C♯4’). Physicalism about a
given range of perceptual qualities typically entails a distinction between the phenomenal quali-
ties manifest in sense experience and the physical properties they are in themselves. One reason
they may be held to do so is precisely the existence of such irreducibly qualitative notions. The
truth of propositions like ‘pink is desaturated red’ and ‘middle C is consonant with G4 but not
with C♯4’ are evident to experience: anyone with grasp of pink and red and the notion of satu-
ration should be able to understand and appreciate the fact that pink is desaturated red simply
⁴1This interpretation moreover has the exegetical advantage of justifying Aristotle’s uncharacteristic preoccupa-
tion with mathematics and ratios in De Sensu; see Sorabji 1972. As we shall see in the following chapters, the idea
of ratios that may be instantiated in different types of matter has further application in Aristotle’s theory of special
perceptual discrimination.
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on the basis of her experience of those colors. If a proposition like this cannot be translated
into the canonical vocabulary of physics—a proposition that moreover seems to be essential to
our experience of red and pink if any is—then we seem to be committed to a contrast between
the nature of the phenomenal property, which evidently has such qualitative features, and the
physical property, which evidently doesn’t. But even if such qualitative features as saturation
and consonance could be reduced to the vocabulary of physics, we would still be compelled to
distinguish the phenomenal quality and the physical quality. For there are a number of non-
qualitative features of the physical qualities that are not manifest in experiences as of them. As
noted at the outset, colors just don’t look like dispositions to reflect, transmit, or emit certain
wavelengths of light, or the microphysical grounds of such dispositions. So phenomenal colors,
colors as they are presented to us in sense experience, are not obviously the same as physical
colors, the physical properties that characterize what the colors essentially are.⁴2
The physicalist strategy in response to these arguments has typically been to diffuse the wor-
rying implications of this apparent contingency of the identity between the phenomenal quality
and the physical quality. The apparent contingency of their identity is due to the fact that sense
experience imperfectly presents the world as it actually is. Perhaps we are presented in expe-
rience with qualitative properties that could have but do not actually belong to the objects we
perceive.⁴3 Or perhaps we are presented only with certain aspects of the physical nature of the
qualities, such that it cannot be discerned on the basis of experience alone what these qualities
are like in themselves.⁴⁴ But in either case the worrying implications of the physicalist’s con-
trast between the phenomenal quality and the physical quality dissolve if we simply let go of the
assumption that sense experience acquaints us with the nature of the relevant range of qualities.
I’ve argued that Aristotle is a physicalist about perceptual qualities in the same way. On
his view the essential nature and behavior of perceptual qualities at different levels of actualiza-
⁴2The parallels between this dialectic and the mainline 20th century debate about the psychoneural identity the-
ory of mind should be clear; see esp. Levine 1993 and Kripke 1980, 144–155; and for in depth discussion of the
parallels, see Byrne 2006.
⁴3Cf. Chalmers 2006.
⁴⁴Cf. Byrne and Hilbert 2007.
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tion may be explained completely in terms of the general physical principles he takes to govern
mixture, motion, and change. Yet Aristotle feels no need to resort to strategies like the one
described above in order to account for the identity between perceptual qualities as they are
presented to us in experience and as features of perceptually qualified bodies. This is because
neither of the above arguments for a contrast between the phenomenal and the physical quality
apply in Aristotle’s framework. In his view qualitative descriptions of perceptual qualities—for
instance, the chromatic difference between different shades of red or the consonance and dis-
sonance of different tones—are fully accounted for by quantitative differences in the ratios of
the relevant qualities.⁴⁵ And there are moreover no “non-qualitative” features present in the
nature of a perceptual quality that might fail to be manifest in the experience of it, since the
essence of the perceptual quality insofar as it is present in a corporeal mixture is the same as its
essence insofar as it is present in a medial motion. For this reason Aristotle is happy to treat the
qualitative sameness manifest between a quality in potentiality and in actuality on the model
of the sameness manifest for instance in identically colored objects. Though the sameness in
the former case (though not in the latter) is explained by the fact that the quality in actuality is
an actualization of that potential, in neither case is there an essential difference to be discerned
between the compared qualities.
In this chapter I’ve argued that Aristotle’s ontology of perceptual qualities leaves no room
for a contingent connection between perceptual qualities as they are in themselves and as they
are manifest in experience. This conclusion, however, leaves room for the claim that perceptual
experience imperfectly presents us with phenomenal qualities that are nevertheless the same in
nature as the relevant features of perceived bodies. Grant that perception presents you with a
quality whose nature corresponds to a physical attribute of the perceived body; nothing in this
picture guarantees that you have been thereby become acquainted with the nature of that qual-
ity. This is an objection of which Aristotle was keenly aware.⁴⁶ His response to this worry is
⁴⁵On harmony and disharmony among quality-ratios, both within and without the genus of sound, see
Sens. 439b25–440a6.
⁴⁶See Plato,Tht. 186b–c. For discussion, see Introduction, xxviii–xxxii.
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not however based in the ontology of perceptual qualities, but rather in a psychological the-
ory according to which the senses “discriminate” (κρίνειν) the qualities they specially perceive.
Starting in the next chapter, I’ll show how Aristotle’s employs the ontological framework of De
Sensu 3–5 in formulating an account of perceptual discrimination. We begin with Aristotle’s
obscure claim that the senses are “mean states” (μεσότητες) of the contrariety present in their
special objects, a claim that relies on central features of this framework.
3The Sensory Mean State
Aristotle uses two seemingly incongruous models to describe the special senses. The first is that
of the soul. The animate sense organ is a microcosm of the living animal; the material organ is
its body, and the sense is its soul. This model presents the sense as a principle of the animate
organ, the form and final cause for whose sake the sense organ is instrumentally structured in
the way that it is. The second is that of a ratio of its organ, akin to the tuning of strings on a lyre.
This model presents the sense as structurally analogous to the qualities it specially perceives,
which in Aristotle’s analysis are also items whose nature is given by a ratio of contrary extremes.
Each model considered independently of the other is revealing, highlighting characteristics of
the special senses that are essential to understanding their function within the animal soul. The
model of the soul highlights the formal and final causal priority of sense over its organ, whereas
the model of a ratio highlights its essential relation to the objects it specially perceives, objects
which are in turn causally prior to it.1 But taking them together exposes a tension. Viewed as
a miniature soul, the sense could not be like a ratio of its organ, for if it were, it would not be
prior to but actually dependent on its organ. Conversely, viewed as a ratio, it could not operate
as the form and final cause that explains the instrumental organization of its organ.2 How, then,
1Cf. An. 418a24–25, cf. 415a15–22. On the ontological priority of perceptual qualities to their senses, see ch. 1.
On the objects of psychological capacities as formal causes, see Johansen 2012, 93–115.
2Aristotle’s use of both models in the case of the senses appears all the more puzzling if we recall that Plato in
the Phaedo (85e–87b) had already noticed this tension in harmonic theories of soul, and that (as we’ll see) Aristotle
himself rejects harmony accounts for similar reasons (An. 407b33–408a18).
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are we to reconcile these models to yield a coherent account of the special senses?
My aim in this chapter is to sketch an account of the senses as both miniature souls and ra-
tios of their respective organs by developing Aristotle’s related, but poorly understood, notion
that the sense is amean state (μεσότης) of the contraries present in its special objects. Properly
understood, the sensory mean state (as I shall call it) combines the essential elements of both
models, yielding a conception of sense as, on the one hand, the principle of the animate organ
and, on the other, a capacity whose actuality consists in its ability to track and regulate the affec-
tions of its bodily organ. This conception moreover sheds light on the condition of the animate
sense organ in a state of second actuality, a question that has been hotly debated by recent inter-
preters. While I shall not claim to have settled the question of the nature of perceptual affection,
I believe that a proper understanding of the sensory mean state provides substantial support for
an alternative account of perceptual affection that deserves serious consideration.
I shall proceed as follows: section 3.1 sets up the tension between the incongruous models
of sense, as soul and as ratio; section 3.2 argues for a conception of the sensory mean state that
would resolve this tension, first by defending an interpretation of a puzzle Aristotle raises con-
cerning the organ of touch, and second by extending the resulting account to the other senses;
finally, in section 3.3, I consider at length the implications of this interpretation for the nature
of perceptual affection.
3.1 Two models of sense
Aristotle views the relation of a sense to its organ on themodel of the relation of a soul to its body,
that is to say hylomorphically. If the eye were an animal, vision would be its soul (An. 412b18–19).
This is because vision stands to the eye as form to matter, the substance of the eye in accordance
with its definition (b19–20). Here we must apply all of the qualifications Aristotle builds into
his hylomorphic conception living bodies. First, by ‘eye’ we must understand an animate eye,
one already endowed with vision, for in the absence of such a power it is an eye only in name,
as though it were made of stone or drawn in pigment (cf. PA 641a17–21). Second, by ‘vision’ we
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must understand the capacity to see, a power that is brought to actuality by the agency of a visible
object (such as a color), but one that the eye possesses in first actuality even in the absence of
visual affection, as a knower possesses knowledge even in the absence of contemplating it (cf.
412a21–26). Finally, we must understand that, on such a hylomorphic conception, the sense and
its organ are the same in number. So there should be as little wonder whether the sense is one
with its organ as there is whether the shape is one with the wax in which it is impressed, or
generally whether the matter of a thing is one with the thing of which it is the matter (b6–9).
But unlike the living animal to which it belongs, the eye is just one part of a functionally
integrated whole—the living animal—a part whose presence must therefore be explained by its
contribution to the survival and flourishing of the whole, for instance by its enabling the animal
to find food, avoid predators, or acquire some degree of practical or theoretical intelligence.3 For
these reasons the sense is better thought of as the substantial form of its bodily organ qua organ,
that aspect of the organic whole that is instrumental for the exercise of the relevant sensory
power:
Text 3.1 Generally concerning each sense one must grasp that the sense is that which is receptive of
perceptual forms without the matter . . . . And [the] primary sense organ is that in which such a capacity
[is present]. Now, they are the same, but their being is different. For that which perceives is a certain
magnitude, yet neither what it is to perceive nor the sense is a magnitude, but a certain logos and capacity
of that [sc. magnitude].⁴ (An. 2.12, 424a17–28)
I shall postpone (until sect. 3.3.2) discussion of the account of sense as what is receptive of per-
ceptual forms or species without the matter and the famous wax analogy (a19–14, elided in this
quotation). But notice for the moment how the sense and its organ are each characterized by
reference to the other. Aristotle first identifies the sense as the capacity to receive perceptual
3See An. 434b23–29, 435b19–24, Sens. 436a18–437a9. I assume it is possible to account for both the animal as
a whole and the activities that make up its form of life without reference to their contribution to anything more
comprehensive, such as its species, its ecosystem, or the cosmos, even if in Aristotle’s view they do provide such
benefits.
⁴καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν
εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης . . . . αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ'
εἶναι ἕτερον· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδ' ἡ αἴσθησις
μέγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου.
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forms without the matter, and then proceeds to identify its “primary organ” as the type of body
in which such a capacity is present.⁵ However, Aristotle wants to avoid giving the impression
that the sense is present in its organ merely as an attribute, as something without which the
organ can go on being what it is. To ward off this misunderstanding, he immediately reminds
us of their underlying unity: the sense and its primary organ are the same in number, though
they differ in being. This underlying unity is more apparent in Aristotle’s second description
of the sense as a certain logos and capacity of that magnitude which is its organ. By describing
the sense in this way, Aristotle makes clear that the capacity definitive of a sensory power is a
capacity of a certain magnitude, namely the animate organ of sense.
Oneway of understanding the sense as a logos and capacity of a certainmagnitude reinforces
the parallel with soul. With this characterization of sense, Aristotle partially delivers on an
account of perception promised in the opening chapter of De Anima. Perception, as with most
of the operations and affections of soul, is an “enmattered logos” (An. 403a5–10, 24–28). As such,
it is an attribute that belongs to an organism not simply because it possesses a certain type of
form or soul, in the way the surface area of a bronze sphere is equal to the product of the square
of its radius and 4pi , not because it is a bronze sphere, but simply because it is a sphere. Rather,
perception belongs to the organisms that possess it because they possess a soul enmattered in
a certain type of body. In this way it is analogous to how a bronze sphere makes contact with a
linear surface at a single point because it is a sphere composed of solid matter.⁶ In this respect
the logos Aristotle identifies with sense parallels the soul itself, which in Aristotle’s view is also
⁵See sect. 3.2.1 below. Aristotle’s point in calling it the “primary” (πρῶτον) organ is to isolate those respects of
the organ by virtue of which the sense is present in it as subject, or in short, what makes the organ an organ of that
sense; cf.Met. 1022a29–31 and Polansky 2007, 331–332. Aristotle’s point may also be to distinguish the unified organ
of sense, or central sensorium, from peripheral organs such as the flesh, tongue, eyes, ears, and nose. As he will soon
go on to argue at length (An. 426b8–29; cf. Sens. 449a5–20), the various senses must belong to a unified perceptual
faculty in which, though different from each other in being, they are the same in number and therefore also one
in matter. So Aristotle may be thinking here of the heart, insofar as it is receptive to a given type of perceptual
form, though the identification of the organ is not strictly germane to the present psychological inquiry. See e.g.
Juv. 469a10–22 (cf. 467b14–468a3), PA 2.10, esp. 656a27–b6 (cf. Somn. 456a4–6 for a possible referent of the remarks
ἐν τοῖς περὶ αἰσθήσεως). Detailed discussion of the unity of the perceptual faculty of soul is given in two recent
monographs by Gregorić (2007) and Marmodoro (2014).
⁶Cf. An. 403a11–16: for Aristotle contact requires matter.
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an enmattered logos, a feature of the living organism that belongs not only in virtue of what it is,
but also because of the sort of matter it has (An. 414a14–28, cf.Met. 1036b24–30). Thus sense, no
less than soul, cannot be understood or defined independently of the sort of matter to which it
belongs. Understood in this way, the sense is a logos because it is the definition of the enmattered
organ, just as the animal soul corresponds to the definition of the living animal.
But Aristotle also conceives of the sense as a logos of its organ in another way, namely as
the ratio of the organ’s composition. Here the parallels with soul appear to cease. Aristotle has
already argued at length against the view that the soul is a harmonia, or, roughly, the proper
attunement of the material elements composing the body (An. 407b33–408a29). Among the the-
ories he criticizes under this heading is one that takes the soul to be the “ratio of the mixture”
(ὁ λόγος τῆς μίξεως) of these elements (408a13–18). Aristotle’s complaint with “harmonic”
conceptions of soul is not that appeals to mathematical ratio and proportion are out of place in
the life sciences. To the contrary, he believes life depends on the maintenance of a proper pro-
portion of the body’s elemental constituents (cf. Long. 466a18–23;Meteor. 379a2–11); and he even
defines some parts of the body in terms of the ratio of their mixture, for instance flesh, bone,
and other “homoeomerous” stuffs. But he thinks it is untenable to regard any such ratio as a
soul. This is partly because there would then be several souls in a single organism, one for flesh,
another for bone, and so on. But his more fundamental reason for rejecting the harmonic con-
ception is that it renders the soul ephiphenomenal and so unable to originate change in the body
(407b34–408a35). Consequently the harmony theory of soul cannot account for the operations
and affections that in Aristotle’s view evidently belong to it.
Given these deep parallels with soul, it would seem incongruous for Aristotle to endorse
a harmonic conception of the senses, that is, to construe them as harmonic ratios whose per-
sistence depends on the proper attunement of their respective organs. But this is just what he
appears to do. For example, he infers as an obvious corollary of the idea that the sense is a lo-
gos of its organ that, like a lyre strummed too violently, extreme perceptual qualities impair the
organ and “loosen” its sensory logos:
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Text 3.2 It is clear from these [considerations, sc. that the sense is a kind of logos and capacity of its
organ] also why the excesses among the perceptual objects destroy the sense organs. For if the mo-
tion of the sense organ should be too strong [sc. for the organ], its ratio—and this is the sense—is loos-
ened, just as the concord and tension [of a lyre] are loosened when its chords are strummed too hard.⁷
(De Anima 2.12, 424a28–32)
Clearly, ‘logos’ here cannot simplymeandefinition, and themusical analogy comparing the sense
to the concord (συμφωνία) of a well-tuned lyre strongly suggests that the relevant meaning is
ratio. Has Aristotle stumbled upon a contrast with the soul that would allow for a harmonic
conception of the senses? Unlikely, since his reasons for rejecting a harmonic theory of soul
would also apply to a harmonic conception of the basic faculties of soul. Aristotle’s fundamental
complaint about the harmony theory is that it supposes that the actions and affections living
things engage in qua living can be given a complete material explanation, one which makes
no ineliminable reference to psychological functions.⁸ For this reason he would find it equally
absurd to conceive of the faculties of soul on the model of homoeomerous stuffs, that is, as
essentially reducible to a composition of elements, or to a ratio thereof: “of what [part] are we
to suppose intellect—or even the perceptive or desiderative faculty—is the composition, and
[compounded] how?” (408a12–13).
I believe there is anotherway to conceive of the sense as a ratio, one that compromises neither
the hylomorphic relation in which the sense stands to its organ nor the parallels between sense
and soul. This approach takes its point of departure from the causal and explanatory priority
of the soul in relation to the body, for in this respect too the animate organ is a microcosm of
the living animal to which it belongs. One way in which the soul is a cause and principle of
the living body as a whole is as a final cause (An. 415b15–21). Living things possess the (first
actuality) psychological functions they do for the sake of their (second actuality) exercise: as
Aristotle summarizes the point elsewhere, “animals do not see so that they may have vision,
⁷φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια. ἐὰν
γὰρ ᾖ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύεται ὁ λόγος – τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἡ αἴσθησις – ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ
συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν. On the translation of τόνος, see Hicks 1907, note
ad 424a32.
⁸See Caston 1997 for a defense of this reading.
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they have vision so that they may see” (Met. 1050a10–11). The sort of body that living things
naturally possess is likewise for the sake of the realization of its psychological functions. We’ve
seen that the body is an instrument of the soul, a composite of functionally integrated matter
organized for the sake of realizing the soul’s characteristic functions. The same is true of the
modular parts of the body. As the animal has sight in order to see, it has eyes in order to have
vision.⁹ So even though neither the sense nor its organ can be defined independently of the
other, the sense is causally and explanatorily prior to its organ. For it is because the sense organ
is an instrument for the exercise of its sense that it is functionally organized as it is, whereas the
converse explanatory relation does not hold.
On the reading I’m suggesting, Aristotle introduces the idea that the sense is the ratio of its
organ to spell out the way in which the sense is the final causal of the animate organ, hylomor-
phically conceived. Here, as elsewhere in De Anima, Aristotle’s claims about the nature of the
senses must be understood against the background of the account of perceptual qualities given
in De Sensu. On that account, a perceptual quality is an item on a scale of attributes defined by
a pair of extreme contraries: black and white in the case of color, bitter and sweet in the case
of flavor, and so on. The determinate qualities populating the scale are analyzed as mixtures of
those extremes, the qualitative differences between them ultimately attributable to differences
in the ratio of their constitutive mixtures.1⁰ For reasons we shall soon consider, it is hypotheti-
cally necessary for the sense to be perceptive of a scale of such qualities that its organ instantiate
a certain ratio of the contraries defining that quality scale. Specifically, the organ must instan-
tiate a 1 : 1 ratio of the relevant extremes, since this is the ratio that determines the mean of the
quality scale(s) it specially perceives.
In short, what it is to be the organ of that sense is to instantiate the mean of the relevant
quality scale. But because the sense is the form and substance in accordance with definition of
such an organ, it too in a way is the mean of that scale. So understood, however, the sense is
⁹And, of course, thereby to see; cf.Met. 1050a15–16.
1⁰See ch. 2 for detailed discussion of this account.
The Sensory Mean State 87
not simply reducible to this ratio, as on the harmonic conception Aristotle rejects. As the final
cause of the animate organ, the sense is also what (by hypothetical necessity) makes the organ
composed in such a way that it instantiates the relevant mean; it is that for whose sake the organ
is composed as it is. The sense therefore stands as the explanatory principle (ἀρχή) or nature
that structures and determines the behavior of its organ.
As I shall argue in the next section, Aristotle captures this aspect of the hylomorphism of
sense and sense organ by comparing the sense to a mean state (μεσότης) of the contrariety
present in the qualities it specially perceives. This approach contrasts sharply with how recent
commentators have tended to interpret Aristotle’s talk of the sensorymean state. By abandoning
their tendency, we stand to gain fresh insight into the explanatory use to which Aristotle puts
the sensory mean, as well as a better understanding of the hylomorphic conception of sense and
sense organ he endorses.
3.2 Sense as a mean state
In several passages Aristotle compares the senses to mean states, specifically to mean states of
the contrariety present in their perceptual objects (τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως: An.
424a4–5; cf. b1, 431a11, 435a21–25,Meteor. 382a19–20). There are at least two ways of interpreting
this comparison. Most contemporary commentators take the comparison simply to call atten-
tion to the fact that the sense is imperceptive of qualities already instantiated by its organ.11
The sense appears as a mean state relative to the qualities it can perceive because the latter must
exceed or fall short of the “mean” condition of the sense organ in order to produce perceptual
affection. I call this the wandering conception of the sensory mean state because, for all we are
told by Aristotle’s description of the sensory mean state on this interpretation, the sense organ’s
position on the relevant quality scale is arbitrary.
One could however take the condition of the sense organ relevant to the sense’s status as a
11For a representative sample, see Barker 1981, 248; Burnyeat 1992, 20–21; Bradshaw 1997, 146; (perhaps)Corcilius
2014, 40–43; (perhaps) Everson 1997, 81–82; Johansen 1997, 216–217 (cf. Johansen 2002); Polansky 2007, 333.
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mean state to be fixed, or stationary.12 Here too the qualities perceptible by the sense are excesses
in either direction of the relevant quality scale, but the condition of the organ is not arbitrary.
This reading, which I’ll presently defend, takes the condition of the organ to be precisely the one
necessary for it to be instrumental for the exercise of its sense—namely, the condition of being
composed of equal portions, or a 1 : 1 ratio, of the relevant extremes. Thus only if the sensory
mean state is interpreted as stationary does the sense’s status as a ratio of its organ explicate its
role as principle and final cause of the animate organ.
The key passage for arbitrating between the wandering and stationary conceptions is Aris-
totle’s discussion of the primary organ of touch. Appropriately enough, this discussion appears
just before Aristotle turns to consider the relation of sense to sense organ in general. His imme-
diate concern is to explain an apparent anomaly in tactile perception, a phenomenon that has
come to be known as the tactile “blind spot”. The phenomenon points out an exception in the
organ of touch that distinguishes it from the organs of the other senses, but it turns out to be an
exception that clarifies the rule.
3.2.1 Aristotle on the tactile “blind spot”
Dip your hand in water. If the water happens to be the same temperature as your hand, you
will, arguably, not feel the water’s temperature. Putative experiences like this are evidence for
a tactile “blind spot”, and as Theophrastus reports they played a role in early Greek theorizing
about perception:
Some suppose that perception comes about in a process of alteration, i.e. that like is unaf-
fected by like but that what is unlike is susceptible to affection, and they cede their opinion
to this [sc. the idea that perception is by contraries]. And they think that what happens
concerning touch bears witness, for what is equally hot or cold as flesh (ὁμοίως τῇ σαρκὶ
θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν) does not cause perception. (De Sensu 2.1–4)
Aristotle agrees that perception compares with alteration in that, prior to perceptual affection,
what perceives is unlike what is perceived: “it seems,” as he judiciously puts it, “to be alteration
12This minority view is held e.g. by Murphy 2005, 328–330, Sorabji 1992, 214–16, and Tracy 1969, 208–209.
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of a sort (ἀλλοίωσίς τις)” (An. 2.5, 416b34–35). However, in evident concession to other pre-
decessors who maintained that perception is “by likes” (416b35–417a2), he also thinks that when
what perceives has been affected it comes to be like what affects it. Perception, in other words,
is a process of assimilation, or “likening” (ὁμοίωσις), in which what perceives comes to be such
as the perceived object insofar as it is perceived. For Aristotle this means that what perceives
must not only be actually unlike, or contrary to, what it perceives, it must also be potentially like
it. These points are summarized in the final lines of De Anima 2.5, Aristotle’s most extensive
discussion of perceptual affection:
Text 3.3 What perceives (τὸ αἰσθητικόν) is potentially such as the perceptual object is already in
actuality, as has already been said. Not being like [sc. the perceptual object] it suffers affection. Having
suffered affection, it has been likened and is such as it.13 (418a3–6, tr. following Lorenz 2007)
In the course of that chapter Aristotle clarifies that the sort of affection and alteration that occurs
when the perceiver is assimilated to the perceptual object is not the ordinary sort of affection and
alteration (417b28–418a3). But his point here is that, in whatever respect that which perceives is
assimilated to the perceived object, it must be potentially but not actually such as the perceptual
object actually is.
This condition on the possibility of perceptual assimilation provides the theoretical backdrop
for Aristotle’s own discussion of the tactile blind spot. In Aristotle’s discussion, however, what
(according to Theophrastus) early theorists presented as a manifest perceptual phenomenon
appears more as a conceptual difficulty. The special senses are supposed to be sensitive to the
full range of their special perceptual qualities. In order to meet this demand—in order, that is,
for what sees to be sensitive to the full range of colors, what hears to the full range of sounds,
and so on—what perceives in the relevant modality must be potentially all but actually none of
those qualities. Thus, Aristotle asserts, “what is colorless is receptive of color, what is soundless of
sound” (An. 2.7, 418b26–27). Now, what is receptive of color is in one way vision, but in another
way it is the eye, or more generally the animate organ of sense, which is also said to receive the
13τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν
οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ' ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.
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form without the matter.1⁴ We shall consider in a moment how the other sense organs achieve
such non-qualification in the relevant genus of quality. For now, notice that this condition,
applied to the organ of touch, presents an apparent difficulty. The qualities specially perceived
by touch are no ordinary qualities. They are the fundamental elements of Aristotle’s cosmos,
the basic components of all material bodies. This is a problem because the organ of touch is
itself a body, so it can hardly lack tangible qualities altogether. It must instantiate some tangible
qualities, to which it will inevitably be imperceptive, but which ones? This is the question that
prompts Aristotle’s discussion of the tactile blind spot.
Aristotle offers a complicated argument in support of his preferred answer to this question.
It is worth considering in detail:
Text 3.4
[1] Theorgan of touch—the sense organ of these [qualities, sc. hot, cold, wet, and dry] and that in which
the so-called sense of touch is present primarily—is the part that is in potentiality such [as these qualities
are in actually]. For perceiving is a type of being affected; hence that which acts makes that [part], which
is potentially [such as it is], actually such as it is.
[2] For this reason we do not perceive anything that is equally hot and cold or [equally] hard and soft,
but rather the excesses, given that the sense is like a kind of mean state of the contrariety present in
perceptual objects.
[3] That is also why [the sense] discriminates the objects it perceives. For it is themeanwhich is capable
of discrimination, since in relation to each extreme it comes to be the other extreme.
[4] And just as that which is to perceive white and black must be neither of these in actuality, but both
in potentiality, and so on in the other cases, in the case of touch too [that which is to perceive hot and
cold must be] neither hot nor cold.1⁵ (An. 2.11, 423b29–424a10)
1⁴An. 3.2, 425b23–24: τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον. Pace Johnstone
2012, 152n28, who supposes Aristotle must be using αἰσθητήριον to refer to the composite of sense and sense organ,
contrary to his ordinary practice of referring to the perceptual composite as τὸ αἰσθητικόν. The fact that hereAris-
totle is evidently comfortable saying that the perceptual composite qua material receives perceptual form without
the matter seems to me an important constraint on how we understand the reception of perceptual form without
matter, rather than an unlikely shift in terminology. In particular, it indicates that material affection is intrinsically
involved in the reception of perceptual form, while at the same time suggesting that the material affection is not
ordinary “destructive” alteration; see below, sect. 3.3, for discussion.
1⁵τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἁφὴ ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ,
τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι ἐστίν· ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν, οἷον αὐτὸ
ἐνεργείᾳ, τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ, δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ἢ σκληροῦ καὶ
μαλακοῦ, οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης
τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται
γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων· καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον αἰσθήσεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ
μέλανος μηδέτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δ' ἄμφω (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
The Sensory Mean State 91
Proponents of the wandering conception will take Aristotle to be discussing the same tactile
blind spot that was evoked by supporters of the view that perception is by contraries. So read,
the passage would indeed support a wandering tactile mean state. Touch would be insensitive
to objects possessing the same tangible qualities as its fleshy organ, whatever they happen to
be; it would perceive only objects possessing “excesses” of these, for instance what is hotter or
colder, harder or softer, than whatever its fleshy organ happens to be. But the blind spot Aris-
totle is pointing out cannot be the one that interested his predecessors.1⁶ Note first that the
blind spot with which Aristotle is concerned is presented in text 3.4.1 as an implication of the
assimilation condition, not, as in Theophrastus’ presentation, a phenomenon simply evident to
experience. Second, that tactile blind spot concerns objects whose temperature is the same as
the perceiver’s flesh, but in text 3.4.1 Aristotle makes clear that his concern is with the primary
organ of touch, which is not flesh but something internal to the perceiver.1⁷ Finally and most
importantly, Theophrastus’ formulation of the phenomenon discusses objects which are as hot
or as cold as the perceiver’s flesh, but there is no such comparandum in Aristotle’s formulation
in text 3.4.2.1⁸ Thus Aristotle’s concern here seems not to be with what is as hot or cold as the
perceiver’s primary organ of touch—as if ordinary perceivers were in a position to sense the
temperature of their primary organ of touch as opposed to their flesh—but with what is equally
hot and cold, and with what is equally hard and soft.1⁹ The tactile blind spot with which Aristo-
tle is concerned is not to whatever happens to be the same temperature as the tactile organ, but
rather to what has a temperature that coincides with the determinate temperature that charac-
ἁφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν.
1⁶Pace Burnyeat 1992, 21n3.
1⁷See esp. An. 422b19–23, 34–423a1, b1–8; cf. 426b15–17. See also note 5 above; cf. Sorabji 1974.
1⁸This detail has regrettably been suppressed by several translators, who have taken it upon themselves to supply a
comparandum; see Barbotin and Jannone 1966, Hicks 1907, the paraphrasis of Ross 1961, and Shields 2016; Hamlyn
1993 is an exception.
1⁹Siwek (1965) reports several variations in the text I’ve printed as τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ἢ σκληροῦ
καὶ μαλακοῦ (424a2–3), most of which flip or omit one or more of the conjunctions. Most of the variations seem
to me to produce nonsense, and none seem to me to support the alternative reading I’m criticizing. Note that hard
and soft are in Aristotle’s view derivative tangible properties that supervene on bodies’ primary tangible qualities;
seeMeteor. 383b21–23.
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terizes the organ’s mean condition.
If this is correct, text 3.4 strongly suggests that the tactile mean state must be stationary.
We’ve seen that the question motivating this discussion concerns which qualities the organ of
touch must possess qua body and so be insensitive to qua organ of touch. The answer Aristotle
wants to give is that the relevant qualities are those corresponding to the mean of the quality
scale, for instance, on the temperature scale, the quality characterized by equal portions (or a
1 : 1 ratio) of the extreme contraries cold and hot. However, all that he is entitled to conclude
from the considerations adduced in text 3.4.1 is that touch’s bodily organ must possess, and so
be insensitive to, some value or other of each tangible quality scale. In order to establish that the
organ instantiates the mean value of each scale, Aristotle needs another premise. The required
premise, introduced in the last clause of text 3.4.2, is that the sense, in this case touch, is “like a
kind ofmean state of the contrariety present in the objects it perceives”, in this case the contraries
determining the quality scales specially perceived by touch.2⁰ Thus, as Aristotle states in text
3.4.2, the bodies to which touch is insensitive are in fact those that instantiate the relevant mean,
for instance, by being equally hot and cold or equally hard and soft, because touch is a kind of
mean state of the relevant contrariety.
3.2.2 Why must the organ of touch instantiate the mean?
Read in this way, texts 3.4.1–2 neatly exhibit the pattern of explanation sketched at the end of the
last section. The organ of touch is composed as it is—namely, in such a way that it is insensitive
to what is (for instance) equally hot and cold but perceptive to what contains an excess of hot
2⁰Note the grammatical construction, a genitive absolute clause introduced by a causal ὡς (see Smyth §§ 2240,
3000). That the clause is so clearly intended to explain the inference introduced by διό at the beginning of the
sentence presents a problem for the proponent of the wandering sensory mean state. The clause may be taken to
modify either the whole previous sentence or just the second clause (ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν), but on their reading
of the passage neither clause is helpfully elucidated by the consideration that the sense is a mean state. On their
view the first claim made in text 3.4.2 is that what is (e.g.) as hot or cold as the organ (whatever its temperature
happens to be) will not be perceptible to it, which follows unproblematically from the assimilation condition. So
too does the second claim, namely that the qualities of which it is perceptive are those that exceed it with respect
to heat or coldness. On the wandering conception, then, the lemma that the sense is a mean state would be an idle
wheel in the argument. That Aristotle evidently does not agree further supports my claim that the sensory mean
state is not wandering.
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or cold—because its sense is such as to be a mean state of these contraries. These passages also
allow us to see how touch may be understood as a ratio of its organ without collapsing into
a harmonic conception. For, although the status of touch as a mean state reflects the mean
condition of its primary organ, the organ instantiates the mean because and in order that it may
be an instrument for tactile perception. So, far from making the sense an epiphenomenon of
the composition of its organ, identifying the sense with the ratio of its organ actually reflects the
former’s final-causal priority over its organ.
Still, it may appear obscure why Aristotle should insist that what makes the organ of touch a
suitable instrument for tactile perception is that it instantiates the mean of each scale of tangible
qualities. Nothing inDe Anima’s discussion of perception and the special senses prior to text 3.4
has led us to expect that the sense organ should instantiate the mean of the quality scale(s) spe-
cially perceived by its sense, or even that instantiating the mean is a matter of possessing equal
portions of contrary extremes.21 Nor have we been given the principles necessary for under-
standing what it would be for the senses to be mean states, much less to grasp the implications
for the composition of the sense organs qua organ. In discussing the tactile blind spot, Aristotle
only hints at the central importance of meanness in his theory of perception.
Because Aristotle’s primary concern is with the nature of the organ of touch, his remarks on
the discriminative power of the senses are necessarily brief. Nevertheless, they suffice to illus-
trate the connection between meanness and the discriminating power of perception on which
his argument turns. We learn from several passages late in De Anima that perception is a dis-
criminative capacity of soul (An. 432a15–16, 427a19–21, 428a1–5; cf. APo. 99b34–35). As with the
other discriminative capacities and states of soul—including nous, scientific knowledge, belief,
and arguably phantasia—it is the job or function (ἔργον: 432a16) of the perceptual capacity as
a whole to discriminate and facilitate the animal’s cognition (γνῶσις) of something external to
21Save perhaps 422b10–13, which seems to anticipate elements of the perceptual ontology of Sens. 3–5: τὰ δ' εἴδη
τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾶ μὲν τἀναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ
τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν· μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ καὶ τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν
καὶ ὀξύ· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν.
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itself (An. 427a17–21, cf. APo. 99b28–35). In special perception, discrimination facilitates cogni-
tion of the perceived object insofar as it acts on the activated sense. As Aristotle argues in text
3.4.3, what gives an individual sense the power to discriminate its special objects is its status as a
mean state between the contrariety present in these objects. Touch too must be a mean state of
this sort; and since being a mean state of this sort requires that its organ instantiate the relevant
mean(s), we may conclude that the organ of touch is composed in the requisite mean way.
In the next chapter I give a detailed account of the connection between meanness and dis-
crimination articulated in text 3.4.3. What is most important for present purposes is to take
note of the explanatory roles of the sensory mean state in De Anima’s discussion of perception.
We’ve already noted one such role, namely explaining the senses’ power to discriminate their
special objects, and we’ve seen Aristotle conclude on that basis that the organ of touch must qua
organ instantiate the mean of each of the tangible quality scales. But another, arguably more
fundamental role of the sensory mean state is to explain, not just how the senses discriminate
their special objects, but how affection by a perceptually qualified object amounts to perception
of it. Consider plants. Plants, in Aristotle’s view, have soul and are subject to affection by per-
ceptually qualified objects—they are, for instance, heated and cooled. But for all that, they do
not perceive these qualities, but are rather affected by them with the matter (An. 424b2–3). One
possible explanation for plants’ insensitivity to these sorts of affection is that they are composed
primarily of earth, and so do not have organs that instantiate the mean qualities necessary for
the presence of a sensory mean state (cf. An. 435a20–b3). But this would get the direction of
explanation precisely backwards. Even if plant bodies were composed in such a way that they
instantiated the necessary mean qualities, plants would still not perceive the temperature of the
hot and cold objects that respectively heat and cool them. For even if a plant’s body were com-
posed of equal portions of cold and hot, its body qua mean in this way would still not be an
organ of touch. In Aristotle’s view being composed in the right way is not enough for a body
part to be a sense organ. If it were, then so long as an eye or piece of flesh retained the requisite
mean composition, it could be an organ of sense even after death or being severed from a living
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body. In Aristotle’s view, however, they would not (cf.GA 735a5–9). To be an organ of sense, and
more generally to be an instrument for the realization of some psychological function, the body
must be structured as it is for the sake of realizing the relevant function. Thus even even plants
mixed in equal portions of cold and hot would lack the organs necessary to perceive tempera-
tures, since they still lack “a mean state and such a principle as to receive the forms of perceptual
objects” (424b1–2)—that is, a sensory power possession of which requires that sort of functional
organization. Plants do not lack perception because their bodies are ill suited to be organs of
sense; plant bodies are ill suited to be organs of sense because plants lack perception.22
Here again Aristotle repudiates the harmonic conception of the senses. Whether an organ-
ism possesses a sense like touch is not merely a question of whether its body is composed in the
right way, namely by having parts mixed in the right ratio(s) of contrary qualities. It is rather
a question of whether it possesses a certain kind of principle, a principle responsible both for
the organism’s ability to receive perceptual form without the matter and for its possession of
sensory organs composed in the right way for the sake of receiving perceptual form without the
matter. I’ve argued that the sort of principle Aristotle has in mind is the sensory mean state,
and I’ve argued that the sense of touch exemplifies Aristotle’s conception of the sensory mean
state. Yet this conclusion raises a difficulty. In the closing lines of his discussion of the tactile
blind spot, Aristotle observes that what goes for touch is what goes for the other senses: the
same condition that requires what is to perceive hot and cold to be potentially both but actu-
ally neither applies equally to what is to perceive black and white, sharp and flat, and sweet and
bitter (see text 3.4.4). But unlike touch, whose organ instantiates some determinate mean value
of the quality scales it specially perceives, Aristotle thinks that the non-tactile senses meet this
condition by lacking qualification altogether: it is the colorless that is receptive of color, and the
22It is possible to read the passage as stating two distinct criteria for tactile perception—having a mean state and
having a principle so as to receive perceptual form without matter—both of which plants fail to meet. But it would
be obscure just what would so distinguish them. Both descriptions pick out the sense of touch, one as a mean state
and another as a capacity for receiving perceptual (tangible) form without the matter, so at best they are different
descriptions of the same psychological capacity. In my view, however, they are more closely connected, since it is
precisely insofar as it is a mean state that touch, or any other perceptual capacity, is receptive of perceptual form
without the matter. Cf. Murphy 2005, 299, who also reads this passage as articulating a single criterion.
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soundless that is receptive of sound. This contrast would appear to strain the analogy we are
trying to draw between the tactile mean state and those belonging to the other senses, at least
insofar as the non-tactile sense organ lack qualification within the relevant scales. The tension
is however only apparent.
3.2.3 The non-tactile senses as mean states
Aristotle conceives of perception as a type of assimilation, in which what perceives moves from
being potentially to being actually such as what it perceives. This conception places two con-
straints on how we understand the composition of the non-tactile sense organs. First, since
each is sensitive to the full range of the quality type it specially perceives, it must wholly lack
qualification within that scale. In this respect the non-tactile sense organs differ from the organ
of touch, which qua body must actually possess some value of the tangible quality scales that
differentiate bodies as such. However, in Aristotle’s view it is not possible for something to be
affected by a quality such as color or sound if agent and patient are entirely unlike. In order to
be potentially and not actually such as the agent quality, the patient must, second, be unlike the
agent in species but like it in genus: “body is naturally affected by body, flavor by flavor, color
by color, and generally what is alike in genus by what is alike in genus” (GC 323b33–324a1). This
general thesis about alteration, or qualitative change, has clear implications for the composition
of the sense organs, which must therefore be the same in genus with the perceptual qualities
to which they are receptive. So, just as with the organ of touch, the non-tactile sense organs
must also be the same in genus with the perceptual qualities of which they are receptive (cf. PA
647a2–9, 14–23).
But how can the non-tactile senses both be the same in genus as the qualities they can receive
and lack qualification within that genus? If this question seems perplexing, it is because we
tend to think that membership in a genus entails—and is entailed by—membership in one of its
species. Just as an animal earns its membership in the genus mammal by being a specific type of
mammal—as, for instance, you and I are mammals because we are humans—so an individual
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quality earns its membership in a genus like color by being a specific type of color, for instance
crimson or sea blue. There is however a further complication in the case of perceptual qualities.
In Aristotle’s view, perceptual qualities are affective qualities, qualities defined partially by their
ability to produce a determinate type of affection. Of course, there may be other conditions
sufficient formembership in an affective quality genus, such as being analyzable as a composition
of a certain pair of extreme contraries. But a member of an affective quality genus cannot be
considered a specific quality of that type unless it is productive of a specific type of affection. If
it is possible to meet this membership condition without falling under some species or other of
the genus, then genera of affective qualities may contain members that are not species of that
genus.
The ontology of perceptual qualities Aristotle develops in De Sensu 3–5 explicitly makes
room for such “generic” membership in a perceptual quality genus. On this approach, the na-
ture of a perceptual quality is determined by its “chemical analysis”, that is, by the proportion of
extreme contraries in its constitutive mixture. In most cases the chemical analysis of a percep-
tual quality also determines the type of affection it produces in other bodies, since the character
of the affection it produces is simply a function of which extreme dominates in the quality mix-
ture and to what degree it dominates over its contrary. However, as we observed at the end of the
last chapter, this account breaks down when applied to the mean value of the scale: because the
mean value is mixed from equal portions of the extremes, the activity of the extremes relative to
another body cancel each other out, resulting in no affection at all.23 I noted in that discussion
that this result—namely the inefficacy of the mean value of a perceptual quality scale—should
be regarded as a crucial feature of Aristotle’s view. We are at last in a position to see why: by
instantiating the mean value of the perceptual quality scale it specially perceives, the non-tactile
sense organs can be at once the same in genus as the qualities they can receive and totally without
specific qualification within that genus.
23See Sens. 447a25–29 (= text 2.10); for discussion, see ch. 2.9.3. The following interpretation amounts to a textual
defense of an interpretation initially proposed by Johansen 2002, 181 and endorsed by Corcilius 2014, 41n27.
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Take the color scale. In De Anima 2.7 Aristotle says it is in the nature of every color to be
capable of moving the actual, or illuminated, transparent (418a31–b2, 419a9–11). As I argued in
the last chapter, this characterization falls short of a definition of color, since in Aristotle’s view
color is not a dispositional property but an attribute of colored bodies whereby they are produc-
tive of the relevant type of affection. But since colors are affective qualities, specifically qualities
capable of producing change in the genus color, nothing can be colored which is not produc-
tive of this sort of affection. Thus bodies that instantiate the mean of the color scale—bodies
whose surface contains equal portions of transparent and opaque stuff—are not, in this strict
sense, colored. They are not however colorless by virtue of not being the sort of thing that can
be colored, since they are bounded bodies, and their respective surfaces contain both transpar-
ent and opaque stuff.2⁴ They are rather colorless by virtue of having a mixture of transparent
and opaque stuff that cannot effect change in the genus of color. Thus, rather than speaking of
meanly-colored bodies simply as colorless, as though they lacked a determinate surface like the
transparent medium, it is better to speak of them as generically but not specifically colored.
This account of meanly colored bodies fits with how Aristotle describes the composition of
the eye jelly, that part of the animate eye that is instrumentally composed for realizing vision.
Like the unbounded airy or watery media through which colors act on it, the watery eye jelly
must be actually transparent to facilitate vision (Sens. 438b5–16, 439b6–10). But since the eye jelly
is confined by a membrane to a bounded, determinate region of the eye, it is not transparent in
the same way that the unbounded medium is transparent (GA 780a27–36).2⁵ Instead, Aristotle
thinks the eye jelly’s transparency is a function of the density of thewater composing it, variations
in which account for variations in eye color. Blue or otherwise lightly colored eyes are due
to a deficiency of fluid, whereas darkly colored or “non-see-through” (μὴ εὐδίοπτα) eyes are
due to an excess of fluid.2⁶ Eye colors intermediate between these extremes differ by degree
(779b26–34), but in Aristotle’s view the eye best suited for vision is one that contains neither
2⁴Aristotle thinks all bodies contain some transparent stuff in their surface; see Sens. 439a21–25.
2⁵Cf. Sens. 438a12–16 and, for discussion, Johansen 1997, 95–100.
2⁶See ch. 1.6.2 for remarks on the visual pathologies Aristotle associates with dark and light colored eyes.
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too much nor too little fluid, but is exactly “proportionate” (σύμμετρον, 779b28) and “the mean
between too much and too little fluid” (ἡ . . . μέση τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὀλίγου ὑγροῦ,
780a23). While, admittedly, even meanly dense eyes will exhibit color in the iris, Aristotle likens
such an appearance to the blue appearance of “see-through” seawater (779b30–33). In this regard
the transparent eye jelly is similar to the unbounded transparentmedia, which also exhibit color,
though the color is neither determinate nor their own (see Sens. 439b1–6, An. 418b4–6).
A clear implication of this account is that the most suitable organ for vision is the one com-
posed so that it instantiates the mean between the extremes of the color scale, namely black and
white or, equivalently, opaque and transparent. Aristotle’s (far briefer) discussions of the other
non-tactile senses indicate a similar commitment to identifying the organ’s composition with
the relevant mean. He argues, for instance, that the organ of hearing, which consists of air com-
pressed in the inner ear, maintains its own proper motion (οίκείαν τινὰ κίνησιν, An. 420a16)
that is disturbed by incoming motions that produce sounds different in pitch—a condition in
which the organ nevertheless qualifies as soundless. Similarly, Aristotle describes themoistened
tongue, the peripheral organ of taste, as having no differentia of flavor (Sens. 449a8–9, 20–21);
though falling short of an explicit identificationwith themean of the flavor scale, this description
of the organ locates it precisely in the gap between genus membership and species membership
in which the mean value of the flavor scale would fall.
All of this strongly suggests that Aristotle thinks of the other senses as mean states and ratios
of their respective organs along the model of touch. Such a conclusion would cohere with Aris-
totle’s explicit goal of giving a fully general account of the senses as discriminative capacities,
one that attributes to each sense organ a role in explaining the sense’s power to discriminate its
special objects:
Text 3.5 So then, each sense, by being present in its sense organ qua sense organ, is of its underlying
perceptual object and discriminates the differences of that underlying perceptual object. For instance,
vision [discriminates] white and black, taste [discriminates] sweet and bitter, and so on in the other
cases.2⁷ (An. 3.2, 426b8–12)
2⁷ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ᾗ
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On this interpretation, the contrast implied by the tactile blind spot would not be between the
composition of the organ of touch and that of the non-tactile sense organs. Rather, each qua
organ of sense would instantiate the mean of the quality scale(s) specially perceived by its sense.
The contrast would instead lie with the distinctive nature of the tangible qualities, which qua
tangible are affective (and so necessarily productive of a distinctive sort of perceptual affection),
but qua differentiae of bodies as such are not. Furthermore, the contrast so understood would
not undermine the general account of special perceptual discrimination Aristotle offers in his
discussion of touch (see text 3.4.3 above). Thus we could look there, to Aristotle’s argument
connecting a sense’s power to discriminate its special objects to its status as a mean state of the
contrariety present in those objects, for a general account of special perceptual discrimination.
Such, at any rate, is the interpretation suggested by the passages we have considered so far.
These were passages that concerned the relationship between sense and sense organ, as well as
thematerial conditions necessary for actual perceiving and discriminating. Thenext sectionwill
focus on the sense as a ratio in active perceiving. As we’ll see, there are powerful objections to
what are sometimes taken to be the implications of the sort of interpretation we are considering.
My goal will be to show that these objections are misdirected, and that there is an attractive
conception of the sense as a ratio in actual perceiving that does not require us to give up the
present account of the sensory mean state.
3.3 Sense as ratio in actual perceiving
We have been considering an interpretation according to which the individual senses are ratios
because each is the formandfinal cause of an organ thatmust, qua organ, be composed in certain
ratio of extreme contraries. Prior to affection by a perceptual quality—when, in other words, the
sense is considered as the first actuality of the animate organ—the sense organ instantiates the
mean value of the scale defined by these extremes, so that it can (as far as possible) be potentially
αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις,
γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
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all but actually none of the determinate species of quality within the scale. Aristotle’s likening of
the sense to a mean state of that contrariety reflects this conception of its organ’s condition prior
to perceptual affection. Thus the sense is a mean state because, as the form and final cause of
the animate organ, it both determines and reflects the condition of its organ, in those respects in
which the latter is an instrument for the realization of the sense’s perceptual and discriminative
functions.
Aristotle also applies the model of a ratio to describe the sense in second actuality. This is
the state in which the (hylomorphically conceived) animate organ is actually perceiving: the
sense is exercising its potential to receive the form of a perceptually qualified object without the
matter; and its organ is suffering affection by the object insofar as it is so qualified.2⁸ However,
contrary to what the present interpretation may lead us to expect, Aristotle does not explicitly
identify the ratio of the sense in second actuality with the composition of its organ in a state of
being affected; he rather identifies this ratio with that of the perceptual quality whose form it is
receiving without the matter:2⁹
Text 3.6
[1] If, then, some voice is a concord [i.e. voice in actuality],3⁰ and voice and hearing are in a sense one—
though they are in [another] sense not one or not the same—and [if] concord is a logos, it is necessary
that hearing is also a kind of logos.
2⁸Cf.An. 419a17–18: πάσχοντος γάρ τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν. Note that for Aristotle the affection
of the organ by a perceptually qualified object must be via somemedium. Since I do not see any difference between
how the causally relevant perceptual quality acts on the medium and how it acts on the sense organ (see ch. 1.6), I
shall ignore this complication in what follows.
2⁹The passage is difficult both textually and exegetically; I include with the translation in the main text several
interpretive glosses (indicated by square brackets). The interpretation I favor is largely consonant with that of
Polansky 2007, 391–393 and Hamlyn 1993, 125–126; cf. Shields 2016, 270–272. Contrasting views include Ross 1961,
277–278 and, especially, Barker 1981 and Hicks 1907, 441.
3⁰The most natural reading of the text given by most MSS has Aristotle making a much weaker claim than his
argument requires. What he needs to say is that voice, or at any rate voice in actuality, is a kind of concord, but
the Greek phrase εἰ δὴ συμφωνὶα φωνή τις ἐστιν is most naturally read as claiming that concord is a type of
voice. Two solutions have been proposed for getting the required premise. (1) Barbotin (1966, 71) keeps the MSS
reading but translates φωνή τις as the subject of ἐστιν: “si donc telle voix est une harmonie”. (2) On the basis of
readings gleaned fromPriscian of Lydia (in his epitome ofTheophrastus’De Sensu) and the Byzantine commentator
Sophonias, Ross (1961, 277) emends 426a27 so that it reads εἰ δ' ἡ φωνή συμφωνία τις ἐστιν (cf. Hamlyn 1993,
Shields 2016). (1) has the advantage of preserving the majority MSS reading, though I have found no parallel
passages in Aristotle’s corpus in which an ‘X τις’ expression serves as the grammatical subject of a predicative
ἐστιν. (2) is less conservative, but it yields a much more natural statement of the required premise. My slight
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[2] Indeed, this is also why each extreme, both the sharp and the flat, destroys hearing; [why the ex-
tremes present] in flavors destroy taste; and [why] in colors the very bright or dark and, in the case of
smell, strong odor, both sweet and pungent, [destroy the sense]: namely [on account of the fact] that the
sense is a certain of logos.
[3] For this reason too [the extremes] are pleasant, whenever they, being [initially] pure and unmixed,
are brought into the logos—[extremes] such as the sharp or sweet or salty;31 for then [such extremes] are
pleasant. But in general what is mixed, [namely] a concord, is more [pleasant] than the sharp or flat, and,
for touch, that which can be heated or cooled [is more pleasant than either extreme]. And the sense is
the logos, but the extremes either pain it or destroy it.32 (An. 3.2, 426a27–b8)
Read in the way I am suggesting, Aristotle’s point in text 3.6.1 is that the hearing of vocal sounds
exemplifies a general feature of special perception, namely that the sense in second actuality is
identical to the ratio or logos that formally characterizes the actualized quality it is perceiving.
Actual voice seems to be exemplary in this regard, since it is so obviously a ratio; it is at any
rate a concord, and a concord is a numerical ratio of sharp and flat pitch (APo. 90a18–19).33 In
any case, the lesson of the example is clear. Aristotle has just argued that when actual voice
occurs with the actual hearing of voice the two are the same in number—though different in
being—and are both located in the perceiver.3⁴ Voice in actuality is a concord, that is, a ratio of
flat and sharp pitches, so the actual hearing with which it is identical must also be a ratio. The
point generalizes because, as Aristotle makes clear in texts 3.6.2–3, qualities in other perceptual
modalities are likewise composed of extreme contraries in a numerical ratio. Thus in these
lines Aristotle is able to derive general corollaries about the primary or “unmixed” extremes of
preference for (1) stems from the comparatively weak ancient authority for Ross’ emendation, but the reader who
finds the (admittedly unnatural) translation of the MSS text unbearable may adopt solution (2), which is equally
compatible with the present interpretation.
31For saltiness as the privative extreme of the flavor scale, akin to bitterness, see Sens. 442a25–27, though cf. An.
422b10–14, quoted in note 21 above.
32εἰ δὴ συμφωνὶα φωνή τις ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐχ ἓν ἢ οὐ τὸ
αὐτό, λόγος δ' ἡ συμφωνία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶναι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φθείρει ἕκαστον
ὑπερβάλλον, καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, τὴν ἀκοήν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὴν γεῦσιν, καὶ ἐν χρώμασι
τὴν ὄψιν τὸ σφόδρα λαμπρὸν ἢ ζοφερόν, καὶ ἐν ὀσφρήσει ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμή, καὶ γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, ὡς
λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθήσεως. διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἄμικτα ὄντα ἄγηται εἰς τὸν
λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ ἁλμυρόν, ἡδέα γὰρ τότε· ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ μικτόν, συμφωνία, ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ
ἢ βαρύ, ἁφῇ δὲ τὸ θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκτόν· ἡ δ' αἴσθησις ὁ λόγος· ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λυπεῖ ἢ φθείρει.
33Cf. Polansky 2007, 391–393, Shields 2016, 270–272. Aristotlemay also be relying on an etymological connection
between ‘voice’ (φωνή) and ‘concord’ (συμφωνία) to establish that voice is a concord.
3⁴See An. 425b25–426a2 (= text 1.5). For a defense of this reading, see ch. 1.3.
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perceptual quality scales, namely that, unmixed with their contraries in some ratio, they destroy
the sense, and that they are pleasant only when they are brought into a ratio. Both corollaries
follow because the sense is a ratio, specifically the one that formally characterizes the quality it
is perceiving.
While Aristotle does not explicitly advert to the sense organ in establishing the identity in
ratio between sense and perceived quality in actuality, there is good reason to think that the
common ratio reflects the condition of the sense organ when it is being affected by a perceptual
quality. We observed that Aristotle’s argument in text 3.6.1 depends on the sameness of the
sense and perceived quality in actuality. But it is a carefully qualified sameness: they are, he
says, in a way the same but in a way not. The way they differ is in respect of what it is to be the
actuality of a perceptual quality and the actuality of a sense. The one is a type ofmotion and the
actuality of an efficient-causal agent, whereas the other is a type of affection and the actuality of
an efficient-causal patient. They are however the same in number, for when the actuality of a
perceptual quality occurs simultaneouslywith the actuality of a sense the (active)motion and the
(passive) affection are present in one and the samematter (cf.Met. 1016b31–35). Both are present
in the perceiver—or, rather, in the organ of sense, the part of the perceiver’s body that suffers
the affection. Since Aristotle’s argument depends on both the sense and the perceived quality
in actuality being present in the sense organ, it is plausible that the actualized sense comes to
have the ratio of the perceived quality because its organ has come to instantiate that quality. If
so, then the ratio with which Aristotle identifies the sense in second actuality also reflects the
condition of its organ: the sense in actuality corresponds to the ratio of the perceived quality in
actuality because, and only insofar as, the organ has been assimilated to that quality.
This argument shows that there are implications for the nature of perceptual affection that
follow from interpreting the (distinct) ratios identified with the sense in both first and second
actuality as alike reflecting the condition of the sense organ, the first in potentiality, the second
in actuality. For, on this interpretation, the sense in first actuality is a mean state reflecting the
mean composition of the organ, while in second actuality it is a (non-mean) ratio reflecting the
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condition of the organ when it is being affected by a perceived quality. It would seem to follow
that the result of perceptual affection is that the organ comes to instantiate the same ratio of
contraries that formally characterizes the perceived quality, such that it comes to be qualified in
the same way as the perceived object.
In one respect, this is an appealing result. As we’ve seen, Aristotle regards perception as a
process of assimilation, in which what perceives, including both the sense and its organ, moves
from being potentially to being actually such as the perceived object insofar as it is perceived.
The most straightforward application of this thesis to the sense organ would be to say precisely
that the affected sense organ becomes such that it somehow instantiates the relevant perceptual
quality, thereby becoming actually such as what it perceives. In another respect, however, the
interpretation seems to commit Aristotle to an extreme and objectionable form of literalism,
the view that perceptual affection involves the affected organ literally taking on the perceived
quality, such that the eye upon seeing crimson comes literally to be crimson, the tongue upon
tasting sweet comes literally to be sweet, and so on. This claim goes beyond the view of many
literalist interpreters, according to whom the a perceived quality comes to be predicable of the
sense organ in actuality, but not by virtue of the sense organ taking on the relevant quality in the
same way as the perceived object. Rather, on their view, the organ has the quality “extrinsically”,
without thematter of the animate organ coming to be such as the perceptually qualified body af-
fecting it.3⁵ In some passages Aristotle seems sympathetic to this more moderate literalism. He
remarks, for instance, that what sees is as though it has been colored (ὡς κεχρωμάτισται: An.
425b22–23; cf. Phys. 244b7–11); and there is evidence that there are analogous material changes
in the organ of smell.3⁶ However, even this moderate version of literalism has been called into
question. The interpretation is objectionable because, asmany commentators have argued, Aris-
totle in De Anima 2.5 seems explicitly to reject the idea that perceptual affection results in the
3⁵See Sorabji 1992, 2001, though see Everson 1997, 84 for a statement of this extreme form of literalism, which
Caston 2005 calls “Fundamentalism”.
3⁶See Johnstone 2012 for a defense of this reading.
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perceiver’s having acquired the same quality as the perceived object, even in a different way.3⁷
I agree that Aristotle’s arguments in De Anima 2.5 entail a distinction between perceptual
affection and such literal assimilation of the sense organ to the perceived quality. However, I
think it would be a mistake to think that we commit Aristotle to viewing perceptual affection
as a case of literal assimilation or ordinary alteration by attributing to him the view that the
condition of the sense organ in a state of perceptual affection is characterizable as the same ratio
of extreme contraries as the perceived quality. As I shall argue inwhat follows, all that it commits
Aristotle to is that the affected sense organ is, for the duration of the affection, taking on the ratio
that characterizes the perceived quality, and in the same pair of contraries; but it does not follow
from this that the organ actually takes on that quality.
The contrast I have in mind concerns, on the one hand, the way in which a thing is affected
and, on the other, the result of the affection. My strategy will be to show that Aristotle’s con-
ception of perceptual affection as an extraordinary type of alteration turns on a difference in its
results compared to those of ordinary alterations. While one way to account for this difference
in result is to posit a distinction in how the patient is affected in ordinary and extraordinary
alterations, it is also consistent with Aristotle’s distinction to insist that patients of ordinary and
extraordinary alterations are affected in the same way, though with different results. If this is
correct, then we can accommodate the idea that the sense organ in second actuality is materially
affected in the way the literalist suggests, without conceding that it is thereby materially altered
in that way.
3.3.1 “Alteration of a sort”
Alteration, in Aristotle’s view, is a change between contraries in the category of quality (τὸ
ποιόν, Cat. 15b11–16; πάθος καὶ τὸ ποιόν, GC 319b32–320a2). Prior to qualitative affection, the
patient object instantiates one species, Fi, of a quality genus F , for instance warmth or softness.
Alteration occurs when the patient object comes into contact with an object that instantiates
3⁷See esp. Caston 2005, 292–299 and Lorenz 2007, 186–188.
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a contrary homogeneous quality, Fk, for instance coolness or hardness. The patient is affected
by the agent qua Fk, with the result that the patient’s initial quality is destroyed and replaced by
another in the same genus. It may be that the patient comes to be qualified in the same way as
the agent, in which case it comes to be Fk. This would be a case of literal assimilation, but there
may also be cases in which, for one reason or another, the patient fails to be fully assimilated to
the agent, only acquiring some other, intermediate quality Fj, for instance lukewarm. These too
are cases of alteration, since the patient has still lost one contrary and had it replaced by another
in the same genus of quality.
An important thing to notice about Aristotle’s account is that it defines alteration in terms
of its result. A thing has a quality if it is said to be qualified somehow (Cat. 8b25), whether as
knowing or as ignorant, healthy or ill, dark or light, hot or cold, rough or smooth, triangular
or square, or in some other way. Alteration occurs when a thing that was qualified in one way
comes to be qualified in another. Since such changes can only occur within a single quality
genus, ordinary alterations necessarily involve the destruction of one quality present in an object
by its contrary. In De Anima 2.5 Aristotle distinguishes two types of ordinary alteration, which
I call “privative” and “stative”:3⁸
privative alterations
Affections in which one species of quality is destroyed by its contrary, with the result that the
patient acquires a privative disposition, e.g. not-Fi; and
stative alterations
Affections in which one species of quality is destroyed by its contrary, with the result that the
patient acquires another contrary, Fj, which is a stable state conducive to the patient’s nature
(417b12–16).3⁹
3⁸See Lorenz 2007, 181–188, cf. Burnyeat 2002, 53–67.
3⁹As Lorenz (2007, 185n11) argues, it is extremely tempting to excise theὥσπερ εἴρηται at 417b14, which would
remove all doubt that the contrast in these lines is not the one made at b2–5 between ordinary and “extraordinary”
alteration (which we’ll presently discuss), but between two types of ordinary alteration.
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Stative alterations are actually a special case of privative alterations. The difference is that, in
stative alterations, the destroyed quality is replaced by a contrary that contributes to the fulfill-
ment of the thing’s nature, as when a learner replaces ignorance of the Pythagorean theorem
with knowledge of it. For this reason too the results of stative alteration are more stable and
longer lasting than those of merely privative alteration (cf. Cat. 8b27–32). But in both cases the
result is the same: the patient, the thing altered qua F, is destroyed and replaced with that same
object otherwise qualified.
The transition characterizing the perceiver’s move from potentially to actually perceiving is
an instance of neither of the above types of alteration. Aristotle characterizes perceptual affec-
tion as “alteration of a sort” (ἀλλοίωσίς τις),⁴⁰ but in his view the analogy between perception
and ordinary alteration is at best partial. For although what perceives is, in a way, assimilated
to the perceived object insofar as it is perceived, this transition does not involve the destruction
of one contrary by another but the preservation (σωτηρία) of the patient qua patient:
Text 3.7 But being affected is no univocal thing. One type [of being affected] is a sort of destruction
[of one contrary] by its contrary, and another is more a preservation of what is in potentiality by what is
in actuality and is like [that actuality] as a capacity [or potentiality] is to its fulfillment. For one who has
knowledge comes to contemplate it, which is either not a case of being altered, since it is a progression
into itself and into its fulfillment, or else it is a different kind of alteration.⁴1 (An. 2.5, 417b2–7)
The first type includes ordinary alterations in which the patient as such does not survive: after
the cool object has been warmed, there ceases to be a cool object; after the ill person has been
cured, there ceases to be an ill person. The second type is “extraordinary” because the patient as
such is preserved, and survives the transition: the knower who comes to exercise her knowledge
does not thereby cease to be a knower, even thoughmerely having and actually using knowledge
are in a sense contraries. For this reason it is somewhat awkward to speak of these transitions as
alterations, for there is no destruction of the quality the patient possessed prior to undergoing
⁴⁰See An. 415b24, 416b34; Ins. 459b4.
⁴1οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν·
θεωροῦν γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὑτὸ γὰρ ἡ ἐπίδοσις
καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. Text following Janone.
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such affection.
Here too the distinction concerns the results of the two types of affection. In ordinary de-
structive alterations the patient as such does not survive affection, whereas in extraordinary, or
preservative, alterations the patient as such is preserved:
preservative “alterations”
Affections in which the patient qua patient is preserved.
Text 3.7 suggests that what allows for the preservation of the patient is the distinctive relation it
stands in to the agent of the relevant affection. In preservative alterations, the agent is not simply
what the patient is potentially—though it is of course that—but the fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) of
the very potentiality that characterizes the patient as such. This relation is exemplified by the
connection between the state of merely possessing an item of knowledge and that of actually
exercising it in contemplation, for in this case the patient, qua knower, has comemore fully into
her own and into fulfillment. But it is important to see that Aristotle does not identify preserva-
tive alterations with transitions into second actuality. For all Aristotle says here, transitioning
into second actuality is but one way for the patient to survive alteration.⁴2 To be sure, Aristo-
tle explicitly compares the perceiver’s transition to second actuality perception to this type of
transition, so it is clear that an adequate account of perceptual affection should construe the
perceived object qua perceived as in some way the fulfillment of the perceiving sense qua per-
ceptive of an object so qualified. In one respect this is easy to do: because the function of the
animate sense organ is to perceive objects qualified in that way, any such affection will be the
fulfillment of the potentiality that characterizes the organ as such. The real difficulty lies in
articulating what this sort of affection must be like, such that it turns out to be a preservative
alteration and not, say, an ordinary stative alteration, in which the patient’s nature is fulfilled via
the destruction of contrary qualities. It is here where I think the distinction between the way a
thing is affected and the result of the affection will prove helpful.
⁴2See also ch. 1.6.
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3.3.2 Receiving perceptual form without the matter
Commentators seeking to articulate the difference between perceptual affection and two types
of “destructive” alteration distinguished above have seized upon Aristotle’s qualification that
the sense is a capacity to receive perceptual form without the matter.⁴3 According to one style
of interpretation—that of the so-called spiritualist interpreters—the qualification indicates that
perceptual affection is a purely formal change, one that does not involve any material alter-
ation of the organ. Now, it is consistent with this interpretation of Aristotle’s qualification that
material changes may attend perceptual affection—there may be, in other words, “standing ma-
terial conditions” for receiving perceptual form without matter. But the material conditions
for perceptual affection form no part of the immaterial reception of perceptual form itself. The
spiritualist approach thus distinguishes perceptual affection from destructive alteration by ex-
cluding the material components altogether: whatever happens to the sense organ when the
sense moves to second actuality, it is no part of the preservative alteration in which perception
consists. This, however, only partially answers our present question. For there is substantial
evidence that there arematerial changes attending perceptual affection: vision, for instance, oc-
curs when the eye has beenmoved and affected, with the result that it has in a way been colored.
To understand how the eye can be so affected and yet retain its potentiality to be acted on in the
way necessary for perception to occur, we also need a positive account of the material changes
attending the transition to second actuality perceiving.
One such account is offered by “non-literalist” materialist commentators, who argue for a
conception of the material aspects of perceptual affection that is superficially akin to the present
interpretation of the sensory mean state.⁴⁴ These commentators interpret the claim that per-
⁴3I cannot within this limited space do justice to the rich and detailed history of the debate between spiritualist
and literalist interpretations of Aristotle’s psychology of perception. In what follows I sketch, in fairly broad strokes,
different interpretive approaches, which may be refined an a number of ways. These sketches will be sufficient for
my present purpose, which is merely to establish the possibility (and hopefully the plausibility) of an account of
perceptual affection consistent with the present account of the sensory mean state. For a detailed critical overview
of the debate, see Caston 2005; I discuss Caston’s positive proposals below. Outliers who fit neatly into neither the
literalist nor spiritualist camp include Charles 2008 and Scaltsas 1996.
⁴⁴See Bradshaw 1997, Caston 2005, Silverman 1989, Ward 1988. To my mind, Caston has developed this most
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ception is an alteration of a sort on the basis of a distinctive reading of the famous wax analogy
Aristotle uses to illustrate the reception of perceptual form without the matter:
Text 3.8 Generally concerning each sense one must grasp that the sense is what is receptive of percep-
tual forms without the matter. For instance, the wax receives the signet of the ring without the iron or
gold: it takes on the golden or brazen signet, but not insofar as it [sc. the signet] is gold or bronze. In the
same way also the sense of each [perceptual quality] is affected by what has color or flavor or sound, but
[(A):] not insofar as each of these is said [or (B): not insofar as it (sc. what has color, etc.) is said to be
each of these (sc. color, etc.)], but insofar as it is such and according to logos.⁴⁵ (An. 2.12, 424a17–24)
Theanalogy admits of several interpretations, in part because a crucial clause of the last sentence
—ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται—is grammatically ambiguous. The construal I la-
belled (A) renders the analogy as follows: just as the wax receives the bronze signet ring not
qua bronze but qua signet, the affected sense receives the colored body not qua body or mate-
rial but qua colored.⁴⁶ For the spiritualist, this illustrates how the sense can be assimilated to
the perceived object in respect of its formal properties without being assimilated in its material
properties; the sense is affected by the colored object only insofar as it is such, namely colored.⁴⁷
The construal I labelled (B) identifies different terms for the analogy: just as the wax receives
the bronze signet not qua brazen ring but simply qua signet, the affected sense receives the col-
ored body not qua perceptually qualified in the relevant way, but qua qualified in in some other
way.⁴⁸
detailed and persuasive version of this approach, so I’ll use his interpretation as a representative of the entire non-
literalist materialist approach. Nothing I shall have to say about non-literalist materialism should hang on this
decision.
⁴⁵καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν
εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον,
λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις
ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ'
ᾗ τοιονδί καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
⁴⁶Construal (A) (1) takes the grammatical subject of λέγεται to be ἕκαστον ἐκείνων, (2) which refers back to
τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον.
⁴⁷See e.g. Burnyeat 1992, Johansen 1997, 189.
⁴⁸For a defense of construal (B), see Caston 2005, 306n120; cf. Silverman 1989, 289n9; Ward 1988, 220–221. This
construal (1′) takes the grammatical subject of λέγεται to be the perceptually qualified object (τοῦ ἔχοντος . . .),
and (2′) reads ἕκαστον ἐκείνων, which here refers back to the qualities of the object (χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον),
as its direct object. It seems tome that another construal that would yield the same sort of analogy (i.e. by preserving
(2′)) would be to take the grammatical subject of the entire sentence, ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου, to be the subject of
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Construal (B) is friendly to the non-literalist materialist, for on that view one thing the anal-
ogy is supposed to show is that perceptual affection consists, as they sometimes put it, in the
successful transfer of “information”. What the wax receives when it accepts the ring’s signet is
not simply a collection of marks that alters the contours of its surface, but a seal that indicates to
its recipient the office or personage fromwhich the sealed item originates. Analogously, on their
view, the sense does not simply undergo ordinary material alteration when it receives the form
of a perceptual quality. It does do that, but in doing so it also receives intentional content bear-
ing information about the body from which it originates.⁴⁹ The analogy also shows that such
transmissions of information, though implying literal assimilation and ordinary alteration of a
sort, do not require the information to be “encoded” in the same matter when it is transferred
to another recipient. Just as the impression does not produce another brazen signet, but rather
a waxen one, so perceptual affection does not on this view produce another colored object, but
rather an object of another sort that encodes the same information.
On this view, then, receiving form without the matter is similar to “transduction”, roughly,
a process of encoding the same information in a different sort of material.⁵⁰ In support of this
interpretation, non-literalist materialists point out that, in text 3.8, the sense is said to be affected
by the perceptually qualified object insofar as it is “of this sort and according to logos”. In their
view the operative meaning of ‘logos’ is ratio, and in particular the ratio of the perceived quality.
What enables Aristotle to distinguish perceptual affection from ordinary alteration is that the
same ratio can be instantiated by several different contrary quality pairs. Perceptual affection,
on this view, preserves the patient as such because the ordinary alterations in which perceptual
affection consists do not affect the patiency of the affected sense.
λέγεται. Thus the clause could be translated: “not insofar as [the sense of each, when it is affected] is said to be
each of these [qualities], but insofar as it is such”. Read in this way, too, the purpose of the analogy is to show that
the sense, though it has come in a way to be such as the perceived object, is not affected in the same way as it is said
to be so qualified. But it avoids the complication of separating the complex description τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα . . . ,
which seems to me an implausible consequence of Caston’s construal.
⁴⁹As Caston (2005, 307 and n122) points out, seals or inscriptions in wax are commonmetaphors for intentional
content in the Greek tradition.
⁵⁰See Caston 2005, 303–304.
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In one respect the non-literalist materialist interpretation of text 3.8 supports the suggestion
that the sameness in ratio of the sense and the perceived quality is grounded in the instantia-
tion of the relevant proportions of matter in the affected organ. But the present interpretation
parts ways with non-literalist materialism at its claim that the contraries in which the sense or-
gan instantiates the proportions are necessarily different from those from which the perceived
quality is mixed and between which the sense is a mean state. With this claim the non-literalist
materialist posits a disconnect between the ratio of the sense in second actuality and its status
in first actuality as a mean state of the contraries defining the quality scale it specially perceives;
but an interpretation that commits Aristotle to such a disconnect is bound to be unsatisfactory.
It is not only that, if this were Aristotle’s view, he would owe us an account of how the sensory
mean state relates to the condition of the animate organ in second actuality, an account he never
actually provides. The deeper difficulty with an interpretation of this sort springs from a gen-
eral problem for interpretations that regard preservative alteration as dependent on underlying
destructive alteration(s). Fortunately, however, there is another, broadly materialist concep-
tion of preservative alterations that locates the contrast with ordinary change in the result of the
affection, rather than in how the patient is affected.
3.3.3 A difficulty for non-literalist materialisms
Like the spiritualist, the non-literalist materialist accounts for the perservative nature of per-
ceptual affection by distinguishing how the sense is affected in ordinary changes from how it is
affected by perceptual qualities in perception. But where the spiritualist locates the distinction
in a contrast between matter-involving and non-matter-involving alterations, the non-literalist
materialist locates it in a contrast between affections that alter the material disposition neces-
sary for the animate sense organ to be subject to perceptual affection and those that do not. Like
the spiritualist, moreover, the non-literalist materialist takes preservative perceptual alterations
to depend on ordinary destructive alterations. For the spiritualist these ordinary destructive al-
terations are part of the standing material conditions for perceptual affection. But for the non-
The Sensory Mean State 113
literalist materialist they are a crucial part of the process by which the ratio of the perceived
quality is “transduced” in episodes of perceptual affection. Specifically, they are the alterations
within some “relevantly related” genus of qualities whereby information about the perceptual
quality is “encoded” in different sorts of matter.
Unlike the spiritualist, then, the non-literalist materialist admits ordinary alterations into
the process of perceptual affection. But she does so in a way that appears to allow for the preser-
vation of the perceptual patient, for even though the sense organ on this view undergoes ordi-
nary alterations of a sort, these alterations are not within the quality genus it specially perceives,
and relative to whose species it is potentially all but actually none. In reality, however, her ac-
count only pushes the problem one step back. Perception is a preservative change because the
reception of a determinate perceptual quality—crimson, say—does not destroy the perceiver’s
receptivity to that quality: just as the mathematician’s use of the Pythagorean theorem does not
undermine (but, if anything, reinforces) her ability to call upon it on subsequent occasions, the
perceiver’s seeing of crimson does not destroy her ability to see crimson on subsequent occa-
sions. But if the perceiver’s reception of crimson without the matter is dependent on ordinary,
destructive alterations within some other quality genus, her ability to receive crimson on sub-
sequent occasions would be destroyed.
To see why, suppose you are presented with a series of crimson color chips. According to
the non-literalist materialist, in seeing the first chip your eye is assimilated to the ratio defini-
tive of crimson, not however by instantiating it with proportions of black and white (or opaque
and transparent), but with contraries definitive of some relevantly related quality genus—call
it F. Because the underlying F-change is an ordinary alteration, your eye comes to be differ-
ently qualified within F, moving from some initial quality Fi to a contrary one coordinate with
crimson—call it Fc. What happens when you are presented with the next color chip? In order
to receive its crimsonness without the matter, your eye would again have to be assimilated to
Fc. Assimilation to Fc requires your eye to be potentially but not actually Fc. But given the ordi-
nary change it underwent by the agency of the previous color chip, your eye is already actually
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Fc.⁵1 So, despite the fact that the mean condition of your eye in the genus of color has not been
affected, your ability to receive crimson without the matter seems not to have been preserved.
I’ve framed this as an objection to non-literalist materialism, but in fact it applies to any
interpretation that takes preservative alteration to depend on ordinary alteration. Whether or
not these ordinary alterations are regarded as features of the perceptual affection itself, the per-
ceiver’s potentiality to be affected will not have been preserved if a consequence of perceptual
affection is that the perceiver has come to be differently qualified in any respect relevant to that
potentiality.⁵2 The natural way to respond to this worry is of course to deny that the under-
lying F-alteration is an ordinary destructive alteration: while the eye in a state of affection in
fact departs from its initial condition Fi and is temporarily assimilated to Fc, the result of the
affection is not that the eye comes to be Fc. But this response would raise the obvious question
why we could not simply apply such an analysis to the condition of the eye in the genus of color,
affirming that the eye in a state of affection is temporarily assimilated to the crimson of the color
chip, but denying that the result of the affection is that the eye has been altered such that it it
has become crimson. Such an account would draw the distinction between ordinary alteration
and perceptual affection, not in terms of how the patient is affected, but in terms of their re-
sults. I find such a result-centered account an appealing alternative, not least because Aristotle’s
conception of affective qualities seems designed to make room for just such a possibility.
⁵1Supposing, of course, that you have had no intervening experience of colors other than crimson. This seems
to me an innocuous assumption, for simply to stipulate that you can be affected by a subsequent chip of the same
color only after a “palate-cleansing” experience of a different color strikes me as ad hoc and lacking in textual
support (though cf.An. 3.1, 425b4–11: it seems that perception of some common perceptual qualities requires palate-
cleansing of this sort). Indeed, such a stipulation would wholly undermine the distinction between destructive and
preservative change articulated in text 3.7.
⁵2Note moreover that it won’t do for the non-literalist materialist to respond by saying that, on subsequent af-
fections by a single quality species, the relevant information comes to be encoded in different pairs or opposites.
Several considerations commit Aristotle to the view that there can be at most one genus into which information
about a given quality scale is “transduced”. First, Aristotle clearly recognizes sameness relations between perceptual
qualities mixed in the same ratio of different contrary qualities (cf. the discussion of coordinatehood in ch. 2.5),
so stipulating that information about perceptual may be transduced into several different quality genera creates
the possibility of the soul confusing heterogeneous qualities mixed in the same ratio. Second, Aristotle is evidently
committed to the view that the soul identifies specific unity among qualities by virtue of the same sense discriminat-
ing the qualities in the sameway (Sens. 447b25–26); yet it is difficult to see how (e.g.) visionwould be discriminating
two instances of crimson in the same way if the ratio of each was encoded in a different pair of opposites.
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3.3.4 Literalism without ordinary alteration
On a result-centered account, preservative alterations are simply affections that do not result
in qualitative change. Such an account presupposes the existence of affections in the category
of quality that do not qualify as alterations, since the subject does not come to be otherwise
qualified but persists qua patient through the affection. Aristotle’s discussion of affective qual-
ities in Categories 8 provides an attractive model for understanding affections of this type. In
that context Aristotle draws a distinction between qualities (ποιότητες) and temporary affec-
tions (πάθη). Qualities in general are stable (παραμόνιμος) and hard to change (δυσκίνητος).
Sweetness, for instance, is a stable attribute of honey, one that would be difficult to displace with
a contrary quality; these qualities, Aristotle says, “have been received” (δεδεγμένα) by their sub-
jects in the sense that they are had not merely as the result of affection by an external agent, but
as stable and enduring attributes (cf. 9a36, quoted in text 1.3). Of course, one way to acquire
an enduring attribute of this sort is through affection. In these cases the attribute acquired by
the patient turns out to be stable and long lasting, perhaps persisting through the remainder
of one’s life—think, for instance, of farmers and day laborers who have developed a dark tan
from excessive exposure to the sun, or sufferers of chronic illness who have developed a per-
sistent pallor in their complexion (9b24–27). According to Aristotle, such persisting affections
turn out to be qualities since, as he puts it, “we are said to be qualified in respect of these” (b27).
Yet many cases of affection will not result in the acquisition of a stable attribute, and in these
cases the subject cannot likewise be said to be qualified in that respect. Aristotle gives as exam-
ples of such temporary affection turning red from shame or pale from fear. While redness and
pallor may indeed qualify a person’s complexion, in Aristotle’s view “one who has turned red
from embarrassment is not called ruddy, nor is one who has turned pale from fear [called] pale,
but rather they have been somehow affected (πεπονθέναι τι). Thus such [attributes] are called
affections, not qualities” (9b30–33, quoted in context in text 1.13).
The contrast between qualities and temporary affections clarifies an important condition on
cases of ordinary alteration. An ordinary alteration must be a change in quality; a subject that
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was qualified in one waymust come to be qualified in another, contrary way. On theCategories 8
account, coming to be qualified in another way is a matter of being affected so that the affected
subject acquires, not just a contrary attribute, but one that endures and is hard to change. Thus
the result of all ordinary alterations is that the affected subject comes to possess the contrary
attribute in the same way as honey possess its sweetness, in the sense that both “have received”
the relevant attribute—note the perfective aspect. By contrast, affections in which the subject
acquires a temporary attribute would not count as alterations in this sense. For though the
subject may temporarily take on a different qualitative condition, the result of the affection is
not contrary qualification. A person of dark complexion may go white from fear and a person
of light complexionmay go red from embarrassment, but in neither case does it come to be true
that the person no longer has the complexion they had before. In these cases we might say that,
although the person was receiving pallor or redness (in the progressive aspect) for the duration
of the affection, at no point had that person received the contrary quality.⁵3
If we understand this condition as a presupposition of Aristotle’s distinction between ordi-
nary, destructive alterations and extraordinary, preservative “alterations”, we can see how the
contrast between perceptual affection and ordinary, destructive alteration lies not in the nature
of the respective affections but in their result. For me to be altered in respect of a perceptual
quality genus like flavor would be for me to lose one stable flavor attribute and acquire a con-
trary but equally stable flavor attribute. This however is not what usually happens when I taste
flavor. When I taste the sweetness of a bit of honey, my gustatory affection is temporary and
fleeting, lasting just as long as I maintain perceptual contact with the honey, or until any lin-
gering (but still temporary) effects in the organ dissipate. Given the condition that a genuine
alteration must be a change in quality, it is clear that this sort of affection is either not an alter-
ation at all or an alteration of an altogether different sort. My tongue has not lost the condition
that made it a suitable patient for such gustatory affection. My tongue qua patient of that gusta-
⁵3There is a striking parallel with the conclusions of Murphy (2005), who argues that Aristotle’s chemistry of
affection must allow for objects to take on certain phenomenal qualities (e.g. “hot-to-the-touch) without altering
their fundamental elemental composition (e.g. without becoming predominantly composed of the hot).
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tory affection possesses the mean value of the flavor scale. True, while it was being affected by
the honey’s sweetness it became, in a way, true to say that my tongue is sweet. But because my
tongue never fully received the sweetness of the honey, it never came to be qualified otherwise
that it initially was. To adapt Aristotle’s language in Categories 8—language that we can now
see is echoed in De Anima 2.5 (see e.g. text 3.3)—when my tongue is acted on by the honey it is
affected somehow (πεπονθέναι τι), but it has not come to be qualified in that respect.⁵⁴ It has
never departed from the mean qualification that characterizes its condition qua organ of taste.
It is not just that perceptual affections happennot to result in qualitative change. The animate
organ of sense is a hylomorphic unity in which the sense is a mean state between the contraries
its organ instantiates in a mean ratio. This condition is a stable attribute of the animate organ, in
theway inwhich sweetness is a stable attribute of honey. Sowe should expect themean condition
of the animate organ to be difficult to change, in part because possessing such a quality is part of
what it is to be that sense organ. Of course, as Aristotle acknowledges, there are cases in which
the mean quality of the organ can be destroyed (see, in addition to texts 3.2 and 3.6 above, An.
435b7–19). These are primarily cases in which it is affected by the excesses of the relevant quality
scale, the unalloyed extremes that in various proportions determine the intermediate values of
the scale. In these cases, as when the organ is destroyed due to injury or death, its inability to
operate as an organ of sense is that it has departed from the mean condition necessary for it to
act as an instrument for the realization for the senses function. For either damage to the organ
has replaced its mean condition with a contrary quality or the soul has perished, and the sensory
mean state no longer exists to hold it in the proper equilibrium.
To some extent, this account of the contrast between ordinary alteration and perceptual
affection validates the moderate literalist’s account of receiving the form without the matter.
According to Sorabji, the eye is only as though (ὡς) it had been colored because it has only
been colored extrinsically, or with a borrowed color, in the way that the sea or sky at sunset
⁵⁴Importantly, Aristotle is careful not to speak of perceptual affection as an alteration or change in quality in
this context, preferring instead to say that affective qualities instill or impress (ἐμποιεῖ) a certain type of affection
(πάθος τι) with respect to the sense (9b7–9).
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takes on the color of the sky or of the sun.⁵⁵ The present, result-centered account of preservative
alteration suggests one way of cashing out this idea: the coloration of the affected eye is extrinsic
or borrowed because it is only due to the activity of the perceived quality, which produces a
temporary affection in the eye but never alters its mean coloration. But the present account
parts ways with moderate literalism in denying that the organ thereby comes in any way to be
colored. For, on this account, the organ has not been altered at all, though it can be described
as temporarily affected (e.g. colored) in a certain way.
In short, on the present picture, receiving perceptual form without the matter is receiving it
without ever having received it.⁵⁶ Where the latter consists in the patient’s acquiring a wholly
different quality, for instance by becoming mixed in an entirely different ratio of the relevant
contraries, patients of the former are moved but never actually displaced from their original
condition. This interpretation may appear unduly reductive, but it is in fact adequate to Aris-
totle’s purposes. In support of this, notice that it both includes all the affections Aristotle wants
to count as receptions of form without the matter and excludes all of those he does not. The
wax receives formwithout matter because it does not acquire the material disposition necessary
for being a signet (though its temporary, mutable affection is sufficient for it to act as a seal).
Likewise the affected medium does not (impossibly) depart from that nature whereby it is a
medium, but is nevertheless affected and assimilated to the quality that affects it. By contrast,
plants and homonymous eyes are affected with the matter. Plants are affected by hot and cold
with the matter because they lack a principle and mean to maintain a stable temperature within
themselves, so affections such as heating and cooling that would be mere affections in animals
turn out to result in quality change in plants. The same is true for homonymous sense organs,
⁵⁵See Sorabji 1992, 212, Sorabji 2001, 53.
⁵⁶This remark should not bemistaken as a contradiction of the “tense test” for pure actualities inMet. 1048b18–34.
ThereAristotle’s concern is with seeing, not as such the receiving of visual form. So it does not follow from the claim
that every instance of seeing is an instance of having seen, together with the idea that seeing involves the reception
of visual form, that every instance of receiving visual form is an instance of having received visual form. First, the
reception of form without the matter is only a necessary condition for perception, since the medium too receives
form without the matter. And second, it is clear that the tense test is an intensional context: processes can be
multiply described, and their satisfaction of the tense test is sensitive to how one describes the relevant process.
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such as those severed from the living body or belonging to a corpse, for without a principle to
make stable their mean condition, they are much more susceptible to qualitative change.
Admittedly, one consequence of this interpretation is that there are far more preservative
changes than commentators have tended to recognize. For if, as I have suggested, a preservative
alteration is any affection in which the patient as such is preserved, then we’ll have to count
affections such as turning red from embarrassment or pale from fear as preservative alterations.
But expanding the range of preservative alteration does not undermine the uniqueness of transi-
tions to second actuality of the sort undergone in active perceiving or contemplating. For unlike
the above cases of preservative alteration, transitions to second actuality are progressions into
the nature and fulfillment of the patient. In these cases, then, the patient is not only preserved
though the affection, but comes more fully to express its own nature for the duration of that
affection. The same cannot be said of preservative alterations that are not also transitions to
second actuality: to turn red from embarrassment or pale from fear is no more a fulfillment of
one’s nature than the affection of an illuminated medium by actual color or the sealing of wax
by a signet.
This further feature of second actualities testifies to the formal and final causal role of the
mean state. By maintaining a stable mean condition in its organ, the sensory mean state deter-
mines and regulates the sort of affections to which its organ is subject. This is evident in the
fact that most perceptual affections—at any rate, those that do not damage or destroy the ani-
mate organ—are preservative alterations, affections that do not result in the displacement of the
organ’s mean condition. More than that, the sensory mean state makes it such that its organ
undergoes such affections for the sake of realizing its psychological function, namely to perceive
and discriminate the range of qualities defined by the contraries of which it is a mean state. In
this way the role of the sensory mean state in second actuality is continuous with its role in first
actuality. In first actuality, the sensory mean state makes it so that its organ instantiates the rele-
vant mean prior to perception. And in second actuality, it makes it so that its organ instantiates
the ratio of the perceived quality in such a way that it does not displace the mean condition
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necessary for realizing its perceptual and discriminative function.
3.4 Concluding remarks
Thesensorymean state reconciles the incongruities betweenAristotle’s twomodels of the special
senses, as miniature souls and as ratios of their respective organs. I have proposed an interpre-
tation of the sensory mean state that captures the essential features brought out by both models,
according to which the sense is a mean state because it is the form and final cause of an animate
organ that, qua organ, must instantiate the mean value of the quality scale specially perceived
by the sense. The sensory mean can be seen as a formal and final cause in this way in both first
and second actuality. While there is a strong objection to this picture stemming from recent
interpretations of perceptual affection, I have argued that this objection is not decisive. There
is an attractive alternative picture that allows for the present account of the sensory mean state.
While more needs to be said about the result-centered picture I have proposed, I hope to have
said enough to establish its plausibility, and to recommend it as a topic for further research.
One of themore striking consequences of the interpretation so far developed is that, in Aris-
totle’s view, what makes a sense organ a suitable instrument for realizing the perceptual and
discriminative functions of the sense is that it is composed of equal portions, or a 1 : 1 ratio, of
a certain pair of contrary extremes. In other words, the organ qua organ is a mean. We’ve seen
at least one reason why the organ qua organ must be a mean is that it must belong to the quality
genus it specially perceives, while at the same time lacking determinate qualification within that
genus. This is a condition on the possibility of perceptual affection. But there is another reason
why the sense organmust be a mean, namely that perception is a discriminative capacity. In text
3.4.3 Aristotle presents an argument connecting meanness and the power to discriminate. The
task of the next chapter is to consider what the connection might be.
4Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Discriminative Mean
Discrimination (κρίσις) is the fundamental concept of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology. It is
in his view an operation common to all of the capacities and states by which the soul engages
in cognition (γνῶσις),1 and it is integral to his accounts of thinking, learning, practical calcu-
lation, recollection, dreaming, and other processes involving cognitive capacities.2 Most strik-
ingly, it plays a central role in his account of sense perception. Whereas his predecessors tended
to deny the senses the power to discriminate, Aristotle regards them as the most basic and uni-
versal of the soul’s discriminative powers.3 At the basic level, the senses are discriminative of
the qualities they specially perceive: vision discriminates colors, hearing discriminates sounds,
taste discriminates flavors, and so on.⁴ But in many cases these basic discriminations give rise
to more complex ones, including cross-modal discriminations, discrimination of similarity and
difference among perceptual qualities, and perhaps also discrimination of so-called commonly
perceived qualities such as number.⁵ For Aristotle, then, the soul’s cognitive abilities cannot be
1An. 427a17–21, 428a3–5
2Thinking: An. 3.4, 429b10–22 et passim; cf. 434b3; learning: APo. 99b32–35; practical calculation: MA 700b17–22;
recollection: Mem. 452b7–12; dreaming: Ins. 460b16–18.
3See e.g. Anaxagoras 59B21 DK (= Axg61 Graham); Plato,Tht. 186b; cf. Democritus 68B11 DK (= Dmc140 Gra-
ham). For a classic statement of the view that Aristotle “expands perceptual content” by extending discrimination
to the senses, see Sorabji 1993.
⁴An. 418a11–16, cf. texts 4.1 and 4.8 below
⁵Cross-modal discrimination: An. 426b12–427a9; discrimination of specific and generic similarity and differ-
ence: Sens. 447b21–448a1; discrimination of common perceptibles: Sens. 442b14–17, 447b24–26, Ins. 460b22.
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restricted to rational or intellectual capacities. All animals have some share of cognition, since
all have some share of perception. And at the most general explanatory level, the soul’s ability
to discriminate and cognize must be viewed as the joint work of thought and perception.⁶
This chapter develops a general account of this fundamental aspect of cognition by focus-
ing on its most basic and universal form: sensory discrimination of special perceptual qualities
such as color, sound, and flavor. Modern interpreters disagree about whether Aristotle’s views
on perceptual discrimination, at the level of either the individual senses or the perceptual capac-
ity as a whole, reflect his views on cognition in general. One influential interpretation regards
perceptual discrimination as the apprehension of differences between types of perceptual ob-
ject, for instance between white and black, white and sweet, and so on.⁷ On this view, it is
natural (though not required) to individuate all cognitive capacities by the types of difference
they discriminate among cognitive objects: as vision enables the animal to discriminate dif-
ferences in color, so does perception as a whole enable it to discriminate differences between
cross-modal objects, and intellect to discriminate differences between a thing and what it is to
be that thing.⁸ According to another proposal, however, the discrimination of special percep-
tual qualities refers to the production of “phenomenal content”, which in Aristotle’s framework
consists in the isolation of perceptual form from the proximate matter of the perceived qual-
ity.⁹ Presumably, on this view, the phenomenal content provided by sensory discrimination
also furnishes content for more complex forms of discrimination, but the discriminative power
of the senses is sui generis, distinct from that of the more sophisticated cognitive capacities that
depend on it.
Aristotle’s explicit reasons for accepting that the senses discriminate suggest a rather differ-
⁶An. 432a15–17; cf. GA 731a30–34
⁷See Ebert 1983; cf. De Haas 2005, 326–328, Marmodoro 2014, 161. The current orthodoxy of rendering κρίσις
(and cognates) into English as ‘discrimination’ (and cognates) in the context of Aristotle’s psychology is due in large
part to the influence of Ebert’s interpretation. I shall suggest towards the end of my discussion (sect. 4.8) that this
translation is perhaps misleading.
⁸Cf. Ebert 1983, 194–195.
⁹See Corcilius 2014
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ent account of discrimination. According to an argument Aristotle presents in De Anima 2.11,
the senses discriminate because each is a “mean state of the contrariety present in what it per-
ceives”:1⁰
Text 4.1 Indeed, this is why [each sense] discriminates the objects it perceives. For it is the mean
that is capable of discrimination, since in relation to each [extreme] it comes to be the other extreme.11
(An. 2.11, 424a5–7)
I’ll argue that a close reading of this argument—which I’ll call Aristotle’s “master argument”—
exposes a highly general pattern of reasoning that extends beyond the discriminative power of
the senses. Using a specific notion of meanness—what I, adapting a bit of Aristotelian termi-
nology, call the “object-relative arithmetic mean”—Aristotle draws an explanatory connection
between meanness and discrimination, which on this view appears as a certain perspectival fea-
ture of cognitive capacities, a feature that marks the capacity as occupying a perspective from
which items in the domain appear as they in fact are, whether darker or lighter, more bitter or
more sweet, and in general lesser or greater on the scale along which the items are differentiated.
This explanatory connection suffices to show that the senses discriminate the qualities they spe-
cially perceive, but it also extends to other discriminative capacities of soul, and in particular to
thought. I’ll suggest that this connection between meanness and discrimination is sufficiently
general to be called a “doctrine” of the discriminative mean, in much the same way as com-
mentators on Aristotle’s ethics refer to a doctrine of the ethical mean in his account of character
virtue.
4.1 Background: the senses as mean states
Before turning to the details of the argument in text 4.1, let me remark briefly on Aristotle’s no-
tion of the sensory mean state. De Anima 2.11 is where Aristotle first introduces the idea that
1⁰See ch. 3 for a comprehensive account of the sensory mean state.
11καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον
τῶν ἄκρων.
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the each sense is a mean state (μεσότης). His immediate aim in introducing this notion is to
establish how the sense organ, and in particular the organ of touch, is such that it is potentially
but not actually each of the qualities it specially perceives (423b30–424a2). As I argued in chap-
ter 3, Aristotle thinks that the sense organ satisfies this condition by being composed in a sort
of equilibrium of the contrary qualities it specially perceives. The organ of touch, for instance,
is equally cold and hot, soft and hard, and so on for each such scale of tangible quality, so that
it is receptive only to what exceeds or falls short of it—that is, to objects that are either colder
than they are hot or vice versa, softer than they are hard or vice versa, and so on. The same
account applies to the other sense organs. Each sense organ is composed in this sort of equilib-
rium because each sense, which is the form and final cause of its organ, must be a mean state
of the contrariety present in its special objects. In this way Aristotle’s claim that the senses are
mean states is meant to reflect the condition of their bodily organs, which qua organ must be
composed in an equilibrium of contrary qualities (cf. An. 435b21–24).
This account fits with the ontology of perceptual qualities Aristotle develops in detail in De
Sensu 3–5, and which is presupposed throughout this stretch of De Anima.12 According to that
ontology, perceptual qualities are mixtures falling along a one-dimensional scale. The scale is
defined by two primary contraries, for instance white and black or sweet and bitter, pairs whose
members are opposed as the respective presence and absence of some nature: transparency in
the case of white and black, nutriment in the case of sweet and bitter. Qualities falling along
the scale are mixtures in different ratios of the primary contraries: at the extremes are qualities
mixed in “pure” ratios (of 1 : 0 and 0 : 1) of the primary contraries; qualities falling between the
extremes are mixed in various ratios of both, their position on the scale determined by which
extreme dominates and to what degree it exceeds its contrary; and finally, at the middle of each
scale is the unique value mixed in a 1 : 1 ratio of the extremes (see figure 4.1). So in requiring
that the organ of touch be composed in an equilibrium of hot and cold or wet and dry, Aristotle
is saying that the condition of the sense organ corresponds to this mean value of the scale, a
12See ch. 2 for detailed discussion.
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1 : 0
− +
0 : 11 : 1
1 : (0< x< 1) (1> x> 0) : 1
Figure 4.1 The structure of a perceptual quality scale
condition that is reflected in his description of the sense organ as a mean state of the contrariety
present in their objects.13
4.2 Aristotle’s “master argument”
Thismuch has been indicated by Aristotle’s remarks on the sensory mean state in the lines lead-
ing up to the argument in text 4.1. As we saw above, its conclusion that the senses discriminate
is supposed to follow from the claim that the senses are mean states of the sort just described.
Curiously, however, the argument seems not to appeal to any specifically perceptual features
of the sensory mean state. As I read it, the argument proceeds in two stages. In the first stage
what is mean (τὸ μέσον) is shown to be capable of discrimination (κριτικόν), on the grounds
that what is mean (or mean in the relevant way) comes to be, relative to each extreme, the con-
trary extreme. In the second stage the senses are shown to be capable of discriminating their
special objects because each is a mean state of the contrariety present in those objects. The rea-
soning here seems perfectly general: Aristotle gives no indication that the connection between
meanness and discrimination applies only in the case of the senses, or even only to cognitive
capacities like the senses. His language rather suggests that the power to discriminate belongs
to whatever is mean in such a way that it operates relative to each extreme as its contrary. This
invites the possibility that other things, indeed many other things, may be shown by the same
argument to be capable of discrimination.
13This is also true of the non-tactile sense organs, despite the fact that Aristotle insists that they lack all qualifica-
tion on the relevant scale. For the mean value of each perceptual quality scale is incapable of producing perceptual
affection, and so is not in the relevant sense a perceptual quality at all; see Sens. 447a25–29 and, for discussion,
ch. 2.9.3.
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Arg. 4.1.1

Major Premise: discriminative belongs to all contrary to both extremes
Minor Premise: contrary to both extremes belongs to all mean
Conclusion: discriminative belongs to all mean
Arg. 4.1.2

Major Premise: discriminative belongs to all mean
Minor Premise: mean belongs to all C
Conclusion: discriminative belongs to all C
Argument 4.1 The “master argument” schema of text 4.1
We find further support for this reading if we consider the argument’s ultimate explanans:
the attribute of being, relative to each extreme, the contrary extreme (or, as I shall sometimes
say, being the contrary of both extremes). I say that this attribute is the ultimate explanans be-
cause it is evidently supposed to explain the connection between meanness and discrimination
that enables Aristotle to show that the senses discriminate their special objects. But this is a
feature of means that extends far beyond sense perception. Aristotle appeals to it, for instance,
in explaining why alteration from intermediate (μεταξύ) qualities does not violate the princi-
ple that change is between opposites (Phys. 224b32–35, 229b19–21). It also appears in Aristotle’s
description of the virtuous mean state (EE 1220b31–33, EN 1108b11–19 [= text 4.2]). Far from
highlighting any distinctive features of the senses, then, the strategy of text 4.1 seems to be to
show that the sensory mean state conforms to a general pattern of meanness, and then to show
that means of this sort have the power to discriminate.
For these reasons, I suggest, we should think of text 4.1 not merely as giving an argument
for sensory discrimination, but as offering a “master argument” for demonstrating the power
to discriminate simpliciter. I offer argument 4.1 as a schematic representation of the master
argument. It highlights two features that I take to be essential for understanding what Aristotle
is up to in attributing the power to discriminate to the senses. First, it construes both stages of
the argument as first figure syllogisms (in Barbara), so that anything that is mean in the relevant
way is also capable of discrimination.1⁴ One feature highlighted by this way of framing the
1⁴Note that I do not intend this claim as a semantic analysis of the universal affirmative propositions expressed
here in Aristotle’s syllogistic. For present purposes it will do to understand these predications extensionally, so that
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argument is that the ultimate explanans of the sensory power to discriminate is a feature of the
relevant sort of meanness, namely that it is the contrary of both extremes. Framed in this way,
then, the key to understanding how the senses discriminate is to understand how this feature of
meanness enables anything at all to discriminate. So a second and related feature this framing
highlights is that the master argument demonstrates the power to discriminate of an arbitrary
minor term: because the argument does not appeal to any particulars of themean in perception,
any C that satisfies the minor premise of argument 4.1.2 (sc. that mean belongs to all C) can be
shown to be discriminative.
Stated in its full generality, themaster argumentmay appear to prove toomuch. Discrimina-
tion is supposed to be a cognitive achievement, so it should be thought of as a capacity common
to some, if not all, of the cognitive capacities of soul. For the same reason, it should also be
thought to belong only to cognitive capacities of soul, capacities that enable their possessors to
make such cognitive achievements. The master argument however seems to show that many
other things are also capable of discrimination, for instance the character virtues, or anything
that happens to possessmean or intermediate values of an arbitrary quality scale, perhaps even a
political constitution (Pol. 1294b18). If so, and if Aristotle’s proof in text 4.1 is not woefully inad-
equate for its purpose, then we should expect to find some implicit restriction of the argument’s
scope, perhaps one rooted in a distinctive feature of the sensorymean state.
The worry, however, is premature. I’ve already suggested that the main interpretive chal-
lenge posed by themaster argument is to understand how, in Aristotle’s view, being the contrary
of both extremes endows the mean with the power to discriminate. Central to understanding
this claim is clarifying the notion of meanness at issue. As we’ll see later, clarifying the relevant
notion does in a way limit the scope of the argument, though not in a way that harms the gener-
ality I’m insisting on. Moreover, once we’ve come to grips with how this attribute of meanness
endows a thing with the power to discriminate, we’ll see that the cognitive ability the master
a predication of the form ‘A belongs to all B’ in Aristotle’s syllogistic is truth-functionally equivalent to a sentence
of the form ‘∀x(Bx⇒ Ax)’ in the predicate calculus. Note that, so understood, it is sufficient (though not necessary)
for the truth of ‘A belongs to all B’ that A belongs to B as such, i.e. that A belongs to B in virtue of what B is.
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argument attributes is plausibly said to belong to what has the mean even of non-perceptual
quality scales. For, as I’ll argue in what follows, the power to discriminate is a perspectival fea-
ture of a cognitive subject, one that marks it as occupying a perspective from which items in the
discriminated domain appear as they are in themselves, namely (intrinsically) lesser or greater,
colder or hotter, darker or lighter, and generally as occupying the position between the extremes
of the relevant scale that qualifies it as the sort of thing it is.
What, then, is the notion of meanness operative in the master argument? The question is
difficult because Aristotle may have any of several notions in mind when he adverts to the idea
of the mean. These notions spring from two traditional sources of Greek thinking about the
meanness, so in asking which notion is relevant to the master argument we will have to tease
apart these two influences on Aristotle’s conception of meanness.
4.3 Aristotle’s conception of meanness
Generally speaking, Aristotle has two models for thinking about meanness. The first model is
that of bodily health, understood as an equilibrium among opposed bodily constituents; this
model, of course, derives from the Greek medical tradition. The second is that of an abstract
property, such as a note on a musical scale, whose meanness is constituted by a certain mathe-
matical relation to its extremes; this model, by contrast, derives from the Pythagorean harmonic
theory of the 4th century. Both models have a discernible impact in significant cases in which
Aristotle appeals to themean, including his accounts of both the character virtues and the senses,
but the latter takes priority in Aristotle’s proof that the senses discriminate.
Let’s look first at the medical model. Scholarly treatments of Aristotle’s “doctrine of the
mean” typically cite the influence of the Greek medical conception of the body as a complex of
opposing constituents, whether of qualities, or powers, or humors, or elements.1⁵ On this con-
ception, states of the body are defined by the relative proportions of these constituents: health
1⁵For an overview of these views and extensive commentary on their influence onAristotle’s physiological theory,
see the excellent and under-appreciated Tracy 1969.
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is the state defined by their proportionality (σύμμετρον) or equilibrium (μετριότης), whereas
illnesses of various sorts are due to excesses and deficiencies among the constituents. Commen-
tators have rightly seen parallels with this model of bodily health in Aristotle’s conception of
character virtue.1⁶ Just like bodily excellences such as health and strength, virtues of character
such as temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency, but preserved by the
mean (EN 1104a12–27). Too much fear and we become cowardly, too little and we become rash;
it is only by feeling a mean amount of fear that we become and remain courageous. Character
virtue thus appears as the psychic analogue to bodily health, the excellent condition of soul that
strikes a mean between excess and deficiency. For similar reasons this model of health extends
to Aristotle’s conception of the sensory mean state. Aristotle thinks that in perception too expo-
sure to the extremes pains or even destroys the sense (An. 424b28–32, 426b3–7, 435b7–19). More-
over, we’ve seen that Aristotle characterizes the condition of the well-functioning sense organ
as a compound of equal portions (a 1 : 1 ratio) of contrary extremes. The well-functioning eye,
for instance, is composed of a “proportionate” (σύμμετρον) density of fluid—proportionate,
that is, between densities that would render the eye opaque or transparent (GA 779b26–34). In a
way, then, the sensory mean state is analogous to the health of the sense organ, insofar as sense’s
meanness reflects the optimal condition of its organ.1⁷
Health is a usefulmodel in these cases because it exemplifies a kind ofmeanness that depends
on the particular “bodily” or material constituents from which the mean thing is compounded.
This is the kind of meanness that is necessary, for instance, for the senses to be receptive to the
full range of the qualities they specially perceive, a status that I’ve argued depends on their being
the form of an organ composed of a proportional blend of contrary extremes. The respect in
which virtue is comparable to bodily health, namely that it is preserved by themean and harmed
by excess and deficiency, likewise invites the idea that virtues of character depend on an equi-
1⁶See, in addition to Tracy 1969, Angier 2010, Brown 2014, Hutchinson 1988, Terzis 1995, and Young 1996.
1⁷The analogy is only partial, however, since Aristotle rejects a harmonic conception of the senses. For discus-
sion, see ch. 3.2.
Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Discriminative Mean 130
librium between certain underlying extremes.1⁸ Aristotle treats such dependence on material
constituents as a general feature of this sort of meanness. This proportionality or equilibrium is
characteristic of health only because it is a proportionality or equilibrium of these constituents
composing the body: even if attributes such as health may be expressed numerically (e.g. as the
ratio of the relevant corporeal mixture), their belonging is nevertheless sensitive to the sorts of
matter in which they are present (cf. An. 408a5–9).
Aristotle however also recognizes aspects of meanness that do not depend on the sort of
matter in which the relevant numerical attribute is present. In Aristotle’s terminology, these
features are abstract (ἀφαιρούμενον), for although they are always present in some matter or
other, they are separable from matter in thought and so may be studied independently of con-
siderations of the sort of matter to which they belong (for instance by the mathematician: Phys.
193b23–194a2, cf.An. 403b9–16,Met. 1026a7–10). To bring out these aspects ofmeanness Aristotle
appeals to the quite different model—or rathermodels—provided by the Pythagorean tradition
in acoustical harmonics.1⁹ Meanness, in this tradition, is a strictly formal or mathematical con-
cept, an equality of ratios or formulae (λόγοι) among terms of a musical proportion.2⁰ Despite
its considerable influence on Aristotle’s thinking about meanness, including its application to
ethics and psychology, this tradition has received comparatively little scholarly attention, so it
will be worth spelling out its approach to meanness in some detail.
In the Pythagorean tradition of Archytas and Philolaus, a musical proportion is an ascend-
ing numerical progression consisting of four terms: two extremes and two means (μέσαι or
μεσότητες21), each of which puts the extremes “into proportion” in terms of some mathe-
1⁸On this see esp. Hutchinson 1988.
1⁹For the identity of these theorists as Pythagorean, see Plato, Resp. 530c–531c, and for an overview of the
Pythagorean conception of musical intervals as ratios, see Barker 2007, esp. 25–29.
2⁰Aristotle seems to agree; cf. Met. 1078a14–16: “the same account [sc. that sciences are more exact (ἀκριβής)
which do not posit magnitudes] applies also to harmonics and optics. For neither studies [its objects] qua seeing
or qua voice (ᾗ ὄψις ἢ ᾗ φωνή), but qua lines and numbers (ᾗ γραμμαὶ καὶ ἀριθμοί), even though they [sc.
their objects] are affections proper to these [sc. seeing and voice]”.
21Huffman 2005, 178 suggests that the terms come to be used interchangeably to refer to the mean term of a
series. Tracy 1969, 344–346, however, claims that μεσότης is ambiguous between this notion of meanness and the
proportion itself, in which case it is close in meaning to proportion, ἀναλογία.
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matical formula. One of these means, the so-called arithmetic mean, expresses proportional
difference, where the mean term B between (greater) A and (lesser)C is such that
A−B= B−C
The other, the so-called subcontrary or harmonicmean, is by contrast that B such that
(A−B)
A
=
(B−C)
C
What interested the Pythagorean harmonic theorists about these equations is that, in numerical
series in which the ratio of the last term to the first is an octave (2 : 1), the harmonicmean stands
to the first in the ratio of the fourth (4 : 3), whereas the arithmetic mean stands to the first in the
ratio of the fifth (3 : 2).22 The standard ancient example is the series 6, 8, 9, 12. In this series,
the ratio of 12 to 6 is that of the octave; the harmonic mean, 8, stands to 6 as a fourth; and the
arithmetic mean, 9, stands to it as a fifth. Finally, yet another mean emerges if we consider a
progression of such series, in which the last term of the second series stands to the first term of
the first series as a double octave (4 : 1). In this case the last term in the first series puts these
extremes into proportion according to the following equation (where A is the double octave of
C):
A
B
=
B
C
This they called the geometricmean.23
22Hence the last term is the fifth of the harmonicmean and the fourth of the arithmetic; see Barker 2007, 302–303.
23Cf. Archytas, fr. 2 Huffman (= Porphyry, in Harm. 93.6–17 Düring): “There are three means in music: first is
the arithmetic, second the geometric, and third the sub-contrary . . . . [Def. 1] [Means are] arithmetic when the
three terms are in proportion as follows: the second [i.e. the mean] exceeds the third by that which the first exceeds
the second. And in this proportion the interval of the greater [term] turns out to be smaller and the [interval] of
the smaller greater. [Def. 2] [Means are] geometric whenever [the terms are such that] as the first is to the second
so the second is to the third. Of these the greater and the lesser make the interval equal. [Def. 3] [Means are]
sub-contrary, which we call harmonic, whenever they are such that by which part of itself the first term exceeds
the second, the mean [i.e. the second] exceeds the third by this part of the third. In this proportion the interval of
the greater terms comes to be greater, and the [interval] of the lesser [terms] lesser” (tr. Huffman, modified).
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These three “Pythagorean” means are of great interest to musical theory, for by using them
alone one can construct the standard harmonic interval of the octave from two fourths and a
whole tone (separating the fourth and fifth)—an impressive feat since, as they knew, these ratios
could be reproduced using several differentmusical instruments, such as the pan flute, the aulos,
the lyre, or metal cymbals. But Aristotle’s interest in the Pythagorean means lies almost entirely
in their application outside of musical theory.2⁴ Indeed, in several passages he displays remark-
able ingenuity with these means, extending their Pythagorean definitions in order to fit them
to novel cases. In his discussion of distributive justice in EN 5.3/EE 4.3, for instance, he distin-
guishes between two types of numerical proportion (ἀναλογία). All proportion is an equality
of ratios (1131a31), but not in every case is there amean term occurring on both sides of the equa-
tion. For example, the proportions 2 : 4 :: 4 : 8 and 2 : 4 :: 5 : 10 both express the equality of
quotients characteristic of the geometricmean, but only the first identifies a term (namely 4) that
satisfies the Pythagorean definition of the geometric mean.2⁵ Aristotle calls the first type of pro-
portion, which does yield a mean value in a continuous series, “continuous” (συνεχής); and he
calls the second type, which merely expresses an equality of quotients, “discrete” (διῃρημένη).
In Aristotle’s view, then, the Pythagorean definitions apply only to a subclass of proportions, the
“means” that belong to continuous proportions.
Such repurposing of the Pythagorean means reflects Aristotle’s interest in a much broader
range of “mean” phenomena. What interests him about the geometrical mean is not the equal-
ity of intervals on either side of the equation, but the fact that if A : B ::C : D then, alternando,
A : C :: B : D—a feature that applies to discrete as well as continuous geometric proportions.
Thus the mean in accordance with geometrical proportion provides an illuminating model for
distributive justice, since it seems to show that proportionality in distribution (in which party A
receives amountC and party B receives amountD) amounts to a proportionality in the amount
2⁴The only exception I know of is a fragment recounting the construction of the octave from two tetrachords
described above, which Ps.-Plutarch attributes to Aristotle; see Mus. 1139b (= frag. 47 Rose) and, for discussion,
Barker 2007, 329–338.
2⁵See Archytas, fr. 2 [Def. 2], quoted in note 23 above.
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distributed (EN/EE 1131b5–20). Similarly, the feature of arithmetic means that interests Aristotle
is not the feature that most intrigued the Pythagorean harmonic theorists—namely the inequal-
ity of the intervals betweenA and B and between B andC.2⁶What interests Aristotle is rather the
observation that the mean in accordance with continuous arithmetic proportion is “equidistant
from each of the extremes”—that, in other words, the mean is no closer, and so no more sim-
ilar, to one extreme than to the other. For this reason the arithmetic mean is instrumental to
Aristotle’s presentation of the mean operative in his analysis of character virtue, since this latter
mean too is characterized as avoiding the excess and deficiency of its extremes (EN 1106a26–32,
quoted in text 4.3 below).
In both contexts Aristotle is adamant that the mean under investigation is an abstract math-
ematical property, though of course it is always present in some quantifiable unit(s) of mat-
ter. He prefaces his appeal to the discrete geometrical mean in his discussion of distributive
justice with the remark, “proportion (ἀναλογία) not only belongs to numbers understood as
units (μοναδικόν), but to number as a whole” (EN/EE 1131a30–31). His remarks are similarly far
reaching in opening discussion of the nature of character virtue: “we must appreciate that in ev-
erything continuous and divisible there is excess, deficiency, and a mean . . .” (EE 1220b21–22; cf.
EN 1106a26–27, quoted in text 4.3 below). Aristotle’s emphasis on the abstract, matter-indifferent
character of themean in question seems to be precisely to contrast it with the compositional no-
tion exemplified by bodily health. This is perhaps why, in more than one such context, Aristotle
explicitly identifies the type of mean in question as, for instance, what the “mathematicians call
call geometrical proportion” (EN 1131b12–13) or the “mean in accordance with arithmetic pro-
portion” (1106a35–36, quoted in text 4.3 below).
If so, then in thinking about how Aristotle uses meanness as an explanatory concept we
2⁶See Archytas, fr. 2 [Def. 1], quoted in note 23 above. Archytas’ interest in the relativemagnitudes of the intervals
given by thesemeans is somewhatmysterious. Barker 2007, 303n37makes the attractive suggestion that it is because
Archytas “noticed andwas intrigued by the fact that the insertion of arithmetic and harmonicmeans between terms
in the same ratio always generates the same pair of ratios in the opposite order”. This is because the harmonic mean
is the fourth of the first term and the last is its fifth, whereas the arithmetic mean is the fifth of the first term and
the last is its fourth.
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should be careful to distinguish which model he has in mind. We should, for instance, distin-
guish the respects in which the character virtues are means on the model of bodily health from
those in which they are means on the model of musical proportion, which arguably cleaves
more closely to what commentators are thinking of when they refer to Aristotle’s “doctrine of
the mean”.2⁷ This is especially important for the interpretation of passages in which Aristotle is
not clear on which model he has in mind, or seems even to conflate the two models. One such
passage is the Eudemian Ethics account of character virtue (1220b21–35), which otherwise neatly
corresponds with the account in Nicomachean Ethics 2.6. I believe text 4.1 is another such pas-
sage. For though Aristotle clearly appeals to the model of health in explicating how the senses
are receptive to the full range of their qualities, his proof that the senses discriminate must by
contrast appeal to the musical model sketched above—specifically, to a variety of this type of
mean we can call the object-relative arithmetic mean.
4.4 The object-relative arithmetic mean
Text 4.1 and its immediate context offer two clues to the type of mean at work in the master
argument. The first clue is provided by the attribute I earlier called the ultimate explanans of
the argument, namely being the contrary of both extremes. The other is provided by Aristotle’s
description of the sensory mean state as being between “the contrariety present in the objects it
perceives” (An. 424a4–5). Together they suggest that the discriminativemean—the mean shown
by the master argument to have the capacity to discriminate2⁸—must satisfy two criteria: first,
it must exhibit proportional difference relative to its extremes; and second, at least insofar as it
applies to the senses, it must be an object-relativemean, one taken in reference to the nature of
the object itself. As it turns out, Aristotle explicitly discusses a type of mean that fits just this
description.
2⁷For a defense of this reading, see Rapp 2006, whose distinction between the “analytical” and the “empirical”
doctrines of the mean very closely approximates the distinction I have in mind.
2⁸See argument 4.1.1 above.
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4.4.1 Proportional difference
Consider first the attribute of being the contrary of both extremes. That this is the ultimate
explanans of the master argument already indicates that Aristotle is working with the musical
model of meanness; for possession of this attribute plainly does not depend on which contraries
are at issue, as it would on the medical model. If the master argument is in fact presupposing
the musical model, then which of the Pythagorean means is at issue? To answer this question
we have to get clear on just what this attribute is supposed to be. We find Aristotle giving his
fullest account of what it is to be the contrary of both extremes in spelling out the opposition
between character virtue and the vices of excess and deficiency:
Text 4.2 Given that there are three dispositions [of soul]—since two are vices, one in respect of excess
and one in respect of deficiency, and one, virtue, is themean state—all are in a way opposed to all. For the
extremes are contrary to one another and to the mean, and the mean [is contrary] to the extremes.
For just as the equal is greater in relation to the lesser and lesser in relation to the greater, in this
way mean [psychological] states exceed the lesser [psychological states] and fall short of the greater
[psychological states] in the domain of affection and action.2⁹ (EN 2.8 1108b11–19)
One thing that seems to follow from this explanation is that a mean that is the contrary of both
extremes stands to each in the way its contrary does. If, for instance, it is mean between a
greater quantity and a lesser quantity, it will be both, like the lesser extreme, less than the greater
extreme and, like the greater extreme, greater than the lesser extreme. But while this is a feature
shared by all three Pythagorean means,3⁰ what Aristotle here calls “the equal” is in another way
distinctive in its relation to the extremes. It is not just that the equal is mutually opposed to
its extremes, but that it is opposed to the each extreme in the same amount. Prior to text 4.2,
Aristotle noted that the equal here is equal because it “exceeds and is exceeded in equal measure
2⁹τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ'
ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις
ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ
μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.
3⁰In the series 6, 8, 9, and 12, for instance, both the harmonic mean (8) and the arithmetic mean (9) are (like 6)
less than 12 and (like 12) greater than 6, and the same holds for the geometric mean (12) between 6 and its “double
octave” (24).
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(ἴσῳ)” (EN 1006a34–35, quoted in text 4.3 below). That is to say, the greater extreme is greater
than the equal in the same amount that the equal is greater than the lesser extreme. This second
feature expresses a relation of proportional difference, and unlike the first, it belongs only to the
arithmetic mean.31
Text 4.2 gives us good reason to think that the arithmeticmeanuniquely bears the attribute of
being the contrary of both extremes. This however is not the complete description of the mean
operative in the master argument. As he did in applying the geometric mean to distributive
justice, Aristotle goes beyond the Pythagorean definition in applying the arithmetic mean to
sensory discrimination. In this case he extends the Pythagorean definition by distinguishing
two ways of measuring the arithmetic mean. The distinction sets up an important contrast
between the discriminative mean operative in the master argument and the otherwise parallel
“ethical” mean of action and affection in terms of which Aristotle characterizes the character
virtues. For whereas the latter mean is famously relative to us, the mean operative in the master
argumentmust be object-relative, in that itsmeanness is determined by its relation to the relevant
extremes.
4.4.2 The object-relative mean
The master argument applies to perception not only because each sense is a mean state, but
because each is a mean state of the contrariety present in the objects it perceives (τῆς ἐν τοῖς
αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως, An. 424a5). I’ve argued that we should understand this extra qualifi-
cation as a reference to the ontology of perceptual qualities that Aristotle develops in De Sensu
3–5, on which account each of the qualities specially perceived by a sense is composed of a mix-
ture of opposite extremes: black and white in the case of color, bitter and sweet in the case of
flavor, and so on. In reference to Aristotle’s claim that the sense organ is (as far as possible)
potentially all but actually none of the qualities to which it is receptive, I suggested that the
31In the series 6, 8, 9, and 12, for instance, only the arithmetic mean (9) exhibits proportional difference between
6 and 12. This is no surprise, since proportional difference is in fact the feature in terms of which the Pythagoreans
defined the arithmetic mean. (See Archytas, fr. 2 [Def. 1], quoted in note 23 above.) and since it moreover fits with
Aristotle’s preferred characterization of the arithmetic mean as what is equidistant from each of the extremes.
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sense is a mean state of this contrariety because its organ is composed in a 1 : 1 ratio of these
extremes. But there is a further implication of this qualification, namely that the contrariety
between which the sense is a mean is the one that defines the quality scale it specially perceives.
This amounts to a further condition on the type of meanness to which the master argument
applies because, in Aristotle’s view, there is more than one way to “take” the mean.
Here again we find clarity in Aristotle’s discussion of character virtue, where he draws a
distinction between taking themean with respect to the object itself and taking it “relative to us”.
The distinction recalls one Plato makes between measuring the great and the small in relation
to each other and in relation to what is in “due measure”,32 but once again Aristotle puts an old
idea to novel use. The character virtues, he argues, are mean states relative to what is mean in
action and affection, though not of what is mean in accordance with the object itself. Like the
crafts, character virtue pertains to the mean “relative to us” (cf. 1106b15–29):
Text 4.3 In everything continuous and divisible it is possible to take a greater, a lesser, and an equal,
and these [sc. greater, lesser, and equal] either [1] in accordance with the object itself or [2] in relation
to us. Now [in each case] the equal is a sort of mean between excess and deficiency, [1] but I call the
equal “mean [in accordance with] the object” when it, being equidistant from the extremes, is one and
the same for all, [2] and [I call] “relative to us” that [sc. mean] which is neither too much nor too little;
this is neither one nor the same for all.
[1] For example, if 10 is many and 2 is few, 6 is taken as the mean in accordance with the object, since
it exceeds and is exceeded in equal measure. This is mean in accordance with arithmetic proportion.
[2] What is [mean] relative to us should not be taken in the same way. For it is not the case that, if 10
minae is a large portion and 2minae is a small portion for a person to consume, the trainerwill [therefore]
prescribe 6minae. For it may be that this [portion] is large or small for the [specific] person taking it—for
it will be small for Milo, but large for the one who is just beginning gymnastic training. The same applies
to running and wrestling. Indeed, every expert avoids excess and deficiency in this way, but rather seeks
after the mean and chooses this—the mean not of the object but relative to us.33 (EN 2.6, 1106a26–b7)
32As the EE 2.3 version of the distinction makes especially clear (1220b23–26). Compare Plato, Pol. 283e, and see
Angier 2010, ch. 4 for a useful recent discussion of the connection between the Platonic and Aristotelian distinc-
tions.
33ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα
ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως· λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν
πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς
ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ
τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο
δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ
δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ
τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ
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object-relative mean subject-relative mean
equidistant from extremes neither too much nor too little
one not one
the same for all not the same for all
Table 4.1 Text 4.3’s distinction between the object-relative and subject-relative means
There are three points on which text 4.3 distinguishes the two ways of taking the mean,
which I summarize in table 4.1. It gives as an example of the object-relative mean what is equal
in terms of arithmetic proportion. As in the standard musical proportion we considered earlier,
6 is the arithmetic mean of the series 2 . . .6 . . .10 because it is the value of B in the formula
10−B= B−2. Moreover, since 6 is the only such term in the series, it is the unique arithmetic
mean of this sort. And since 6’s status as the arithmetic mean is fixed by nothing apart from its
relation to 2 and 10, it will vary neither depending on the circumstances in which it is measured
nor depending on who is taking the measurement. This arithmetic mean is thus object-relative
in the sense that its value is fixed solely by its proportional difference relative to the contrary
extremes defining the relevant scale.
The same is not true of what I call the subject-relative mean. To see why, Aristotle asks
us to suppose that the quantities being measured are portions of food, and asks us to imagine
an evaluative context in which a trainer, an expert in diet, is to recommend to a trainee an
appropriate portion of food. Interpretations of Aristotle’s example vary widely; here is how I
propose to read it.3⁴ The trainer’s goal is to take a portion of food that is neither too much
δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον
ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
3⁴Aristotle’s doctrine of the ethical mean has been extensively discussed, and, to say the least, not every available
interpretation coheres with the account of the distinction between object-relative and subject-relative meanness
I provide here. To clarify the dialectical stance of the proceeding account, I note the following commitments of
my account: (1) Character virtues are mean states derivatively, because (a) each aims at and hits upon the subject-
relative mean of the relevant domains of action and affection, and because (b) each is therefore “between” contrary
vicious extremes, which respectively aim at and hit upon excess and deficiency in those domains. (2) The training
analogy of text 4.3 clarifies the subject-relative mean by comparing moral agents to the evaluative position of the
trainer (so not to those of Milo and the novice trainee). (3) The subject-relative means of action and affection are
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nor too little for the trainee to eat. Suppose the trainer knows that 10 minae (or pounds, let’s
say) of food is too much for anyone to eat, and 2 pounds is too little. This bit of knowledge is
undoubtedly pertinent, but it is not enough for her to go on. For while it tells the trainer that 10
pounds is too much and 2 pounds too little to recommend anyone, it does not show how much
would be neither too much nor too little for any specific person. It would be wrong, in short, to
conclude from the fact that 10 pounds and 2 pounds are respectively toomuch and too little of a
portion for anyone that 6 pounds—the object-relativemean between them—is the right amount
for everyone.
On what basis then does the trainer arrive at the mean portion of food for the trainee? Her
recommendation will clearly depend on the trainee’s condition: the good trainer will consider
several factors, including what the trainee is training for and her stage in the training, before
recommending a portion. Trainees who differ in these variables will require the trainer to de-
viate from the object-relative mean to different degrees. The portion of an expert wrestler like
Milo, for instance, will exceed the object-relative mean, while that of a novice may fall short.
But even if the portion recommended by the trainer coincides with the object-relative mean, it
would not be mean for the same reason. The trainer is not interested in arriving at the portion
that is equidistant between the greater and the lesser but the one that is neither too much nor
too little for each trainee. What satisfies this sort of meanness will not be unique, since it varies
according to who or what specifically it is relative to which the mean is being evaluated. Nor
then will it be the same for all, since there is nothing to guarantee that the mean between too
much and too little will be invariant when taken relative to different persons or things. This sort
of mean is thus subject-relative because it is evaluative; its status as a mean depends on factors
external to its proportional difference to the extremes.
Whatmakes themean taken in this way “subject-relative” is therefore not that it is subjective.
mean because they avoid excess and deficiency in the relevant domain (so not because they are “middling” or issue
from a mean disposition). (Note that for present purposes I needn’t take a stance on the “parameters” relative to
which the subject-relative mean is evaluated.) I believe an interpretation of this sort can be gleaned from Brown
1997, 14 and Rapp 2006; see esp. Brown 1997 for a defense of (2) and critical commentary of rival interpretations,
and see Brown 2014 for (1) and (3).
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To the contrary, both sorts of mean (as I have described them here) are objective in the sense
that their status as a mean does not depend on the attitudes of the measurer. Just as there is an
objective fact of the matter whether 6 is the object-relative arithmetic mean between 2 and 10,
so too is there an objective fact of the matter whether 4 pounds of food is the subject-relative
arithmeticmean—neither toomuchnor too little—for the trainer to recommend a given trainee.
What distinguishes the subject-relative arithmetic mean is rather that the factors determining
which value of a scale is the subject-relative arithmeticmean (relative to some evaluative context)
are not limited to the numerical relations to the extremes that determines that value’s position on
the scale. These additional factors are “subject-relative” in Aristotle’s view because they usually
reflect certain norms specific to the evaluative context in which the measurer takes the mean—
training, for instance, or building. This norm-governed aspect of the subject-relative arithmetic
mean is further reflected in the fact that it is mean between what is too much and too little, and
not simply between what is greater and lesser.
So understood, the contrast between the object-relative arithmetic mean and the subject-
relative arithmetic mean is an important one for Aristotle to highlight in spelling out the notion
of meanness characteristic of the senses. The quality scales specially perceived by the senses
are defined in terms of a distinctive pair of extremes, and the discrete values of those scales
are likewise defined in terms of the numerical relations to the extremes that determine their
respective positions on the scale. In specifying that the senses are mean states of the contrariety
present in their their objects, then, Aristotle is claiming that the sensory mean state is an object-
relativemean state, onewhose status as amean relates it to the defining features of the perceptual
qualities it specially perceives. This sets up an important disanalogy with the ethical mean state,
which we’ve so far observed to be a near perfect analogue.
4.4.3 What the virtuous person doesn’t discriminate
I’ve argued that the master argument extends the power to discriminate to the senses insofar as
they are object-relativemean states of the quality scales they specially perceive, but this conclu-
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sion may appear too strong. Aristotle more than once describes the phronimos, the ideal moral
agent possessed of both character virtue and practical wisdom, as one who discriminates.3⁵ Yet,
as we know, the meanness characteristic of character virtue is subject-relative. At first blush,
then, the requirement that the senses be object-relative mean states may seem superfluous, for
it seems that the connection between arithmetic meanness and discrimination obtains however
one takes the mean. But Aristotle’s qualification has a point, one that comes to light if we con-
sider what the virtuous person as such does—and more importantly does not—discriminate.
Recall first the parallels between the mean state characteristic of the virtues and the mean
state characteristic of the senses. Courage, for instance, is a mean state because it is related to
the practical and affective means in a sphere of human activity: it aims at and hits upon what
is mean between feelings of fear and confidence and in standing firm in the face of dangers
(EN 1115b10–13). As such, courage falls in a way “between” a vice of excess, namely rashness, and
a vice of deficiency, namely cowardice, which respectively aim at and hit upon feelings of undue
confidence or fear, and so fail in different ways to stand firm in the face of the right dangers and
for the right reasons (1116a4–7). I’ve argued that the senses are mean states in an analogous way.
Vision, for instance, is amean state because it is related to the chromaticmean: it is the form and
final cause of an organ that qua organ instantiates the mean value of the color scale. As such,
it too falls “between” a range of extreme states, which to various degrees exceed or fall short of
vision’s mean position.
Both courage and vision are accorded their status as mean states by being related to a sort
of mean. But since the means to which courage and vision are respectively related are taken in
different ways, they must differ in the perspective they gain on the relevant scales by being so
related to the mean. Occupying the mean state of a subject-relative mean between excess and
deficiency allows you to tell whether an item on the relevant scale is toomuch or too little relative
to some evaluative context, where the status of that item as the subject-relative arithmetic mean
is inextricably bound to the norms specific to that evaluative context. By contrast, occupying the
3⁵See EN 1099a22–24, 1113a29–31; cf. 1143a8–10, 29–32.
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mean state of an object-relative mean between excess and deficiency allows you to tell whether
an item on the relevant scale is in itself greater or lesser, where its status as greater, lesser, or
“equal” makes the item the sort of thing that it is and holds independently of any evaluative
context.
To see the difference, consider Aristotle’s observations about the opposition between virtue
and its opposed vices immediately following text 4.2:
Text 4.4 For the courageous man appears rash in comparison to the cowardly but cowardly in com-
parison to the rash; similarly, the temperate man [appears] indulgent in comparison to the insensible but
insensible in comparison to the indulgent, and the generousman [appears] wasteful in comparison to the
ungenerous but ungenerous in comparison with the wasteful. For this reason too each of the extreme
[states] confounds themeanwith the other [extreme state]; the coward calls the courageousman rash
and the rash man calls him a coward, and analogously in the other cases.3⁶ (EN 2.8, 1108b19–26)
Aristotle is contrasting the perspectives afforded by virtue and the vices of excess and deficiency.
Because virtue, like the vice of deficiency, falls short of the vice of excess, it too appears deficient
from the perspective afforded by the vice of excess. But it appears excessive from the perspec-
tive afforded by the vice of deficiency. The implication is that, whereas the vicious extremes
confound3⁷ the mean with the contrary extreme, both extremes appear as they are from the
perspective afforded by the virtuous mean, namely as excessive and deficient.
A similar point applies to the sensory mean state.3⁸ From the perspective afforded by the
“extreme” states of sense, states in which the sense organ is mixed in a ratio of contraries that
deviates from the object-relativemean in the direction of either the greater or the lesser extreme,
values of the relevant quality scale appear unduly greater or lesser. For instance, when the tongue
is excessively bitter (due perhaps to illness), objects will appear bitter even when they are not
(An. 422b8–10). Similarly, objects will appear darker or lighter than they are to people with
3⁶ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος
πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον
οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν,
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.
3⁷Literally ‘push away’, ἀπωθοῦνται.
3⁸The parallel is also noticed by Johansen 2002, 181, who does not however draw the important contrast I shall
go on to draw in the perspectives afforded object-relative and subject-relative arithmetic means.
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with dark and light eyes, which are respectively composed of an excess or deficiency of fluid
(GA 779b35–780a7). Here too the implication is that the perspective afforded by the sensory
mean state, the state in which the sense organ is mixed in a way that corresponds precisely to
the object-relative arithmetic mean of the relevant scale, is the only one fromwhich items in the
scale appear sweet or bitter, light or dark, and in general greater or lesser the mean when and
only when they are.
But here the analogy in the “perspectives” afforded by character virtue and the sensorymean
state gives way to a contrast. Because the mean relative to which the character virtues are mean
states is subject-relative, items on the scale the virtuous person discriminates appear as toomuch
or too little, not in themselves, but only relative to some evaluative context. Indeed, the coura-
geous person and the cowardly person could agree on whether a certain emotional response is
exceedingly fearful, in the sense that it lies close to the extreme on the scale between feelings of
fear and confidence. What however they must disagree on, and that correctness about which
characterizes the perspective of the courageous person, is whether that response is too much,
too little, or just what is called for in some practical situation. That is because the extremes in
the latter case are extremes of a subject-relative mean, which is fixed not only in relation to the
object itself, but also to factors specific to an evaluative context. Matters are different in the case
of the sensorymean state. Healthy Socrates and Sick Socrates cannot agree on whether the same
wine is sweet or bitter (or, if sweet, how sweet), because it is only to Healthy Socrates that the
flavor of the wine appears as it is in itself. This is because the mean relative to which the sense is
a mean state is object-relative, fixed by its relation to the extremes that define the quality scale it
specially perceives.
For Aristotle, then, the common status of the senses and the character virtues as arithmetic
mean states accords both a perspective from which items in their respective domains appear as
they are. But because we determine what is arithmetically mean in different ways in charac-
terizing the sensory and ethical mean states, the ways in which items in the relevant domains
appear as they are likewise differ. From the perspective afforded by the virtuous mean state—
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a state characterized by its relation to a subject-relative arithmetic mean—items appear as too
much, too little, or just right relative to various practical situations. This perspective presents
the virtuous person with objective features of the items in the relevant domains of action and
affection, features such as the suitability of certain practical or emotional responses in different
practical situations; but it does not as such present the virtuous person with the features that
make them the actions and affections they are in themselves. The trainer’s expertise in prescrib-
ing the right amount of food does not consist in (though it may presuppose) appreciation of
what counts as greater, lesser, or equal portions of food, but rather in a sensitivity to factors that
may determine different amounts as appropriate for different trainees. For the same reason, it
is no mark of virtue to know whether a particular action or affection counts as greater, lesser, or
equal on the scale that determines the sort of action or affection it is. The virtuous person must
also be able to tell whether the relevant action or affection (such as it is) is too much, too little,
or precisely what is called for in various practical situations.
By contrast, the perspective afforded by the sensory mean state—a state I’ve argued is char-
acterized by its relation to an object-relative arithmeticmean—is precisely one fromwhich items
appear as they are on the relevant scale, namely greater, lesser or equal. As we’ve seen, these are
the features that define the essential nature of the qualities specially perceived by a sense. So
there is a point to Aristotle’s stipulation that the senses must be object-relative mean states of
the quality scales they specially perceive. The point is to clarify that their perspective on these
quality domains is one from which the qualities appear as they are in themselves, independent
of any evaluative context: whether greater or lesser, lighter or darker, sweeter or more bitter.
4.5 Discrimination as a perspectival feature
Here, then, is one thing that follows from Aristotle’s claim that the senses are mean states, and
in particular object-relative mean states, relative to the quality scale(s) they specially perceive,
namely that the senses occupy a perspective fromwhich qualities falling on the relevant scale(s)
appear as they are in themselves. If this is the feature of meanness that is supposed to be brought
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out by the conclusion that the senses discriminate in text 4.1, it imputes to Aristotle a strikingly
different conception of basic sensory discrimination in comparison with the ones suggested
by the interpretations mentioned at the start of the chapter. According to this conception, the
senses’ ability to discriminate seems to consist neither in the ability to cognize differences be-
tween perceptual qualities, nor in the production of phenomenal content through separating
perceptual form from its proximate matter. It is rather a perspectival feature of the senses, a
feature that marks them as occupying a perspective from which one can determine how the
qualities specially perceived by a given sense are in themselves, namely greater or lesser on the
scale that defines each as the kind of quality it is.
One major advantage of interpreting discrimination as a perspectival feature of this sort is
that it allows us to see the connections between Aristotle’s argument for sensory discrimination
and other ancient discussions of the issue. One particularly significant discussion is in Plato’s
Theaetetus, and in particular its critique of Protagoras’ homomensura doctrine in the first part of
the dialogue.3⁹ As we observed in the introduction,⁴⁰ Socrates interprets Protagoras’ claim that
man is the measure of all things as equivalent to the claim that each person is the “determiner”
or “judge” (κριτής) of what is and is not the case for her:
Socrates. . . . Now, Protagoras, “Man is the measure of all things” as you people say—of
white and heavy and light and all that kind of thing without exception. He has the cri-
terion (κριτήριον) of these things within himself; so when he thinks that they are as he
experiences them (οἷα πάσχει), he thinks what is true and what really is for him.
(Tht. 178b; tr. Levett-Burnyeat)
In saying that each person has within themselves the criterion for determining the perceptual
attributes of things, Socrates takes himself to be offering an account in support of the thesis that
each person’s perceptions or sensory affections are true, so that, for instance, a breeze percep-
tually appears cold or warm to someone only if the breeze is cold or warm (cf. 160c) As we saw
before, Socrates seems to think that viewing sensory affections as the criteria for perceptible
3⁹Cf. Narcy 1996, who also notes a connection between Aristotle’s account of perceptual discrimination and the
Theaetetus, but is led to very different conclusions.
⁴⁰See Introduction, xxviii–xxxii.
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attributes naturally goes with, and perhaps even entails, a relativism about perceptual qualities
according to which things come to be perceptually qualified in some way only for some cog-
nitive subject. Socrates, we noted, rejects such relativism on independent grounds. But even
apart from the relativist ontology he recommends for the Protagorean doctrine, Socrates denies
that the senses could be the criteria for determining the perceptual attributes of things. For even
if we perceive the hardness of a hard thing and the softness of a soft thing, it is not the soul
through the senses but the soul by itself that must determine (κρίνειν) the hard thing’s hardness
or the soft thing’s softness: the knowledge of such things must therefore lie, not in the sensory
affections, but in the processes of reasoning about them.
Like the Socrates of the Theaetetus, Aristotle rejects the relativist implications of the Pro-
tagorean doctrine. But he remains sympathetic to the idea that sensory affections are the stan-
dards or criteria on which to determine the perceptual qualities of things. Also like the Socrates
of the Theaetetus, Aristotle finds this idea implicit in the Protagorean doctrine. But whereas,
on Socrates’ picture, this idea leads naturally to the relativist conclusions that both he and Aris-
totle reject, Aristotle sees it as an innocuous and even trivial consequence of the Protagorean
doctrine:⁴1
Text 4.5 We call both scientific knowledge and perception a measure of things for the same reason,
[namely] because we cognize something by them, since they are measured rather than measure. But
what happens for us is just as though we came to know how large we are because someone measured
us, applying the cubit-length to us so many times. Indeed, Protagoras says that man is the measure
of all things, as if he were saying the knower or the perceiver, and them because the one has per-
ception and the other scientific knowledge, which we say to be the measure of their underlying ob-
jects. He seems to be saying something remarkable when in fact he is saying nothing remarkable.⁴2
(Met. 10.1, 1053a31–b3)
⁴1See McReady-Flora 2015, esp. 74–91 for detailed discussion of the contrast between Aristotle’s treatment of
Protagoras in this passage and (his considerably less friendly) remarks on the homo mensura elsewhere in the
corpus.
⁴2καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην δὲ μέτρον τῶν πραγμάτων λέγομεν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ αὐτό, ὅτι
γνωρίζομέν τι αὐταῖς, ἐπεὶ μετροῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ μετροῦσιν. ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
ἄλλου ἡμᾶς μετροῦντος ἐγνωρίσαμεν πηλίκοι ἐσμὲν τῷ τὸν πῆχυν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῶν ἐπιβάλλειν.
Πρωταγόρας δ' ἄνθρωπόν φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν
αἰσθανόμενον· τούτους δ' ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἴσθησιν ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, ἅ φαμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν
ὑποκειμένων. οὐθὲν δὴ λέγοντες περιττὸν φαίνονταί τι λέγειν. SeeMcReady-Flora 2015, 80–83 for a defense
of this reading of οὐθὲν δὴ λέγοντες περιττὸν φαίνονταί τι λέγειν in b3.
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What is true about the Protagorean doctrine in Aristotle’s view is that we can treat the knower
and the perceiver each as a “measure” (μέτρον) of its underlying objects.⁴3 This is because scien-
tific knowledge and perception are alike “measures” of their respective objects. But for Aristotle
they are measures in a curious way. Perception and scientific knowledge are not measures by
measuring but by being measured. Aristotle’s remarks are obscure, but in light of the connec-
tion with theTheaetetus we’re now considering, his point may be this: perception and scientific
knowledge do not cognize and so “measure” their object by virtue of acting on the world but by
virtue of theworld acting on them.⁴⁴ According to this suggestion, the status of the perceiver and
the knower as a measure of perceptible and scientifically knowable objects depends on the way
that perception and scientific knowledge are “affected” by their respective objects. If so, then
pace the Socrates of theTheaetetus, the standard or criterion whereby the perceiver determines
perceptible attributes lies in the sensory affections themselves.
The conception of discrimination as a perspectival feature, which I’ve suggested is expressed
in the master argument, is continuous with this picture of perception as the measure of percep-
tual objects. If Aristotle’s view is that the senses are the criteria and measures of the qualities
they specially perceive by virtue of being affected by these qualities in the right way, then he
owes an account of the conditions under which the senses are affected in the right way by the
relevant qualities. My suggestion is that the master argument is Aristotle’s way of delivering
this account. To sum up our results so far, the first stage of the master argument (arg. 4.1.1)
connects the power to discriminate, here understood generically as the power characteristic of
what operates as the criterion of some range of cognitive objects, to a certain perspective on
those objects, a perspective I’ve argued Aristotle characterizes in terms of the arithmetic mean.
The sort of perspective associated with the power to discriminate differs with how one takes the
relevant arithmetic mean. But in the case of the senses Aristotle is clear that the requisite mean
must be an object-relative one. For it is only from the perspective of this mean that the qualities
⁴3Cf. An. 426b8–9 for a parallel use of ὑποκείμενον used in reference to special perceptual objects.
⁴⁴McReady-Flora (2015, 77)’s suggestion that Aristotle’s remarks indicate that “on his view the world is prior to
and determines how we apprehend it” would be another suggestion amenable to the present interpretation.
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of perceived bodies appear as they are in themselves, and therefore only from this perspective
that the senses are in a position to act as a measure of their special objects, perceiving things as
having them when and only when they do.
As we observed earlier in this chapter, however, Aristotle’s reasoning in the master argu-
ment does not seem to be restricted to the sensory mean state; it seems to extend to anything
that occupies the perspective of the relevant (object-relative) arithmetic mean. Whenwe turn in
the next section to examine the second stage of the master argument (arg. 4.1.2), I’ll suggest that
the theoretical role of the master argument depends crucially on its generality. In particular,
I’ll suggest, Aristotle also wants the master argument to provide an account of the conditions
under which thought, the other basic discriminative capacity of soul, discriminates scientifi-
cally knowable objects. The master argument, in short, is intended to give a unified account of
discrimination—a “doctrine of the discriminative mean” similar to the well-known doctrine of
the ethical mean—and, as I’ll show, the lengths to which Aristotle goes to maintain the parallel
between sensory and intellectual discrimination testifies to his commitment to such a unified
account.
But before turning to the second stage of the master argument, let me briefly address the
worry about the generality of the master argument we raised earlier.⁴⁵ The worry was that the
master argument seems to overgenerate discriminative capacities: Aristotle seems to regard dis-
crimination as a cognitive achievement, but if the master argument applies across the board to
anything occupying the perspective of the relevant mean, then it seems that we’ll have to treat as
discriminative much more than just the cognitive capacities of soul. The present interpretation
offers at least two ways to respond to this worry, but I think one is decidedly the optimal re-
sponse. The suboptimal response would be to accept the conclusion on the grounds that being
discriminative on Aristotle’s view is simply a matter of occupying the right sort of perspective
on the discriminated domain. On this view the senses would be “discriminative” of their special
objects in the same way that a thermostat is “discriminative” of a room’s ambient temperature
⁴⁵See sect. 4.2.
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or a whistling kettle is “discriminative” of when the water inside it exceeds 100◦C; that is, they
would be tools that may be used to discriminate the qualities they specially perceive. Admit-
tedly, this view is compatible with the present interpretation of the master argument, and in at
least one passages Aristotle speaks as if we discriminate perceptual qualities by using the rele-
vant sense as a mean state.⁴⁶ However, in text 4.1 as well as other passages,⁴⁷ Aristotle is explicit
that it is the senses that do the discriminating. These passages suggest that Aristotle does not
distinguish between the sensory affection and the cognitive process of discriminating, neither
of which can be undergone (e.g.) by plants or inanimate objects. In order to account for this
aspect of Aristotle’s view, I think it is better to treat it as a presupposition of the master argument
that what instantiates the discriminative mean must be a cognitive subject, for instance a sense
or the intellect.
On what I take to be the optimal response, the reason why the master argument does not
attend to the cognitive aspects of discrimination is because it is not designed to give a complete
account of what it is for a sense (or any other discriminative capacity) to be capable of discrim-
ination. As I’ve argued, its aim is the more modest one of articulating the conditions under
which the senses (and other cognitive capacities) are affected in the way necessary for them to
be the criteria of their special objects; and for this purpose it is entirely reasonable for Aristotle
to ignore features of discriminative capacities that are nevertheless essential to their status as
discriminative. But the generality I’m taking Aristotle to insist on in text 4.1 still has a point.
For, in a different respect, the aim of the master argument is not modest at all. To articulate
the conditions under which the perceiver and the knower are respectively measures of what can
be perceived and scientifically known is a big task indeed. That’s because, in Aristotle’s view,
everything is ultimately an object of perception or of scientific knowledge:
Text 4.6 The soul is in a way all the things that are, since the things that are are either objects of per-
ception or of thought, and scientific knowledge is in a way the objects of scientific knowledge, perception
in a way the objects of perception . . . . Thus the soul is just like the hand, for as the hand is a tool of tools,
⁴⁶ὡς μεσότητι χρώμενοι; seeMeteor. 382a16–21 (= text 0.3).
⁴⁷See e.g. An. 426b8–12 (= text 4.8)
Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Discriminative Mean 150
intellect is a form of forms and perception is a form of perceptible objects.⁴⁸ (An. 3.8, 431b21–432a3)
So the master argumentmust be as general as it is, if it is to describe the conditions under which
both perception and thought discriminate all of their objects. Aristotle takes a systematic ap-
proach to explaining how perception and thought discriminate their objects. To this extent,
then, text 4.1’s proof that the senses discriminate is just one application of an overarching doc-
trine, one according to which the conditions under which a cognitive capacity discriminates are
the conditions under which it takes the perspective of the object-relative arithmetic mean.
4.6 A doctrine of the discriminative mean
Aristotle’s claim that the character virtues are mean states is sometimes called his “Doctrine of
the Mean”. It seems to me that one reason why ‘doctrine’ is an apt label for his claim is that
its theoretical role is in part to unify otherwise disparate phenomena. Courage, temperance,
generosity, and the other character virtues are a motley bunch. To be sure, each is an excellence
of character in some domain of human activity, and each governs agents’ practical and affective
responses to a certain range of situations. But the practical and affective responses that virtue
calls for in different domains of activity and in different practical situations may appear wildly
divergent—the same indignation required by courage on the battlefield may be an exercise of
bad temper in peacetime, and the same charitable contribution may in different situations (or
for different persons) be an expression of generosity, liberality, ormiserliness. The idea that each
of these virtues is a mean state imposes enough order on these phenomena to allow the ethical
theorist to study them at some level of abstraction. Armed with this idea, she can say that each
virtue aims at the subject-relative arithmeticmean in the domains of action and affection proper
to it; that each is flanked by two (sometimes hitherto nameless) vices of excess and deficiency;
and that what counts as the mean or correct practical or affective response at which each aims is
⁴⁸ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ
ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά . . . . ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ
ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴ- σθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.
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ineliminably contextual, such that the criterion for the correctness of an action or affection can
only be its choiceworthiness for the virtuous person herself.
The same unifying theoretical role may be given to the claim that the discriminative capac-
ities of soul are mean states. The two basic discriminative capacities of soul, perception and
thought, are in many ways very different psychological capacities.⁴⁹ Yet both perception and
thought have the power to discriminate the cognitive objects to which they are receptive. To
explain how both capacities share a common discriminative function, Aristotle introduces the
idea that the power to discriminate is a feature of the object-relative arithmetic mean. Armed
with this idea, Aristotle can give a common account of how these different cognitive capacities
manage to discriminate the objects they do. Themaster argument, which in its first stage shows
that one way of being discriminative of a domain is to take the perspective of the (object-relative
arithmetic) mean of that domain, offers Aristotle one way to give such a common account. For
if perception and thought can be shown to be appropriately mean in the relevant domains, they
can be shown to be alike discriminative of those domains. It is therefore not entirely accurate
to say that Aristotle has a single “Doctrine of the Mean”; if he has any, he has at least two. His
doctrine of the ethicalmean states that virtues of character are mean states corresponding to the
subject-relative arithmetic mean of some domain of action and affection. Similarly, his doctrine
of the discriminativemean states that one way to be discriminative of a certain domain of objects
is to be a mean state corresponding to the object-relative arithmetic mean of that domain.
In this section we examine how the claim that the discriminative capacities of soul are mean
states is applied in Aristotle’s accounts of perception and thought. As we’ll see, matters are much
clearer in the case of perception, but nevertheless the same pattern of explanation can be dis-
cerned in Aristotle’s discussion of intellect, which draws explicitly on his account of perception.
Thus, I submit, if we make clear the explanatory structure present in Aristotle’s discussion of
perception, we can spot hitherto unnoticed references to the sensory mean state in his discus-
⁴⁹Forwhich reasonAristotle criticizes predecessors (like Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and others) who
treated thinking as identical to perceiving; cf. An. 427a21–29,Met. 1009b12–38.
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Arg. 4.2.2

Major Premise: discriminative belongs to all mean
Minor Premise: mean belongs to all sense
Conclusion: discriminative belongs to all sense
Argument 4.2 Themaster argument applied to the senses
sion of the capacity for thought.
4.6.1 The senses as object-relative arithmetic mean states
We’ve already taken note of the importance of determining which model Aristotle has in mind
when he adverts to the mean in explanation of some phenomenon. This is especially important
for understanding the proof that the senses discriminate in text 4.1 (see argument 4.2), since
it turns out that Aristotle actually appeals to two notions of meanness in this context. He ap-
peals to the compositional mean exemplified by health in describing the senses as mean states
of the contrariety present in their special objects, and he appeals to a version of the Pythagorean
arithmetic mean when he argues that the senses thereby discriminate their special objects. An
adequate interpretation of the argument must therefore show how the senses, by being mean
states corresponding to the compositional mean, are alsomean states corresponding to the object-
relative arithmetic mean.
I propose to read the argument as follows. I claimed in section 4.1 that a sense must be a
mean state because it is the form and final cause of an organ that, qua organ, is composed in an
equilibrium of contrary qualities (of black andwhite, or of bitter and sweet, etc.). This constraint
applies to the sense for reasons quite independent of discrimination: in order for the animate
sense organ to be receptive to the full range of the qualities it specially perceives, it must be
potentially but not actually such as each of these qualities. For if it were actually such as one
of these qualities, it could not be affected by—and therefore would not be receptive to—objects
qualified in thatway. Now, inAristotle’s perceptual ontology, what it takes to be actually such as a
perceptual quality is to be mixed in the same proportion of the relevant extremes—for instance,
anythingmixed in a 2 : 3 ratio of black to white is colored in the same shade (yellow, say). So the
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best way for the animate organ to lack all such qualification, while remaining potentially such
as its these qualities are, is for it to be composed in an equilibrium (or 1 : 1 ratio) of the relevant
contraries, a position on the scale at which there exists no quality that could affect it.⁵⁰ The
application of the master argument to the senses is meant to bring out that the senses, by being
related in this way to the compositional mean of the relevant scale, are also related to the object-
relative arithmetic mean, for the simple reason that the two means coincide in quality scales of
this type. They coincide because, as we noted earlier, the compositionally mean (1 : 1 mixed)
value of the scale falls exactly between the “pure” (1 : 0 and 0 : 1mixed) values at the extremes
of the scale. So the sense, by being a compositional mean state in the way sketched above, also
exhibits proportional difference between these extremes: it is the form of an organ that falls
short of one extreme (the one corresponding to the maximal presence of some nature, such as
nutriment or transparency) to the same degree that it exceeds the other (the one corresponding
to the maximal absence of that nature). According to the master argument, being mean in this
way is sufficient for having the capacity to discriminate items on the relevant scale. Hence, it is
because the senses are mean states in this compositional sense that they are mean in the respect
sufficient for discrimination, as text 4.1 asserts.
These technical details of Aristotle’s argument are important for two reasons. First, they
show how the conditions under which the senses are receptive to perceptual form can come
apart from those under which they discriminate their special qualities, despite the fact that both
sets of conditions appeal to considerations of meanness. They come apart because a sense may
be receptive to a quality without being discriminative of it. Consider again the case of Sick
Socrates, who tastes the wine—and so, presumably, is receiving its gustatory form—but who
nevertheless fails to discriminate its flavor: the wine tastes bitter to him, when it is in fact sweet.
We analyzed this case in terms of Sick Socrates’ illness, which caused his gustatory organ to
deviate from its mean position: the deviation did not prevent him from tasting the wine, since
apparently his gustatory organ was not qualified in the same way as the wine; but it did prevent
⁵⁰Matters are only slightly different in the case of touch; see ch. 3.2.3.
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its flavor from appearing to him as it is in itself. It is only when the organ is “healthy”—when,
that is, it corresponds to the compositional mean—that it is in a position to discriminate the
qualities to which it is receptive.⁵1
Second, the technical details of Aristotle’s account expose themechanismwhereby the senses
discriminate their special qualities. This allows us to see how satisfying the condition on object-
relative arithmetic meanness—namely, being the contrary of both extremes—enables the senses
to be such that their special objects appear as they are in themselves. Consider now the case of
Healthy Socrates, who both tastes and discriminates the wine because his gustatory organ is in
its proper equilibrium condition. He manages to do so because the gustatory form he receives
from perceptually interacting with the wine turns out to be the same as the one the wine actually
has. In other words, the result of the interaction is that Socrates’ gustatory organ comes to
be (temporarily, and in the relevant way⁵2) exactly like the wine in respect of gustatory form.
This form is given by the ratio of the mixture composing the wine’s flavor—let’s say it is mildly
sweet, a 1 : 3 mixture of bitter (lack of nutriment) and sweet (presence of nutriment). When
the wine perceptually interacts with the gustatory organ, it temporarily displaces the latter from
its mean position and moves it closer to its own condition. Now, the character of the gustatory
motion produced by the wine is a function of its mixture, so in this case the gustatory organ
will be moved twice as much in the direction of the sweet as it is moved in the direction of the
bitter. Because Healthy Socrates’ organ is in the right compositional mean state, the resulting
motion will be such that it comes into perfect correspondence with the flavor of the wine, from
a 1 : 1 to a 1 : 3 ratio of bitter to sweet. Contrast Sick Socrates, who will not come into perfect
correspondence with the wine’s flavor, though the motion exerted by the wine on his gustatory
organ is the same: if his organ falls short of the mean (2 : 1, say), the wine will taste more bitter
than it really is (1 : 2, say), and if his organ exceeds the mean (1 : 2, say), the wine will taste
⁵1Thus I am only in qualified agreement with the suggestion of De Haas 2005 that perceptual discrimination and
the reception of form are the same in number but different in being. They can be, but only in the optimal case in
which the organ corresponds precisely to the compositional mean.
⁵2See ch. 3.3.4.
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sweeter than it really is (1 : 4, say).
Interpreted in this way, sensory discrimination appears to be precisely the sort of passive “af-
fection by the world” that text 4.5 led us to expect. It is the passive process by which perceptual
objects are presented (or represented) to the cognitive subject accurately, in a way that corre-
sponds to the nature of the qualities the perceived object actually possesses. The senses manage
this cognitive feat by exploiting the causal powers of the objects in the environment, such as
objects’ abilities to move transparent bodies (color), or compacted air (sound), or to heat and
chill (temperature). For Aristotle what is crucial to this process is that the animate sense organ
is in such a condition that causal affection in these ways will result in the object being presented
as it really is. The mean in his view guarantees this perspective because it situates the animate
sense organ in such a way that affection by these objects results in the subject coming to be such
as these objects already are.
4.6.2 Intellect as an object-relative arithmetic mean state
Aristotle’s discussion of intellect testifies to his determination to present this model of sensory
discrimination as just one instance of a broader explanatory connection between meanness and
discrimination. This is in spite of some crucial differences between perceiving and thinking.
Most pertinent among these is that, whereas perception is the result of a causal interaction be-
tween the perceiver and an external body, thought does not depend on the presence of an exter-
nal agent, since its objects are already in a way present in the soul (An. 417b15–16). Nevertheless,
Aristotle elects to construe thinking as another case in which the cognitive subject is “affected”
or otherwise acted on by its cognitive object:
Text 4.7 If then thinking is just like perceiving, it would be a type of affection by the objects of thought,
or something else of that sort. Itmust therefore [1] be unaffected, but receptive of the form and potentially
such [as it is], without [actually] being it; and [2] in the same way as what can perceive is related to the
objects it perceives, so too [must] the intellect be related to what it thinks.⁵3 (An. 3.4, 429a13–18)
⁵3εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον.
ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν,
ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά.
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Arg. 4.3.3

Major Premise: discriminative belongs to all mean
Minor Premise: mean belongs to all intellect
Conclusion: discriminative belongs to all intellect
Argument 4.3 Themaster argument applied to the intellect
Aristotle’s remarks are very general, but I believe there is a plausible and attractive interpretation
of them on which the parallel between perception and intellect includes the idea that intellect
satisfies the master argument (as in argument 4.3). On this interpretation, thought stands to
a wide range of intelligible forms as an object-relative arithmetic mean state, and it does for
reasons analogous to those that motivated this conclusion in the case of the individual senses.
The parallel between perception and thinking is at the level of first actuality. This is the level
at which the perceiver, having been born and in possession of fully developed sense organs,
requires only the causal agency of a perceptually qualified object for actual perception.⁵⁴ Sim-
ilarly, it is the stage at which the thinker, having fully received some intelligible form through
education or intellectual discovery, is in a position to contemplate that form at will. Accord-
ing to text 4.7, the thinker’s transition to actually contemplating that form is effected in some
way by the agency of what the thinker contemplates: even though it is entirely up to the thinker
whether and when she contemplates this form, her thinking is somehow brought about though
“affection” by the object of thought. As I understand the passage, Aristotle derives from this two
further parallels with perception.⁵⁵ The first has to do with the “composition” of the intellect in
first actuality. To be receptive to the full range of its objects in this state, the intellect must be
potentially but not actually such as what it can think. On the one hand, this is a further parallel
with the senses, each of which satisfies this constraint by being the form of a compositionally
mean organ. On the other hand, the constraint is exponentially more demanding in the case of
thought, since thought must be receptive to everything there is. In a complicated series of argu-
ments, Aristotle leads us to the conclusion that the nature of intellect prior to actual thinking
⁵⁴Given, of course, the presence of an appropriate medium for the interaction.
⁵⁵See Cohoe 2013 for another recent commentator who also finds two conclusions in this text.
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is nothing apart from this potential (An. 429a21–22), and so must lack a dedicated bodily organ
(a24–27).⁵⁶ The controversial details of the arguments needn’t detain us, however, since it is in
any case clear that they advert to considerations similar (if not identical) to those that lead him
to conclude that the senses are compositional mean states. Were there a dedicated organ for
thought, it would be qualified in some way, so that it would be not just potentially but actually
such as one of its special objects. So even if, as Aristotle acknowledges, what perceives and what
thinks are unaffected by their objects in different ways—since what perceives is unaffected by
being the form of a bodily organ (cf. a29–b5)—there remains an important analogy between the
cognitive subjects of perception and thought.
The second parallel concerns the resulting relation between the intellect and its special ob-
jects. Aristotle claims that intellect is related to intelligible objects as a perceptual capacity is
related to its objects. He does not go into further detail about the character of this relation here,
but if he is alluding earlier remarks about the relation of the senses to their special objects, they
are perhaps these:
Text 4.8 So then, each sense, by being present in its sense organ qua sense organ, is of its underlying
perceptual object and discriminates the differences⁵⁷ of that underlying perceptual object. For instance,
vision [discriminates] white and black, taste [discriminates] sweet and bitter, and so on in the other
cases.⁵⁸ (An. 3.2, 426b8–12)
This passage references both elements of the above-given account of sensory discrimination:
that a sense is of a given scale of perceptual qualities because it is the form of an organ composed
of the contraries defining that scale; and that it discriminates the values of that scale because the
ratio of the organ’s mixture coincides with the scale’s object-relative arithmetic mean. A maxi-
mally literal extension of this account to thoughtwould require saying that the intellect, by virtue
of being none of the objects it can think prior to thinking them, is thereby discriminative of these
⁵⁶For discussion of these arguments see, in addition to Cohoe 2013, Caston 2000 and Sisko 1999.
⁵⁷“Differences” (διαφοράς) here refers to the determinate species of the perceptual quality genus, for example
determinate flavors or shades of color; cf. An. 422b10–14.
⁵⁸ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ᾗ
αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις,
γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
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items—again because in this condition it somehow coincides with the object-relative arithmetic
mean of the relevant scales. If extending the account in this way seems absurd, it is because it is
not at all obvious (and Aristotle does not here indicate) that intelligible objects exhibit the scalar
structure necessary for there to be a mean of this sort. But the idea is more promising than it
may seem: there is in fact considerable evidence that Aristotle regards a substantial subclass of
intelligible objects as scalar in a way precisely analogous to perceptual qualities.
Aristotle routinely claims that there is single knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of contraries.⁵⁹ The
claimmay be taken as saying that contraries belong to same science, or body of knowledge; or it
may be taken as saying that it belongs to the same expert, or possessor of scientific knowledge, to
knowboth of a pair of intelligible contraries. Eitherway, it implies that some intelligible domains
are structured in a way similar to perceptual quality scales. Certainly some intelligible opposites
will not admit of intermediate values, for instance odd and even, both of which belong to the
same mathematical knowledge of number. But others certainly will. An immensely important
class of these opposites belong to biological kinds. It is well known that Aristotle takes biological
species belonging to the same genus to differ among themselves only by degree. As he puts it,
species belonging to the same genus differ according to “the more and the less” (μᾶλλον καὶ
ἧττον), or “excess and deficiency” (ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν), whereas heterogeneous species
are related at most by analogy (cf. PA 644a16–21, HA 486a21–24):
Text 4.9 Roughly speaking, it is by the figures of the parts and of the whole body that kinds have
been defined, when they bear a likeness–e.g. members of the bird kind are so related to each other, as
are those of the fish kind, the soft-bodied animals, and the hard-shelled animals. For their parts differ
not by analogous likeness, as bone in humans is related to fish-spine in fish, but rather by bodily
affections, e.g. by largeness [and] smallness, softness [and] hardness, smoothness [and] roughness,
and the like—speaking generally, by the more and less.⁶⁰ (PA 1.4, 644b7–15; tr. Lennox, modified)
⁵⁹A particularly salient context in which Aristotle mentions this is An. 3.3, 427a5–6, but there are references to it
littered throughout the corpus; see Bonitz s.v. ἐπιστήμη § 4.
⁶⁰σχεδὸν δὲ τοῖς σχήμασι τῶν μορίων καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου, ἐὰν ὁμοιότητα ἔχωσιν, ὥρισται τὰ
γένη, οἷον τὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων γένος πρὸς αὐτὰ πέπονθε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τὰ μαλάκιά τε καὶ
τὰ ὄστρεια. τὰ γὰρ μόρια διαφέρουσι τούτων οὐ τῇ ἀνάλογον ὁμοιότητι, οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ
ἰχθύι πέπονθεν ὀστοῦν πρὸς ἄκανθαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν, οἷον μεγέθει μικρότητι,
μαλακότητι σκληρότητι, λειότητι τραχύτητι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅλως δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
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This passage is striking not only for its similarity to the language Aristotle uses to describemath-
ematical notions ofmeanness (cf. text 4.3 above), but also for its claim that kinds within the same
biological genus differ primarily in the bodily affections (σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν) of their parts,
all of which affections are quantifiable in terms of a certain pair of contraries. For instance,
kinds of bird differ according to the largeness or smallness of their feathers, and the hardness
and softness of their beak. The sum of these quantifiable differences ranged between contrary
opposites constitute the differences between kinds falling under the genus bird, and so at least
in part constitute the essence of each of these kinds.⁶1 It would therefore belong to the expert
ornithologist—the first-actuality knower who can exercise her knowledge of the genus bird at
will—to know how bird species are ranged with respect to each of these quantifiable differences
in respect of which they differ by the more and the less.
It seems that we can apply the master argument to give an account of intellectual discrim-
ination within at least this limited class of intelligible objects. Intellectual discrimination of
individual species within the genus bird, for instance, requires the first-actuality intellect to be
neither large nor small, nor hard nor soft, nor rough nor smooth, nor any of the contraries in
terms of which bird species differ according to the more and the less. For if it were, it would not
be appropriately subject to the agency of each intelligible object within this domain. A natural
way to account for how the intellect achieves such radical unaffectedness relative to this intel-
ligible domain (and indeed vary many others) is to say that it lacks bodily affection altogether.
In this way the bodily “composition” of the intellect is a limit case of the composition of the
sense organs: whereas the sense organs must lack qualification within to the limited range of
bodily affections (perceptual qualities) they perceive, the intellect must lack qualification with
respect to all types of bodily affection, since it can think things that differ in respect of any of
these affections. For similar reasons, intellect could plausibly be said to be discriminative of its
objects. For just as the senses occupy a perspective from which causal interaction with their
special objects presents them in perception as they are in themselves, so too does the intellect
⁶1See Lennox 1980 for a classic statement of this view.
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occupy a perspective from which the agency of intelligible objects presents them in thought as
what they are essentially and in themselves. In both cases this perspective is owing to the way
in which the cognitive subject is unaffected: the sense by being the form of a compositionally
mean body, the intellect by lacking a bodily organ altogether.
These remarks on intellectual discrimination are admittedly sketchy. A more complete ac-
count would require understanding the agency Aristotle attributes to intelligible objects in text
4.7, an interpretive project that would involve the daunting task of coming to grips with the role
of the active intellect.⁶2 It is not impossible that, given a fuller understanding, the structural
parallel between sensory and intellectual discrimination will turn out to be looser than I have
suggested. But the similarities Aristotle evidently sees between perception and thought, as well
as those between his ontologies of perceptual and intelligible objects, seem to me strong evi-
dence that the explanatory connection between meanness and discrimination expressed by the
master argument is not meant to apply only to the senses. What seemsmore likely is that it gives
expression to a general doctrine extending to both of the basic discriminative capacities of soul.
4.7 The importance of discrimination
To be sure, even if the explanatory connection between discrimination and the object-relative
arithmetic mean is as far reaching as I’ve suggested, there will be kinds of both perceptual and
intellectual discrimination to which it does not apply. The perceptual capacity as a whole, of
which the individual senses are only logically distinguishable parts (Sens. 449a16–20), is not only
responsible for the discrimination of special perceptual qualities. It is also responsible for the
discrimination of sameness and difference, both within and across sensorymodalities, as well as
cross-modally accessible qualities like shape, number, and motion.⁶3 Likewise, the intellectual
capacity is responsible for more than the discrimination of intelligible domains structured like
⁶2For an account of agent intellect that retains this aspect of the parallel between perception and thought by
identifying active intellect with the objects of thought, see Charles 2000, esp. 130–135.
⁶3Though perhaps this also occurs at the level of individual senses; cf. Ins. 460b22.
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biological kinds: the domain of intelligible objects also includes things like odd and even, which
do not admit of a mean, as well as items like number and substance, which for Aristotle do not
admit of contrariety at all (Cat. 3b24–31).
On the one hand, the existence of these further kinds of discrimination is entirely consistent
with the doctrine of the discriminative mean, for as I’ve presented it, it only states a sufficient
condition for having the power to discriminate. But on the other hand, we cannot say with the
same certainty that the structure of discrimination is the same in all of its varieties. Aristotle
does attempt to show that some of these more advanced kinds, such as the perceptual discrim-
ination of sameness and difference, depend on more basic modes of discrimination.⁶⁴ Other
kinds he seems explicitly to ascribe to different cognitive capacities. For instance, it belongs
not to thought (διάνοια) but to the rational faculty of nous to grasp items like substance and
perhaps number, which are among the first principles of a demonstrative science and so cannot
be understood in the same way as the truths demonstrable from them. (It also seems to be a
lesson of Posterior Analytics 2.19 that the grasp of these principles originates in basic perceptual
discriminations, which in some subjects serves as the starting point of a long inductive process
culminating in the grasp of first principles by nous—a point that is perhaps also reflected in
Aristotle’s claim elsewhere that perception is necessary for “discriminative nous” (An. 434b3).)
Even so, it is likely that these more advanced kinds of discrimination will not be brutely passive
and causal in the way I’ve described its most basic forms. If so—if, that is, in these advanced
kinds the subject is not purely passive, but actively contributes to shaping the content of the
discriminative episode—there will not be as neat of a connection between discrimination and
presentational accuracy. The subject’s input will have introduced the possibility of error.
Nevertheless, special attention to its most basic forms puts us in the best position to appre-
ciate the fundamental importance of discrimination, and especially sensory discrimination, for
⁶⁴For instance, the soul “proclaims” (λέγει) specific unity “by means of (a) the discriminating sense and (b) the
way [sc. it is discriminating” (Sens. 447b25–26). I take it that (a) is the means by which soul discriminates generic
unity, since special perceptual qualities are efficacious relative to at most one sense; and (b) is the means by which
it discriminates specific unity (since identical qualities will affect the sense in identical ways, as Aristotle goes on
to explain [b26–448a1]). For helpful discussion see Alexander, in De sens. 142.12–142.27.
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Aristotle’s account of cognition. On the interpretation developed here, discrimination is not
fundamental because it is responsible for the subject’s awareness of differences between cogni-
tive objects; to the contrary, this turns out to be a derivative kind of discrimination on the order
of discriminating specific and generic sameness, which in Aristotle’s view depend on prior dis-
criminations of individual qualities.⁶⁵ Nor is sensory discrimination fundamental because it is
responsible for the production of phenomenal content, since the result of sensory discrimina-
tion is not the isolation of perceptual form from its proximate matter in the perceived quality.
Rather, discrimination, and especially sensory discrimination, is fundamental because it is the
most basic way in which the subject, the living animal, gets a cognitive grasp on what the world
around it is really like.⁶⁶ In Aristotle’s biology, animals are endowed with cognitive capacities in
the first place because the distinctively animal form of life makes certain demands of the natural
environment. Animals need to find food that will nourish and not harm them, to evade preda-
tors and other sorts of danger, and to select mates for sexual reproduction. Accomplishing these
tasks with even aminimal rate of success requires the animal to have some way of gaining access
to objects in the environment, and of telling which features an object has that may be relevant
to its needs. If the animal is to survive, it must (for instance) be able to use taste to tell whether
an object is nourishing, hearing to tell whether a nearby animal is a conspecific, and vision to
see if what is circling it is a predator. Aristotle’s insight is that cognitive capacities are the way
in which the animal gains this access to its environment. Primarily, when the animal perceives,
but also when it exercises sensibility or thinks, it “discriminates and cognizes one of the things
that are” (κρίνει τι . . . καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων, An. 427a20–21). In Aristotle’s view, these
modes of cognition consist in part in a receptivity to a certain range of objects. But receptivity
alone is not sufficient for the animal to be presented with these objects as they are in themselves.
My suggestion is that the other function of cognition, the presentation of the objects to which
the animal is receptive as they really are in themselves, is secured by discrimination.
⁶⁵See note 64 above.
⁶⁶See Introduction, xxi–xxvi.
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Basic sensory discrimination, as I’ve presented it, is ideally suited to facilitate this cognitive
task. The objects populating the animal’s natural environment are bodies endowed with a com-
plex array of causal powers, qualities that enable them to move and affect other bodies. One
way for an animal to gain cognitive access to these objects is to make itself receptive to certain
of these affective qualities. For this purpose nature has endowed the animal with organs ded-
icated to the reception of certain types of bodily affection. Nature has moreover attuned these
organs to coincide with a specific sort of mean, so that affection by any one of these perceptually
qualified bodies produces awareness (not to say conscious awareness) of how the causally rele-
vant body is actually qualified. In these cases the animal discriminates the quality of the relevant
body, and thereby gains the wherewithal to tell whether the object is food, or a predator, or a
mate.
Aristotle thinks thatmuch the same story can be told in the case of basic intellectual discrim-
ination. Here, however, the cognitive demands are not restricted to the animal’s survival. They
also include intellectual goals like and scientific knowledge and understanding, goals that are
in an important sense internal to the activity of intellectual discrimination itself. Despite these
differences, and despite the absence of a dedicated bodily organ in virtue of which thought is
receptive to intelligible objects, thought no less than perception gains the requisite sort of cog-
nitive access by virtue of exploiting the (quasi-) causal powers of intelligible objects. Here too,
then, the power of thought to discriminate its objects, to be presented with them as they really
are, depends crucially on how it is “attuned” with respect to its objects.
4.8 Κρίσις and ‘discrimination’
The present interpretation of κρίσις, the process I’ve been calling discrimination, contrasts
sharply with those canvassed at the outset of this chapter. According to these interpretations,
κρίσις consists in some type of separation or telling apart, whether the telling apart of different
cognitive objects (e.g. discriminating white from back) or separating perceptual form from its
matter (e.g. discriminating black from its matter). In the context of these interpretations, ‘dis-
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crimination’ (and its cognates) seems apt as a translation of κρίσις (and its cognates). On the
present interpretation, by contrast, discrimination seems singularly inapt, since on this view
κρίσις needn’t (and in its most basic forms doesn’t) involve any sort of separating or telling
apart cognitive objects. This may be viewed as a difficulty for my interpretation, since at least
one shade ofmeaning of the Greek term κρίσις (and its cognates) is separation and telling apart.
In closing, then, I’d like to respond to this worry by remarking on the shade ofmeaning of κρίσις
(and its cognates) from which the present interpretation draws.
Aristotle clearly appropriates κρίσις (and its cognates) as a term of art in his psychology,
but translators have not agreed which among its several meanings is being picked up on in this
context. According to one tradition of interpretation, Aristotle’s usage draws from its meaning
in forensic contexts to refer to the judgment or decision of a judge, or κριτής.⁶⁷ This interpre-
tation was influentially criticized by Ebert (1983). He argued first on philological grounds that
this translation is anachronistic, since the forensic sense of κρίσις (and cognates) was not stan-
dard until after Aristotle’s time. Second, he objected on philosophical grounds that judgment
is not sufficiently cognitively basic to capture the psychological meaning of κρίσις: judgments
are propositional, whereas psychological κρίσις needn’t be. Ebert proposed that κρίσις should
instead be taken in its basic meaning of separation and selection, which we also find Aristotle
using in parts of the corpus.⁶⁸ For the interpretive tradition that takes Aristotle to be drawing
from this meaning, κρίσις and its cognates refer to processes of discrimination or discerning.
Understood in this way, the sorts of processes Aristotle has in mind correspond closely to oth-
ers in the history of psychology. Understood in Ebert’s preferred way as the cognitive activity
of discriminating the difference between two cognitive objects, Aristotle’s concept of κρίσις
compares with the notion of discrimination or discernment in classical empiricist psychology.
Discrimination in this tradition is a mode of the association of ideas, one that contrasts with
mental operations like comparison or association.⁶⁹ Other commentators who have adopted
⁶⁷See e.g. Hamlyn 1993, Hicks 1907: ‘judge’; Barbotin and Jannone 1966 (cf. Narcy 1996): ‘juger’.
⁶⁸See Bonitz s.v. κρίνειν.
⁶⁹See, e.g., Locke, Essay II. XI, James 1890, Vol. 1, Chapter XIII. Aristotle too has a version of the association of
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this translation seem to have in mind a different, more contemporary notion of discrimination
current in vision science. According to this notion, discrimination consists in the separation of
figure and ground, or the selection of a visual object from its surrounding environment.
Though I have elected to retain the (by now standard) translation of ‘discrimination’, in part
to avoid the awkwardness of transliterating κρίσις and its cognates throughout, I do not share
the view that Aristotle’s use draws on their meaning of separation or selection, nor do I suspect
that his concept of κρίσις finds many parallels in the subsequent history of psychology. As I
noted earlier,⁷⁰ the closest parallel to Aristotle’s use of these terms in his psychological works
is found in Plato’s Theaetetus. In attributing the power to discriminate to the senses, Aristotle
is insisting that, under the right conditions, we can use them to determine how things are in
themselves. To this extentAristotle’s use ofκρίσις is related to aspects of its forensic—or perhaps
proto-forensic—meaning. This connection needn’t imply (as Ebert worries) that discrimination
is propositional (though in some of its forms it may be), nor that it is not cognitively basic.
To ward off these misunderstandings, we could perhaps retain the translation ‘discrimination’,
giving it the somewhat artificial sense of ‘telling apart X fromnot-X’: white fromnot-white, sweet
from not-sweet, etc.⁷1 But if we want to avoid all of the potentially misleading implications of
words like ‘judgment’ or ‘discrimination’, a better translation of κρίσις (and cognates) in this
context might be ‘detection’ (and cognates). This word at any rate seems better to capture what I
have argued to be the fundamental role of κρίσις in Aristotle’s psychology: namely to facilitate
animals’ cognitive access to the objects and attributes of their environment that mean the most
to their survival and flourishing.
ideas: when recollecting, for instance, we can move from one preserved sensory affection to another that is similar,
or contrary, or continuous with it; cf.Mem. 451b15–20 and, for discussion, Lorenz 2006, 148–173.
⁷⁰See sect. 4.5 above.
⁷1Cf. Gregorić 2007, 145.
Conclusion
With the conclusion that the senses discriminate (κρίνειν) the qualities they specially perceive,
Aristotle upholds a thesis that was as controversial in his intellectual milieu as it is in ours.1
For, according to Aristotle, what it is for a sense to discriminate its special qualities is for it to
be affected in such a way that those qualities are presented to the perceiver as they essentially
are: namely, in his view, as greater or lesser on the scale that defines the quality as the one it
is. To the extent that Aristotle succeeds in establishing special perception as a “discriminative”
capacity of soul, his conclusion may therefore be regarded as support for a naïve conception of
sense experience as a state in which the perceiver is presented with the essential nature of some
range of an objects’ perceptually accessible properties.
The foregoing chapters examined in detail the reasons Aristotle offers in support of this
conclusion. We saw that Aristotle’s defense of basic sensory discrimination has two basic com-
ponents. The first is a physicalist perceptual ontology that analyzes perceptual qualities on a
model of “chemical analysis”.2 According to this model, a determinate perceptual quality is a
mixture of contrary extremes of state and privation, its essential nature and causal efficacy fixed
by the degree to which one extreme dominates over its contrary in its constitutive mixture. This
ontological picture of perceptual qualities sets up the second component of Aristotle’s defense,
an argument for sensory discrimination that derives the senses’ ability to discriminate their spe-
cial objects from their status as mean states of the contrariety present in those objects. Aristotle
regards the senses as mean states because each is the form and final cause of an animate bod-
1See note 3 of ch. 4 for references to some ancient opponents of perceptual discrimination.
2See chs. 1 and 2.
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ily organ that, qua organ of that sense, is a compound of the same extremes that define the
quality genus it specially perceives.3 The hylomorphic conception of the animate sense organ
implied by this characterization generates an argument for sensory discrimination, which takes
the form of a general account of the conditions under which the essential nature of a specially
perceived quality is actually present in the affections it produces in the perceiver.⁴ In Aristotle’s
view, each sense discriminates its special objects insofar as it is the form of an organ that occu-
pies the object-relative arithmetic mean of the quality scale it specially perceives—a perspective
characterized as one from which the qualities affecting the perceiver appear as they essentially
are.
Appreciation of these ontological and psychological details of Aristotle’s conception of sen-
sory discrimination brings to light two important features Imentioned in the introduction. First
are the teleological considerations driving Aristotle’s support for the naïve conception of sense
experience.⁵ We saw that, in characterizing sense perception as a component of animals’ cogni-
tive function, Aristotle takes the contribution of the senses to animals’ survival and flourishing
to be governed by the norm of truth or, as we might say, presentational accuracy: the senses
belong to the animals that have them in order to furnish them with an accurate presentation of
the qualities of objects that make a difference to their survival and flourishing. The present in-
terpretation allows us to see this teleological role reflected in Aristotle’s conception of the senses
as mean states of the quality scales they specially perceive. In Aristotle’s view, the essential na-
ture of a perceptual quality is identical to a mixture characterized by the excess of one among a
pair of extreme contrary ingredients. To furnish the animal with an accurate presentation of a
quality of this sort, the senses must be in a position to present that quality as excessive or defi-
cient in respect of the relevant extremes. That the senses meet this condition on satisfying their
teleological role is in Aristotle’s view reflected in their nature as mean states of the contrariety
present in their special objects. For, as such a mean state, each is the form and final cause of an
3See ch. 3.
⁴See ch. 4.
⁵See ch. 4.7 and Introduction, xxi–xxvi.
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organ that, qua organ, occupies the object-relative arithmetic mean of the quality scale(s) it spe-
cially perceives, the unique position from which affection by any one of those qualities presents
it as excessive or deficient in the way characteristic of its essential nature.⁶
Another feature of Aristotle’s defense of basic sensory discrimination that the present in-
terpretation brings to light is Aristotle’s response to rival theories of sensory affection and ex-
perience, and most prominently to a theory he finds implicit in Plato’s argument for the dis-
tinction between perception and knowledge in theTheaetetus.⁷ As Aristotle understands it, this
argument purports to show that the perception (αἴσθησις) of a quality like the hardness of a
hard thing must be distinct from the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of that quality, since knowledge
of that quality would require grasp of the being or essential nature (οὐσία) of the hard thing’s
hardness. However, the argument goes, only the soul by itself—and not via the senses—can de-
termine (κρίνειν) the being of such qualities. For the Socrates of theTheaetetus, this conclusion
amounts to a decisive rejection of the Protagorean hypothesis that each person “has the criterion
(κριτήριον) of these things within himself; so when he thinks they are as he experiences them,
he thinks what is true and what really is for him” (Tht. 178b); for the argument shows that the
knowledge of such qualities are not present in the sensory affections (186d).
We’ve seen that Aristotle signals his rejection of this theory when he claims—with explicit
reference to the Protagorean homo mensura doctrine—that sense perception, along with more
advanced cognitive states such as scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), is a measure (μέτρον) of
its underlying objects.⁸ The previous chapters have detailed Aristotle’s reasons for rejecting the
theory underlying Socrates’ argument in theTheaetetus. Where Socrates argued that the being
of perceptual qualities cannot reach the soul through the senses, we saw that Aristotle defends
a view on which the objective, perceiver-independent nature of a perceptual quality can also be
present in the perceptual affections it produces. Where Socrates distinguished sensory affections
⁶See ch. 4.6.1 for discussion of the details of this picture of perceptual affection.
⁷See Tht. 184b–186e, esp. 186b–c. I defend this view of Aristotle’s reception of this part of the dialogue in the
Introduction, xxviii–xxxii and ch. 4.5.
⁸Cf.Met. 1053a31–b3, quoted as text 4.5; for discussion, see ch. 4.5.
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from the cognitive processes by which the soul determines (κρίνειν) the being of a hard thing’s
hardness and a soft thing’s softness, we saw that Aristotle articulates the conditions under which
touch discriminates what is hard and soft without qualification.⁹ The conditions under which
touch discriminates hard and soft are in Aristotle’s view the conditions under which each of the
soul’s cognitive capacities discriminate its special objects, namely insofar as each is a mean state
of the relevant range of cognitive items.1⁰ So where Socrates alleged that the soul that perceives
through touch the hardness of a hard thing or the softness of a soft thing has not thereby grasped
the being or essential nature (οὐσία) of these qualities, Aristotle argues that these are precisely
the cases in which touch discriminates hard and soft.
As I suggested in the introduction, much of the contemporary philosophical interest of Aris-
totle’s theory of perceptual discrimination stems from the fact that it expresses a conception of
sense experience that coincides closely with the naïve conception, since on both conceptions
the perceiver is presented in sense experience with the essential nature of some range of an
object’s perceptually accessible properties. We saw that, for some contemporary theorists, to
vindicate this naïve conception would be to claim that sense perception is a form of knowledge
of those properties.11 However, it would be wrong to conclude on this basis that Aristotle him-
self therefore conceives of sense perception as a form of knowledge. For though, as we’ve seen,
Aristotle rejects the argument Socrates gives for distinguishing perception of a perceptual qual-
ity and knowledge of that quality, it is not obvious that he rejects Socrates’ conclusion. First
of all, the consideration Socrates adduces in support of this conclusion—that the senses can-
not discriminate and so have no share in the being or truth of what they perceive—states only
a necessary condition for knowledge of perceptual qualities. Moreover, Aristotle agrees with
the letter of Socrates conclusion that αἴσθησις, perception, must be distinct from ἐπιστήμη,
knowledge, since in Aristotle’s view the latter term denotes the intellectual cognitive state of
⁹Cf.Meteor. 382a16–21, quoted as text 0.3.
1⁰See ch. 4.6.
11For an overview of this conception of sense experience, which I call Weak Revelationism, see Introduction,
xii–xx.
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scientific knowledge, which must strictly be distinguished from perception.12 So Aristotle’s de-
fense of basic sensory discrimination makes a case for perceptual knowledge only in the limited
sense that it supports the contemporary view that perception, on the naïve conception, is a form
of knowledge of some range of an object’s perceptually accessible properties.
Still, I think it would be equally wrong to conclude that Aristotle therefore sees no epistemic
implications following from his rejection of the claim that the senses cannot discriminate and
so have no share in the being or truth of what they perceive. To the contrary, even though Aris-
totle maintains that αἴσθησις or perception must be sharply distinguished from ἐπιστήμη or
scientific knowledge, he regards perception and scientific knowledge each as a type of cogni-
tion (γνῶσις). It belongs to a different study to consider what epistemological consequences
Aristotle takes to follow from the claim that perception is a type of cognition. But I would like,
in closing, to mention two areas of further research where I believe the present interpretation
stands tomake a contribution: first, the unity of Aristotle’s conception of cognition; and second,
the role of perception in scientific inquiry.
1. The unity of cognition in Aristotle. Aristotle is sometimes held to have an “implicitly
graded” notion of cognition.13 According to this interpretation, Aristotle thinks of cognition
in two distinct ways, but only in one of these ways does perception qualify as a type of cogni-
tion. Sometimes he thinks of cognition as a sort of awareness or grasp of the truth of some fact,
and at these times perception appears to be a type of cognition. At other times, however, he
thinks of cognition as a state of understanding, in which the cognizing subject is not only aware
of the truth of some fact but is also in a position to explain why it is the case; and at these times
perception appears not to be a sort of cognition.
Some commentators claim to find evidence for an implicit gradation in Aristotle’s notion of
cognition in passages where Aristotle characterizes cognition as a state in which the subject has
12See esp. APo. 1.31.
13The claim goes back to Burnyeat 1981, cf. Barnes 1994. Fine 2014, 189–190 is a representative recent example of
this interpretation.
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cognitive access (γνωρίζειν) to the primary causes and principles of what she cognizes.1⁴ For,
whereas Aristotle explicitly defines advanced cognitive states like scientific knowledge as states
in which the subject has cognitive access to the causes of what she cognizes (see APo. 79b9–12),
we are nowhere told that perception is likewise a state in which the perceiver has cognitive access
to the primary causes of what she knows. However, if the present interpretation of sensory
discrimimation is correct, this evidence is not as decisive as it may seem. To see why, we only
have to recall that Aristotle is a physicalist about perceptual qualities. In his view, colors, flavors,
and other perceptual qualities are in essence causes of perceptual motion and affection; they are,
as Aristotle summarizes his view in De Sensu, features of a perceptually qualified object “being
which it will produce (ποιήσει) perception and actuality [sc. more generally]”.1⁵ Since, on the
present interpretation, the perceiver who discriminates a specially perceived quality is presented
with it as it essentially is, it would seem to follow that there is a way in which perceivers too have
cognitive access to the cause of what they cognize, namely, the quality responsible for her current
perceptual affection.
A full defense of this view would involve addressing difficult interpretive questions that have
been put aside for the purposes of the present study. Chief among these would perhaps be ques-
tions concerning the character of the discriminating subject’s awareness of the essential nature of
the qualities she discriminates. Aristotle seems committed to the idea that perceptual affection
is in its very nature a process of which the subject is aware.1⁶ But special questions arise when
we consider the special case of sensory discrimination. For instance, when a perceiver discrimi-
nates by taste the sweetness of a morsel of food, and is thereby presented with the relative excess
of nutriment that is causing the occurrent sensory affection, is her experience phenomenologi-
cally any different from a perceiver whose experience of sweetness is erroneous owing to some
temporary deviation of the gustatory mean state? Or, rather, are the two experiences indis-
1⁴See Phys. 184a12–14; cf. 194b12–14,Met. 983a25–26, 994b29–30, 996b14–16. For discussion of these passages, see
Burnyeat 1981, 106–108.
1⁵Sens. 439a16–17; for discussion of this passage, see chs. 1.1 and 2.1.
1⁶See Phys. 244b15–245a1; I briefly discuss the qualitative character of sense experience in ch. 1.7.
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tinguishable, even though one of the tasted objects is sweet while the other is only apparently
sweet?1⁷ Addressing questions of this sort might reveal crucial differences in the way perceivers
have access to the causes of what they cognize and the way, for instance, scientific knowers have
access the causes of what they cognize. Nevertheless, the present interpretation at least opens
up the prospect that Aristotle may have a unified conception of cognition according to which
all cognitive states are modes of cognitive access to the causes of what the subject cognizes.1⁸
2. Perception and scientific inquiry. We have until now been concerned with sensory cogni-
tion of perceptual qualities, states in which the subject perceives and discriminates a perceptual
quality by means of the sense specially perceptive of it. But Aristotle also regards perception
as a mode of cognition—and indeed the most authoritative mode of cognition—of particulars,
including the particular substances that possess the qualities specially perceived by the senses.1⁹
This characterization serves in part to distinguish perceptual cognition from states like scientific
knowledge, which are exercises not of perception but of thought, and in which subjects charac-
teristically cognize universals.2⁰ But it also clarifies the contribution that perceptual cognition
makes to scientific inquiry and intellectual learning. ForAristotle, the object of scientific inquiry
1⁷These questions become especially pressing when we consider the role of sensory discrimination in Aristotle’s
account of animal motivation. On the one hand, Aristotle wants to identify both perceptual pleasure (and pain)
and actual appetitive desire (and aversion) with certain episodes of perceptual discrimination; see An. 431a8–14,
cf.MA 700b17–22. On the other hand, the traditional “intensional” interpretation of perception’s role in appetitive
desire squares neither with the present interpretation of discrimination, nor (as it seems to me) with the alethic
function that I’ve argued underlies Aristotle’s conception of the senses’ teleological role. I leave this issue too for
future research. On the unity of perception and desire in these cases of animal motivation, see esp. Charles 2006
andWhiting 2002 (though cf. Moss 2012, 36). For an overview of the traditional intensional reading, seeMoss 2012,
30–41; for objections to this reading and a defense of an alternative “extensional” reading that better fits the present
interpretation, see Corcilius 2011.
1⁸Aristotle sometimes distinguishes perception from intellectual cognition by saying that perception cognizes
the fact whereas the latter cognize the cause or reason why; see e.g.Met. 981b10–13. While these passages might be
taken to imply that Aristotle denies perceptual access to causes, the proponent of the present suggestionwould reply
that Aristotle’s claim is restricted to denying that perceivers grasp the causes of facts known in intellectual states such
as scientific knowledge. In other words, the facts whose causes are not grasped in perception are universal facts that
are made clear in perception through their particular instances, facts such as that fire is hot, or that lunar eclipses
are the interposition of the earth between the sun and moon; cf. APo. 88a1–8. Aristotle’s denial that perceivers
grasp causes would therefore not extend to particular facts whose causes are grasped only incidentally in states like
scientific knowledge (APo. 71b28–29; cf. APr. 67a27–28), facts such as that this (or this fire) is now hot, or that the
earth is now interposed between the sun and the moon; cf. APo. 90a24–30, 88a12–17.
1⁹See esp.Met. 981b11; cf. APo. 87b28–30.
2⁰See e.g. APo. 87b37–39 and An. 417b21–23 in addition to the passages cited in note 19.
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is to know the causes explanatory of observable phenomena, a process that leads ultimately to
knowledge of themost universal and explanatorily prior principles of the relevant domain.21 All
scientific inquirymust begin, however, with what is explanatorily posterior butmore cognitively
accessible (γνωριμώτερον) to us and to perception, namely the concrete particular substances
we encounter in perception.22 To the extent that perception furnishes the starting points of
inquiry—namely the facts from which the search for causes begins—it is necessary for all sci-
entific inquiry (APo. 1.18). But perception’s most distinctive contribution is that it furnishes the
“prior cognition” (προϋπάρχουσα γνῶσις) from which knowledge of the unexplained first
principles of a science ultimately arises. As Aristotle argues in Posterior Analytics 2.19, percep-
tion does so bymeans of an inductive process whereby it “instills” (ἐμποιεῖν) the universal from
which knowledge of first principle arises in the soul of the inquirer (100b1–5); for “though we
perceive the particular, perception is of the universal: for instance human being, not Callias the
human being” (100a16–b1).
The nature of the inductive process Aristotle describes in Posterior Analytics 2.19 is the sub-
ject of extensive controversy. It is certain, however, that Aristotle takes perception’s ability to
furnish the prior cognitions from which knowledge of first principles arises to be rooted in its
status as an “innate discriminative capacity” (δύναμις σύμφυτος κριτική, 99b35). Of course,
the sort of perceptual discrimination of concrete particular substances that could plausibly un-
derpin the inductive process Aristotle describes would extend far beyond the basic sensory dis-
criminations we’ve been considering. The discriminations we’ve been considering coincide with
episodes of special perception, in which the subject perceives an object insofar as it is (e.g.) col-
ored or flavored by means of the sense defined by its receptivity to qualities of that type. By
contrast, the discriminations that seem to be most relevant to the inductive process Aristotle
describes coincide with episodes of incidental perception, in which the subject perceives an
object, not insofar as it is perceptually qualified, but insofar as it is a particular substance, for in-
21See APo. 2.2 with
22See Phys. 184a15–21, 24–25; APo. 71b33–72a5; EN 1095b2–3.
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stance Callias or a human being, which happens also to be perceptually qualified in some way.23
Now, as I claimed in Chapter 4,2⁴ it is likely that the discrimination of common and incidentally
perceived attributes of objects is not the brutely causal and passive process that we find at the
level of basic sensory discrimination. Nevertheless, it is plausible that incidental perceptual dis-
crimination, like the incidental perceptual episodes with which it coincides, is to a large extent
dependent on the basic sensory operations that give rise to special perceptual discrimination.
To this extent, the present interpretation promises to shed light on the psychological basis for
the epistemological role Aristotle sketches for perception in Posterior Analytics 2.19.
However, a complete account of the psychological underpinnings of perception’s epistemo-
logical role would have to take into account two further considerations that go beyond the scope
of the present study. First is how, and to what extent, the presence of intellect (νοῦς) amplifies
the content available to rational perceivers who are capable of the inductive process Aristotle
describes in Posterior Analytics 2.19. The capacity for the basic sensory discriminations we have
been considering belongs to rational and non-rational animals alike, since it is based in the
formal and final causal nature of the senses as mean states of the quality scales they specially
perceive. Aristotle affirms the generality of this mode of perceptual discrimination in introduc-
ing the epistemological role of perception (99b34–35). But it quickly emerges that the inductive
process Aristotle has in mind is available only to rational animals for whom perception can also
generate reason or an account (λόγος), an ability that for Aristotle also implies such advanced
perceptual capacities as memory, the ability to store percepts (99b36–100a3).
Commentators have seen a role for intellect in the operation of advanced perceptual capac-
ities distinctive of rational animals. Some have argued that intellect plays a role in incidental
perception, from which it would follow that the sort of discriminations required for induction
to first principles are not available to non-rational animals.2⁵ Others have argued that intellect’s
23See An. 418a20–24; for further discussion of the distinction, see note 25 of the Introduction.
2⁴See ch. 4.7.
2⁵For a recent defense of this traditional view, see Herzberg 2011, 137–155; cf. Kahn 1995, 367–368. Johansen (2012,
282–283) argues for a moderate interpretation according to which possession of intellect, while not necessary for
incidental perception, provides additional content to rational perceivers.
Conclusion 175
contribution lies rather in rational animals’ ability to form refined experience (ἐμπειρία) from
a body of memories of the same phenomenon.2⁶ For while Aristotle allows that non-rational
animals have some share in refined experience (Met. 980b25–28), these commentators argue
that this sort of experience falls short of the grasp of facts involving universals from which
arise the prior cognitions necessary for knowledge of first principles.2⁷ Both of these claims
are controversial,2⁸ and I take no stand on them here. But if we are right to suppose that the
more advanced discriminations of particular substances available only to rational animals de-
pend on basic sensory discriminations available to all animals, then the present interpretation
could serve as a constraint on conception of the role of intellect in the more advanced modes of
perceptual discrimination. For, whatever the contribution of intellect to the content available
to rational perceivers, it must be limited to what is not already made available from basic sen-
sory discrimination and the psychological operations whereby perceivers discriminate objects’
common (and perhaps incidentally perceptible) attributes.
The present interpretationwould also seem to operate as a constraint in respect of the second
controversy an account of the psychological underpinnings of perception’s epistemological role
would have to consider, namely how, if at all, perception justifies the intellectual knowledge that
arises from it. There is an undeniably empiricist ring to Aristotle’s claims that perception fur-
nishes the starting points of scientific inquiry and the prior cognitions necessary for knowledge
of first principles. But some commentators have argued that there is nevertheless a major gap
between perception and the rational subject’s grasp of first principles. For whereas perception
may in Aristotle’s view be necessary for grasp of first principles, it is not sufficient; rational sub-
jects additionally require the rational faculty of intellect to apprehend principles as the ultimate
2⁶See APo. 100a4–6,Met. 980b28–981a1.
2⁷See Hasper and Yurdin 2014; Gregorić and Grgić 2006 argue for two kinds of refined experience, a basic kind
available to non-rational animals, and a more advanced kind available exclusively to rational animals.
2⁸For an alternative interpretation of incidental perception according to which it not essentially dependent on
intellect, see Cashdollar 1973. For an alternative interpretation of refined experience as a state in which subjects do
not grasp universals, see Charles 2000, 150–153; cf. Frede 1996.
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explanatory items of the relevant domain.2⁹
Again, for the limited purposes of this dissertation, I need not take a stand on this contro-
versy. For all that I have argued, perception may not have a justificatory role in the inductive
process whereby rational perceivers acquire knowledge of first principles. But if perception’s
ability to furnish the prior cognition from which such knowledge arises is rooted in basic dis-
criminative capacities shared by all animals, the role of intellectual intuition would here too
be limited to activities beyond what can be provided by perceptual discrimination alone. In
this dissertation I hope only to have illuminated those basic discriminative capacities which are
available to rational and non-rational perceivers alike.
2⁹See Frede 1996 for an extreme version of this view, according to which perception plays only a causal role in
grasp of first principles; cf. Barnes 1994, 267–269 and Irwin 1989, 134–136, 531–532. For criticismof these approaches,
see Bolton 1991, 15–17 and Charles 2000, 149–161.
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